Roberts v. Chicago, St. Paul, Minneapolis & Omaha Ry. Co.
| Decision Date | 08 March 1892 |
| Citation | 51 N.W. 478,48 Minn. 521 |
| Parties | John Roberts v. Chicago, St. Paul, Minneapolis & Omaha Ry. Co |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Appeal by defendant, the Chicago, St. Paul, Minneapolis & Omaha Railway Company, from a judgment of the district court of Scott county, entered upon default, December 5, 1890, in favor of plaintiff, John Roberts.
Appeal also by defendant from an order made in the same action by Hicks, J., April 15, 1891, discharging an order to show cause why said judgment should not be vacated.
The plaintiff, John Roberts, was employed by defendant as fireman on an engine hauling freight trains between St. Paul and St James, Minn. On March 7, 1890, at St. James, while on a side track, he was caught between the water tank at that place and the tender attached to the engine, and seriously injured. He began this action October 15, 1890, to recover damages, and the summons and complaint were served that day on defendant by delivery to its station agent at Shakopee, Minn. The original summons and complaint, and proof of service, were filed on November 5, 1890, in the office of the clerk of the district court in Scott county.
On November 1, 1890, the defendant, claiming to be a Wisconsin corporation, filed with the clerk of the district court its petition for the removal of the action into the circuit court of the United States for the district of Minnesota, third division. The petition was accompanied by a proper removal bond. The clerk, at its request, made a certified transcript of the papers on file, and defendant filed this copy in the federal court, together with its answer in the action.
On November 7, 1890, plaintiff's attorney presented an affidavit that no appearance had been made or answer served by the defendant, and applied to the judge of the state court for judgment. He ordered that the action be referred to John L. Townley, Esq., as sole referee to hear and report and order judgment, and further ordered that, upon filing his report, judgment be entered by the clerk in accordance therewith. The referee heard plaintiff's evidence, and on December 4, 1890, made his report, stating his findings of fact and conclusions of law, and ordering judgment for plaintiff, and assessing his damages at $ 21,905. Judgment was entered the next day on this report.
On December 30, 1890, defendant presented to Hon. Henry G Hicks, one of the judges of the state district court, an affidavit stating the removal of the action into the federal court, and the subsequent entry of judgment in the state court, and procured from said judge an order that plaintiff show cause before that court why the judgment should not be vacated, on the ground that the state court had lost jurisdiction by the removal. Cause was shown by plaintiff and the matter submitted on January 17, 1891, and taken under advisement.
On March 3, 1891, plaintiff appeared in the United States circuit court, and moved to strike the case from its calendar, and remand the suit to the state court. After hearing the parties, an order was on that day entered in that court, remanding the suit, on the ground that the petition and bond for removal had not been presented to the state court for its action; that filing them with the clerk was not such presentation. 45 F. 433.
On April 13, 1891, the state district court, Hicks, J., made an order in the motion pending in that court, discharging the order to show cause, and denying the motion to vacate the judgment.
These appeals are from that order, and from the judgment entered by default on the referee's report.
Judgment and order affirmed.
J. H Howe and S. L. Perrin, for appellant.
The appellant is a corporation of the state of Wisconsin. It has been declared to be such in three separate special acts of the legislature of Minnesota, still in force. Sp. Laws 1881 chs. 219, 228, 362. The respondent is a citizen of the state of Minnesota. The amount in controversy exceeds $ 2,000. Upon all questions affecting the jurisdiction of the federal courts, the laws of congress are supreme.
The statute relied upon by plaintiff is Sp. Laws 1881, ch. 219. The language is this: "And provided, further, that in all suits and proceedings upon causes of action arising in this state, in which the said Chicago, St. Paul, Minneapolis & Omaha Railway Company shall be a party, (it) shall be deemed to be, for all purposes, a domestic corporation, and not otherwise."
The board of directors of appellant, on May 12, 1881, resolved that the appellant accept the said three several acts, and the rights, powers, privileges, franchises, and immunities granted by them, subject to the limitations, restrictions, and conditions in each of said acts contained. The most that can be claimed is, that for purposes of all suits upon causes of action arising in Minnesota, the railroad company became a domestic corporation; that is to say, a corporation of Minnesota. But, by becoming such, the appellant did not cease to be a corporation of Wisconsin, and as such entitled to remove this cause into the federal court. Railway Co. v. Whitton's Adm'r, 13 Wall. 270; Muller v. Dows, 94 U.S. 444; Nashua & L. R. Corp. v. Boston & L. R. Corp., 136 U.S. 356; Moore v. Chicago, St. P., M. & O. Ry. Co., 21 F. 817; Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. v. Becker, 32 F. 849.
