Roberson v. State

• Decision Date: 01 July 2014
• Docket Number: No. A14A0095.,A14A0095.
• Parties: ROBERSON v. The STATE.
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

327 Ga.App. 804
761 S.E.2d 361

ROBERSON
v.
The STATE.

No. A14A0095.

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

July 1, 2014.

[761 S.E.2d 363]

Catherine E. Whitworth, for Appellant.

Andrew J. Ekonomou, Atlanta, Jacquelyn Lee Johnson, for Appellee.

BARNES, Presiding Judge.

A Camden County jury found Donnie Roberson guilty of two counts of child molestation and three counts of felony sexual battery. Following the denial of his motion for new trial, Roberson appeals and contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, the trial court erred in admitting similar transaction evidence, his trial counsel was ineffective, and the trial court erred in instructing the jury on the credibility of a witness. ¹ Upon our review, we affirm.

On appeal from a criminal conviction, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and the defendant no longer enjoys a presumption of innocence. We neither weigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of witnesses, but determine only whether the evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find the defendant guilty of the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).
(Citation omitted.) Stepho v. State, 312 Ga.App. 495, 496, 718 S.E.2d 852 (2011).

So viewed, the evidence demonstrates that in January of 2008, the then 14–year–old victim was visiting her grandmother and Roberson, who was her step-grandfather. While her grandmother was away, Roberson approached the victim while she was in bed and touched her vagina and breast. During Thanksgiving of 2008, the victim was asleep on the sofa while visiting her grandmother and Roberson when Roberson pulled down her shorts and pulled up her shirt and “started touching [her] ... vagina and ... breasts.” The victim pretended to be asleep and Roberson “pulled down his shorts and ... took out his penis.” When the victim's uncle walked into the room, Roberson quickly covered the victim, sat on the floor and pretended like nothing happened. In December of 2008, the victim told her great-aunt about the incident, and when the great-aunt later confronted Roberson, he told her that he “needed help,” “[t]hat he [had] already talked to God ... and confessed to God about this,” and that he had “touched [the victim] here and there.” Thereafter, the victim's “mother” ² reported the incident to police, and following an investigation, Roberson was arrested for the crimes charged.³

At the trial, the State presented evidence of two similar transactions. As to the first incident, the great-aunt testified that in 1985 or 1986, when she was 14 years old, she was riding in a car with Roberson when he stopped the car, turned off the engine, touched her leg and said that he “wanted to give [her] a little money because he wanted some of this pussy.” The two struggled, but she escaped from his car and hid until Roberson drove away. The great-aunt said that she told her mother and her sister, who was Roberson's wife, but when confronted, Roberson told them that he had never intended to hurt her, and nothing further was done.

As to the second incident, the woman the victim refers to as her mother testified that in 1980 or 1981, when she was about 10 or 11 and Roberson was in his twenties, she and Roberson were joking around with each other and he threatened to put his penis on her head if she repeated something she had said. When she did, Roberson took his penis out

[761 S.E.2d 364]

and put it on her head. She did not report the incident.

1. Roberson contends that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions for the crimes charged because there was no evidence corroborating the victim's testimony and no other witnesses had seen anything happen between him and the victim. This argument is unpersuasive. Contrary to Roberson's contention otherwise, “Georgia law ... does not require corroboration of a child molestation victim's testimony. Thus, the testimony of the victim[ ], standing alone, was sufficient to support [Roberson's] convictions.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Brown v. State, 324 Ga.App. 718, 720(1), 751 S.E.2d 517 (2013).⁴

2. Roberson also contends that the trial court erred in admitting similar transaction evidence involving the victim's mother and great-aunt. He contends that the evidence should not have been admitted because the State did not sufficiently establish that he committed the similar transactions, the transactions were not sufficiently similar to the present allegations, and the time between the similar transactions and the present transaction was too remote.

The exception to the general rule that evidence of other crimes is not admissible has been most liberally extended in the area of sexual offenses: In crimes involving sexual offenses, evidence of similar previous transactions is admissible to show the lustful disposition of the defendant and to corroborate the victim's testimony. There need only be evidence that the defendant was the perpetrator of both crimes and sufficient similarity or connection between the independent crime and the offenses charged.

(Footnote omitted.) Brown v. State, 275 Ga.App. 281, 284(2), 620 S.E.2d 394 (2005). We will not reverse a trial court's decision to admit similar transaction evidence absent an abuse of discretion. Parker v. State, 283 Ga.App. 714, 721(3), 642 S.E.2d 111 (2007).

Here, after conducting a pre-trial hearing, the trial court admitted evidence of the two similar transactions for the purpose of showing Roberson's course of conduct and lustful disposition toward victims of a certain age, and found that the requirements under Williams v. State, 261 Ga. 640, 409 S.E.2d 649 (1991) had been met. Per Williams, the State must make three affirmative showings. Williams, 261 Ga. at 642(2)(b), 409 S.E.2d 649. First, it must identify a proper purpose for the admission of the evidence; second, it must establish that the defendant committed the separate act or offense; and third, it must show “a sufficient similarity between the independent offense or act and the crime charged so that proof of the former tends to prove the latter.” Williams v. State, 261 Ga. 640, 642(2)(b), 409 S.E.2d 649 (1991).

Roberson does not challenge that the evidence was admitted for a proper purpose, but maintains that the State failed to prove that he committed the similar transactions because the only evidence presented was the victims' testimony. However, “it is well settled that there need not be a criminal charge or conviction relating to a similar offense for it to be admissible.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Whitman v. State, 316 Ga.App....