Robert M., In re

• Court: California Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: JOHNSON; LILLIE, P.J., and THOMPSON
• Citation: 163 Cal.App.3d 812,209 Cal.Rptr. 657
• Parties: , 22 Ed. Law Rep. 253 In re ROBERT M., a minor, on Habeas Corpus. B004265.
• Decision Date: 17 January 1985

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209 Cal.Rptr. 657 163 Cal.App.3d 812, 22 Ed. Law Rep. 253 In re ROBERT M., a minor, on Habeas Corpus. B004265. Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 7, California. Jan. 17, 1985.
As Modified Jan. 24, 1985.
Hearing Denied April 4, 1985. ^*

[163 Cal.App.3d 814] Timothy M. Moss, Long Beach, for minor.

John K. Van de Kamp, Atty. Gen., Donald F. Roeschke and Beverly K. Falk, Deputy Attys. Gen., for respondent.

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW

JOHNSON, Associate Justice.

Robert was declared a ward of the court pursuant to Welfare & Institutions Code section 602 ¹ after he admitted taking part

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in a burglary. He was placed on home probation on various conditions including: "Attend a school program approved by the Probation Officer without absence unless excused by parent, guardian, school authorities or Probation Officer. Maintain satisfactory grades and citizenship." This is a standard probation condition in the Los Angeles County juvenile courts.

On two occasions Robert has been remanded to juvenile hall to serve "Ricardo M." time ² for failure to comply with the satisfactory grades and citizenship condition of his probation. In the first instance, the probation [163 Cal.App.3d 815] officer's report showed Robert had received four D's, two F's, had numerous absences and was suspended for a time for refusing to dress for P.E. In the second instance, the report showed one C, two D's, three F's and ten U's in citizenship.

Following his second incarceration, Robert brought this petition for habeas corpus. We issued an order to show cause and stayed future implementation of Ricardo M. time pending our decision. We treat the petition for writ of habeas corpus as a petition for writ of mandate.

ISSUES

The issues raised in this petition can be divided into two groups: procedural and substantive. The procedural issues are whether the March 1984 commitment order violated the prohibition against double jeopardy or the procedural requirements of section 777 and due process. The substantive issues are whether conditioning probation on Robert maintaining "satisfactory grades and citizenship" deprives him of liberty without due process of law because the condition is vague and uncertain or because Robert lacks the capacity to comply.

DISCUSSION

A. Under the Facts of This Case It Would Be Fundamentally Unfair to Revoke Robert's Probation for Failure to Maintain Satisfactory Grades and Citizenship.

In this case of first impression we are not prepared to say a court may never require a certain performance level in school as a condition of probation. When a minor is adjudged a ward of the court under section 602 the court must place the care, custody and control of the minor under the supervision of the probation officer. (Section 727.) When such ward is placed under the supervision of the probation officer "[t]he court may impose and require any and all reasonable conditions that it may determine fitting and proper to the end that justice may be done and the reformation and rehabilitation of the ward enhanced." (Section 730; and see § 727: "[t]he court may make any and all reasonable orders for the ... supervision [and] conduct ... of such minor, ...") Such conditions are valid and enforceable unless they bear no reasonable relationship to the underlying offense, or prohibit conduct neither criminal in nature nor related to future criminality. (In re Gerald B. (1980) 105 Cal.App.3d 119, 124-125, 164 Cal.Rptr. 193 and cases cited therein.)

School attendance has regularly been upheld as a condition of probation reasonably related to rehabilitation and prevention of future criminality. (In [163 Cal.App.3d 816] re Gerald B., supra, 105 Cal.App.3d at p. 125, 164 Cal.Rptr. 193; In re Mark M. (1980) 109 Cal.App.3d 873, 876, 167 Cal.Rptr. 461; and see, Rosenberg & Rosenberg, Truancy, School Phobia and Minimal Brain Dysfunction (1977) 61 Minn.L.Rev. 543, 547-548.) This is so, not because school attendance keeps juveniles off the streets--commitment to juvenile hall would accomplish this purpose more effectively--but because of the well known correlation between education and the crime rate. (See, Serrano v. Priest (1971) 5 Cal.3d 584, 607, 96 Cal.Rptr. 601, 487 P.2d 1241.) Presumably, mere attendance at school without learning accomplishes

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little. Accordingly, although we do not reach the question, we recognize an argument can be made that the outside stimulus to learning provided by a probation requirement of satisfactory grades and citizenship is rationally related to rehabilitation and prevention of future criminality.

Nor do we find it necessary to reach the question whether the requirement of "satisfactory" grades and citizenship is inherently void for vagueness. ³ It is an essential component of due process that individuals be given fair notice of those acts which may lead to a loss of liberty. (United States v. Harriss (1954) 347 U.S. 612, 617, 74 S.Ct. 808, 811, 98 L.Ed. 989.) This is true whether the loss of liberty arises from a criminal conviction or the revocation of probation. (See, People v. Lewis (1978) 77 Cal.App.3d 455, 464, 143 Cal.Rptr. 587.)

" 'Fair notice' requires only that a violation be described with a 'reasonable degree of certainty' ... so that 'ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited.' ...." (Burg v. Municipal Court, (1983) 35 Cal.3d 257, 270-271, 198 Cal.Rptr. 145, 673 P.2d 732 [citations omitted].) Robert contends the word "satisfactory" is too vague to provide a student fair warning he or she is skating on thin ice. Do "satisfactory grades" mean a C average; a D minus average; promotion to...