Roberts v. Babkiewicz
| Decision Date | 02 July 2008 |
| Docket Number | Civil No. 3:07CV01821(AWT). |
| Citation | 563 F.Supp.2d 358 |
| Parties | Dale C. ROBERTS, Plaintiff, v. Joe BABKIEWICZ, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut |
John R. Williams, New Haven, CT, for Plaintiff.
Scott M. Karsten, Karsten, Dorman & Tallberg LLC, West Hartford, CT, for Defendant.
RULING ON MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS
Plaintiff Dale C. Roberts ("Roberts") brought this action against Defendant Joe Babkiewicz ("Babkiewicz") alleging claims for excessive force, false arrest, and malicious prosecution pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.1 Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c), Babkiewicz has moved for judgment on the pleadings. For the reasons set forth below, Babkiewicz's motion is being granted.
For purposes of this motion, the court takes the following factual allegations set forth in the Complaint as true. In addition, the court takes judicial notice of certain records of the Connecticut Superior Court.
On December 1, 2004, Babkiewicz, an officer of the Police Department of Bloomfield, Connecticut, assaulted Roberts inside the Bloomfield Police Department headquarters where the department held Roberts in custody on various criminal and motor vehicle charges. Babkiewicz thereafter falsely accused Roberts of the felony of assaulting a police officer and maliciously prepared a false report containing the false accusation. Roberts was charged in Superior Court in Hartford, Connecticut, with assaulting Babkiewicz. On May 25, 2005, the prosecuting attorney nolled this charge.2 Superior Court records show that on the same day, the plaintiff pled guilty to a charge of Interfering with an Officer, in violation of Connecticut General Statutes § 53a-167a. Section 53a-167a provides:
A person is guilty of interfering with an officer when such person obstructs, resists, hinders or endangers any peace officer, special policeman appointed under section 29-18b or firefighter in the performance of such peace officer's, special policeman's or firefighter's duties.
Conn. Gen.Stat. § 53a-167a (2007).
The legal standard for a motion for judgment on the pleadings under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c) is identical to that for a 12(b)(6) motion. Cleveland v. Caplaw Enterprises, 448 F.3d 518, 521 (2d Cir.2006). When deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must accept as true all factual allegations in the complaint and must draw inferences in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974). Although a complaint "does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiffs obligation to provide the `grounds' of his `entitle[ment] to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Bell Atlantic Corporation v. Twombly, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1965, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). "Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, on the assumption that all allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact)." Id. (citations omitted). The plaintiff must plead "only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Id. at 1974. "The function of a motion to dismiss is `merely to assess the legal feasibility of the complaint, not to assay the weight of the evidence which might be offered in support thereof.'" Mytych v. May Dept. Stores Co., 34 F.Supp.2d 130, 131 (D.Conn. 1999), quoting Ryder Energy Distribution v. Merrill Lynch Commodities, Inc., 748 F.2d 774, 779 (2d Cir.1984). "The issue on a motion to dismiss is not whether the plaintiff will prevail, but whether the plaintiff is entitled to offer evidence to support his claims." United States v. Yale New Haven Hosp., 727 F.Supp. 784, 786 (D.Conn.1990) (citing Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 232, 94 S.Ct. 1683). In its review of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court may consider "only the facts alleged in the pleadings, documents attached as exhibits or incorporated by reference in the pleadings and matters of which judicial notice may be taken." Samuels v. Air Transport Local 504, 992 F.2d 12, 15 (2d Cir.1993). Additionally, Ghartey v. St. John's Queens Hosp., 869 F.2d 160, 162 (2d Cir.1989).
The defendant argues that the plaintiffs claims for excessive force and false arrest are barred by the applicable three year statute of limitations because the plaintiff filed his complaint on December 7, 2007, more than three years after the December 1, 2004 alleged assault and false arrest. The plaintiff's claims for excessive force and false arrest accrued on December 1, 2004. See Wallace v. Koto, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 127 S.Ct. 1091, 1100, 166 L.Ed.2d 973 (2007) (); Singleton v. City of New York, 632 F.2d 185, 191 (2d Cir.1980) () (quoting Bireline v. Seagondollar, 567 F.2d 260, 263 (4th Cir.1977)). Accordingly, these two claims are barred by the applicable three-year statute of limitations, Lounsbury v. Jeffries, 25 F.3d 131, 134 (2d Cir.1994), and the defendant's motion to dismiss on this basis is being granted as to the plaintiffs excessive force and false arrest claims.3
The defendant argues that the plaintiffs malicious prosecution claim is legally insufficient because the disposal of the case against the plaintiff by a nolle prosequi does not constitute a disposition in favor of the plaintiff.4 To prevail on a claim of malicious prosecution, the plaintiff must establish four elements: "(1) the defendant initiated a prosecution against the plaintiff, (2) without probable cause to believe the proceeding can succeed, (3) the proceeding was begun with malice and, (4) the matter terminated in the plaintiff's favor." Ricciuti v. N.Y.C. Transit Authority, 124 F.3d 123, 130 (2d Cir.1997). As the court discussed in Holman v. Cascio, 390 F.Supp.2d 120, 123 (D.Conn.2005), "[t]he majority of decisions applying Connecticut law ... hold that a nolle of the criminal charge may still permit the plaintiff to satisfy that element [of favorable termination] if the circumstances of the nolle satisfy the See v. Gosselin[, 133 Conn. 158, 48 A.2d 560 (1946)] test of `an abandonment of the prosecution without request from or by arrangement with'" the plaintiff (citation omitted). See also Frey v. Moloney, 476 F.Supp.2d 141, 148 (D.Conn. 2007) (). For example, "if some charges were nolled in exchange for a guilty plea to another offense, those nolled charges could not be the basis for a subsequent malicious prosecution claim." Holman, 390 F.Supp.2d at 124 (emphasis added).
In this case, the plaintiff has failed to set forth factual allegations that could plausibly suggest5 a favorable disposition of the underlying criminal proceeding. A nolle of the assault charge on the same day as the plaintiffs guilty plea to another, apparently related, charge suggests only that the assault charge was nolled in exchange for the guilty plea, which constitutes an unfavorable disposition. The court would have to "conjure up unpleaded facts," Twombly, 127 S.Ct. at 1969, in order to state a scenario in which the nolle of the assault charge was not in exchange for the plaintiffs plea of guilty to Interfering with an Officer.
Because the plaintiff has not set forth factual allegations that suggest a favorable disposition, the plaintiff has not alleged all the...
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Roberts v. Babkiewicz
...May 25, 2005, the same day as Roberts's guilty plea, and concluded that the two charges were "apparently related." Roberts v. Babkiewicz, 563 F.Supp.2d 358, 361 (D.Conn.2008). Reasoning that it "would have to `conjure up unpleaded facts,' in order to state a scenario in which the nolle of t......