Roberts v. City of Forest Acres

• Decision Date: 21 August 1995
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 3:94-1815-17.
• Citation: 902 F. Supp. 662
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina
• Parties: John E. ROBERTS, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF FOREST ACRES and Daniel Jacko, Defendants.

902 F. Supp. 662

John E. ROBERTS, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF FOREST ACRES and Daniel Jacko, Defendants.

Civ. A. No. 3:94-1815-17.

United States District Court, D. South Carolina, Columbia Division.

August 21, 1995.

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S. Jahue Moore, Kirkland, Wilson, Moore, Allen, Deneen & Taylor, West Columbia, South Carolina, for plaintiff.

Isaac M. Stone III, Lewis, Reeves & Stone, Columbia, South Carolina, for defendants.

ORDER

JOSEPH F. ANDERSON, Jr., District Judge.

This matter is presently before the court on cross-motions for summary judgment. The court heard argument on these motions on July 7, 1995 and, at the conclusion of the hearing, took the motions under advisement. Thereafter, both parties filed supplemental memoranda in support of their respective positions. For the reasons that follow, the Defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted, and the Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment as to liability is denied.

Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). It is well-established that summary judgment should be granted "only when it is clear that there is no dispute concerning either the facts of the controversy or the inferences to be drawn from those facts." Pulliam Inv. Co. v. Cameo Properties, 810 F.2d 1282, 1286 (4th Cir.1987). The party moving for summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, and the court must view the evidence before it and the inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655, 82 S.Ct. 993, 994, 8 L.Ed.2d 176 (1962). The issue of liability in this action may appropriately be decided on cross-motions for summary judgment because the material facts are essentially undisputed.

I. Facts

On February 6, 1994, at approximately 8:40 a.m., the Plaintiff, John Roberts, was stopped for speeding by Defendant Daniel Jacko, a police officer for the City of Forest Acres. Roberts was on his way to a command staff meeting of the South Carolina National Guard, which was scheduled to begin at 9:00 a.m. at Fort Jackson. He was running late for the meeting because he had been at the hospital all night visiting his father, who had recently suffered a heart attack. After Defendant Jacko pulled Roberts over, Roberts attempted to explain the circumstances behind his speeding, but Jacko insisted on writing him a speeding ticket. Apparently, Roberts became upset when Jacko would not accept his excuse, and words were exchanged. Roberts was eventually charged with disorderly person, in addition to speeding, and Jacko placed him under arrest and took him to the Richland County Detention Center. Roberts was released on a $726.00 bond later that day.

Roberts' case was called before a municipal court judge on March 10, 1994. At the beginning of the hearing, Jacko offered to drop the disorderly person charge, but Roberts' counsel instead requested a finding of not guilty based on a lack of proof. Jacko had no objection, so the judge formally made a finding of not guilty on the disorderly person charge. In addition, Jacko reduced the speeding charge from 62 m.p.h. in a 40 m.p.h. zone to a lesser two-point speeding violation. Roberts entered a plea of not guilty to the lesser charge and the trial of that offense proceeded. At the conclusion of the trial, the judge dismissed the charge against Roberts because the judge determined that under South Carolina law Roberts was immune from arrest for speeding, because "he was in the discharge of military duties" at the time of the arrest. Defs. Ex. 1, at 14, ll. 11-12 (transcript of speeding trial before municipal court judge).

The Plaintiff filed this lawsuit on July 1, 1994 under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that he was wrongfully arrested by Defendant Jacko. In addition, the Plaintiff's complaint includes claims under South Carolina law for false imprisonment, assault and battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, malicious prosecution, and negligence or recklessness. These claims are before the court under its supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

II. Discussion

In essence, all of the Plaintiff's claims arise from his assertion that he was immune from arrest under South Carolina constitutional and statutory law because he was discharging his military duty at the time of the incident. Specifically, the Plaintiff cites to Article XIII, § 2 of the South Carolina Constitution, which provides, "The volunteer and militia forces shall (except for treason, felony and breach of the peace) be exempt from arrest by warrant or other process while in active service or attending muster or the election of officers, or while going to or returning from the either of the same." S.C. Const. art. XIII, § 2. The Plaintiff also cites to section 17-13-60 of the South Carolina Code of Laws, which similarly provides, "No person shall be arrested while actually engaged in or attending military or militia duty or going to or returning from such duty, ... except for treason, felony or breach of the peace." S.C.Code Ann. § 17-13-60 (Law.Co-op.1985). The Plaintiff argues that the offense of speeding is neither treason, felony, or breach of the peace, and that he was therefore immune from arrest while going to his military duty.¹