But assuming that the provisions of the statute of 1881, and the resolutions of acceptance, did constitute an agreement or condition that appellant would not remove a cause to the federal court, the statute, then, is unconstitutional and void, and the appellant is not bound by its acts in accepting its terms. Insurance Co. v. Morse, 20 Wall. 445; Doyle v. Continental Ins. Co., 94 U.S. 535.
Within the time limited by the statute, defendant presented its petition and bond to the clerk of the state court, who accepted and filed them. They then became a part of the records of the court in the case. The court was not in session. The appellant did all the statute required; filed his papers in the state court in proper time. It was, of course, the duty of the clerk to file them, and he did it. They then became accepted by the court. St. Anthony Falls Water-Power Co. v. King Wrought-Iron Bridge Co., 23 Minn. 186; Steamship Co. v. Tugman, 106 U.S. 118; Carson v. Hyatt, 118 U.S. 279; Railroad Co. v. Mississippi, 102 U.S. 135; Kern v. Huidekoper, 103 U.S. 485; Railroad Co. v. Koontz, 104 U.S. 5; Manning v. Amy, 140 U.S. 137.
To this weight of authority the respondent opposes the decision of Judge Gresham in Shedd v. Fuller, 36 F. 609. The judge remanded the cause because the petition and bond were not presented to the court for its action; that it was not sufficient to present the petition and bond to the clerk, who is the court's mere ministerial officer, but must be presented to the court for its judicial action. To this position he cites but one case, Stone v. South Carolina, 117 U.S. 430. This case does not support the decision for which it is cited. On the contrary, the supreme court say in that case that upon filing the petition and bond -- the suit being removable under the statute -- the jurisdiction of the state court absolutely ceases, and that of the circuit court of the United States immediately attaches.
The Shedd Case is authority for the respondent's position, but it is directly opposed by the decision of Judge McCrary. In re Iowa & M. Const. Co., 10 F. 401; Osgood v. Chicago, D. & V. R. Co., 6 Biss. 330; Connor v. Scott, 4 Dill. 242.
J. L. McDonald, for respondent.
The entry of plaintiff's judgment is in no manner assailed, except upon the ground that the court below lost jurisdiction, and the cause was removed to the federal court, by the mere filing with the clerk of the petition and bond for removal, without even exhibiting them to the court.
The grounds upon which the court below denied appellant's motion, and upon which Judge Nelson, of the United States circuit court, remanded the case to state court, are absolutely conclusive and unassailable. But we deem it our duty to ask this court to pass upon the question whether the appellant has, under Sp. Laws 1881, ch. 219, and its acceptance of the same, the right to have such an action as this, arising in this state, removed to the federal courts.
The state had the power to impose the condition that the defendant, by accepting, should be deemed a domestic corporation. It is within the range of a constitutional domestic policy to say to a foreign corporation, "I will not admit you, unless under specific restrictions;" for the restrictions to be placed on corporations are eminently matters of local policy. Wharton's Confl. Laws, § 105; Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168; Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, 18 How. 404; Railroad Co. v. Harris, 12 Wall. 65.
The case of Insurance Co. v. Morse, 20 Wall. 445, simply held (the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Davis dissenting) that agreements in advance to oust the court of jurisdiction conferred by law are illegal, and that a party cannot bind himself in advance by such an agreement.
But in the case of Doyle v. Continental Ins. Co., 94 U.S. 535, that court receded from its position taken in Insurance Co. v. Morse, and squarely held that a state has the power to impose conditions.
The entire question whether a case can be removed from the state to the federal courts by the mere filing of the petition and bond with the clerk of the state court has been recently reviewed and settled by the supreme court of the United States. Stone v. South Carolina, 117 U.S. 430; Burlington, C. R. & N. Ry. Co. v. Dunn, 122 U.S. 513; Shedd v. Fuller, 36 F. 609.
By appearing in the state court, and making this motion to vacate and set aside this judgment, the appellant voluntarily submitted...
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