Defendant Jacko argues that he is entitled to qualified immunity as to the Plaintiff's section 1983 claim, because it is unclear whether the immunity afforded to military personnel under South Carolina law applies to speeding violations. Indeed, Defendant Jacko argues that speeding is, in fact, a breach of the peace and that the Plaintiff was therefore not immune from arrest.

The Defendants acknowledge that there is no South Carolina case law interpreting the phrase "treason, felony or breach of the peace" or considering whether speeding is a breach of the peace for purposes of South Carolina's constitutional and statutory immunity at issue here. However, the Defendants cite to a South Carolina Attorney General's Opinion construing an analogous constitutional provision that grants a similar immunity to state legislators. Article III, § 14 of the South Carolina Constitution provides:

The members of both houses shall be protected in their persons and estates during their attendance on, going to and returning from the General Assembly, and ten days previous to the sitting and ten days after the adjournment thereof. But these privileges shall not protect any member who shall be charged with treason, felony or breach of the peace.

S.C. Const. art. III, § 14. The Attorney General determined that "speeding as a criminal misdemeanor in South Carolina, represents a `breach of the peace' ... and thus members of the General Assembly are entitled to no constitutional immunity from being stopped for, charged with and convicted of such offense." S.C.Att'y Gen.Op. No. 79-138, at 220 (Dec. 21, 1979). The Attorney General's Opinion provides a thorough analysis of the phrase "treason, felony or breach of the peace" and concludes that the phrase "encompasses all crimes, whatever their technical classification." Id. (citing 81A C.J.S. States § 45, at 386 (1977); 5 Am. Jur.2d Arrest § 104; Annotation, Immunity of Public Officer from Criminal Arrest, 1 A.L.R. 1156 (1919)); cf. S.C.Att'y Gen.Op. No. 2843 (Feb. 27, 1970) (concluding that members of the South Carolina National Guard are not exempt from arrest for the offense of drunk driving while in active service of the Guard, because that offense constitutes a "breach of the peace" within the meaning of S.C. Const. art. XIII, § 2).

Furthermore, as cited in the 1979 Attorney General's Opinion, the United States Supreme Court has rendered essentially the same interpretation of the legislative privilege in the United States Constitution. Williamson v. United States, 207 U.S. 425, 28 S.Ct. 163, 52 L.Ed. 278 (1908). In Williamson, the Court examined Article I, section 6 of the United States Constitution, which provides, in relevant part, "The Senators and Representatives shall in all Cases, except Treason, Felony and Breach of the Peace, be privileged from Arrest during their Attendance at the Session of their respective Houses, and in going to and returning from the same." U.S. Const. art. I, § 6. The Supreme Court reviewed the history of the phrase "treason, felony and breach of the peace" and held that the phrase was intended to exclude "all crimes from the operation of the parliamentary privilege, and therefore to leave that privilege to apply only to prosecutions of a civil nature." Williamson, 207 U.S. at 438, 28 S.Ct. at 167.

Numerous state courts have reached the same conclusion in construing similar provisions of their own state law. See, e.g., People v. Flinn, 47 Ill.App.3d 357, 5 Ill.Dec. 690, 692-93, 362 N.E.2d 3, 5-6 (1977) (holding that traffic violation is a "breach of the peace" within constitutional provision that exempts state legislators from arrest except for treason, felony, or breach of the peace, because the immunity applies only to civil arrests); Ex parte Emmett, 120 Cal.App. 349, 7 P.2d 1096 (1932) (holding that rule exempting members of the legislature from arrest extends only to civil cases, not criminal cases). See generally Annotation, Immunity of Public Officer from Criminal Arrest, 1 A.L.R. 1156, 1156-57 (1919) ("It is provided by the Constitution of the United States, and by the constitutions of practically all of the states, that members of Congress, or of the state legislature, shall be exempt from arrest while in attendance at a session of their body, or while going to or coming from the place of meeting, except in cases of treason,...