Roberts v. People

• Decision Date: 13 February 2006
• Docket Number: No. 05SC140.,05SC140.
• Parties: Carolyn Ersila ROBERTS, a/k/a Carolyn Wilson, Petitioner, v. The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Respondent.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

Page 1005

130 P.3d 1005

Carolyn Ersila ROBERTS, a/k/a Carolyn Wilson, Petitioner, v. The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Respondent.

No. 05SC140.

Supreme Court of Colorado, En Banc.

February 13, 2006.

Rehearing Denied April 3, 2006.^*

David S. Kaplan, Colorado State Public Defender, Andrew C. Heher, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, for Petitioner.

John W. Suthers, Attorney General, Elizabeth Rohrbough, Assistant Attorney General, Appellate Division, Criminal Justice Section, Denver, for Respondent.

BENDER, Justice.

INTRODUCTION

We review the court of appeals' decision in People v. Roberts, 114 P.3d 75 (Colo.App. 2005), which affirmed an award of restitution imposed on Carolyn Ersila Roberts after she pled guilty to theft from an at-risk adult. The court of appeals held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion or exceed its statutory authority when it included both pre-judgment interest of eight percent and post-judgment interest of twelve percent in Roberts's restitution order.

We affirm the judgment of the court of appeals and hold that Colorado's sentencing and criminal restitution statutes require trial courts to include pre-judgment interest in orders of restitution as a condition of probation to compensate fully victims for loss of use of money from the time the money is stolen to the time a restitution award is entered. Because post-judgment interest on the restitution amount awarded has the statutory purpose to encourage speedy payment of the restitution order, which is different from the purpose of pre-judgment interest, a trial court must impose both pre-judgment interest and post-judgment interest in probationary restitution orders.

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW

While working as a caregiver to an elderly client, Roberts received eleven personal checks from that client totaling over six thousand dollars. Although Roberts claimed that these checks were to reimburse her for money she spent purchasing medications and supplies for her client, she could not produce receipts for these purchases. Roberts was charged with theft from an at-risk adult. After she pled guilty, the court sentenced her to five years of probation and ordered her to pay restitution.

The court calculated the amount of restitution by totaling the amount of money Roberts stole from her client plus interest of eight percent compounded annually from the date of the thefts to the date of the restitution order. Thus, the court ordered Roberts to pay $6645.86 in stolen money plus pre-judgment interest of $2139.31, for a "grand total" of $8785.17. As required by Colorado's restitution statute, the court also imposed an annual post-judgment interest rate of twelve percent on the judgment until Roberts paid the judgment amount in full.

Roberts appealed the restitution order to the court of appeals, arguing that the trial court erred when it ordered her to pay pre-judgment interest of eight percent. Specifically, Roberts argued that the portion of the trial court's restitution order that included the eight percent pre-judgment interest exceeded that court's sentencing authority because the criminal restitution statute provides only for post-judgment interest. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's restitution order, reasoning that a trial court has broad discretion in setting the amount of restitution, that one purpose of restitution is to compensate the victim for loss of use of money, and that the restitution statute must be read liberally to make the victim whole. Roberts, 114 P.3d 75. That court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion or exceed its statutory sentencing authority when it imposed pre-judgment interest of eight percent compounded annually in the restitution award. Id.

Roberts sought certiorari review, arguing that the trial court exceeded its statutory authority by ordering her to pay pre-judgment interest — that is, interest on the amount she stole from the date of the offense to the date of the restitution order — at the rate of eight percent compounded annually.¹

Roberts argues first that Colorado's restitution statute does not explicitly permit pre-judgment interest and second that the provision of the restitution statute requiring post-judgment interest precludes pre-judgment interest.

ANALYSIS

A. Colorado's Restitution Statute Requires Trial Courts to Impose Pre-Judgment Interest in a Restitution Order to Compensate the Victim for Loss of Use of Money.

We first address Roberts's argument that including pre-judgment interest in a restitution order is prohibited because Colorado's restitution statute does not explicitly permit pre-judgment interest. Roberts argues that had the General Assembly intended to permit pre-judgment interest, it would have explicitly provided for it in the statute.

Restitution in criminal cases is part of a trial court's sentencing function. See §§ 18-1.3-603, C.R.S. (2005). A sentence which is beyond the statutory authority of the court is illegal. People v. District Court, 673 P.2d 991, 995 (Colo.1983).² To address Roberts's argument that the trial court exceeded its statutory authority, we must determine the intent of the General Assembly beginning with the plain language of Colorado's restitution statute. Spahmer v. Gullette, 113 P.3d 158, 162 (Colo.2005); see also § 2-4-101, C.R.S. (2005).

Colorado's sentencing statute requires "[a]s a condition of every sentence to probation, [trial courts] shall order that the defendant make full restitution pursuant to" Colorado's restitution statute. § 18-1.3-205, C.R.S. (2005)(emphasis added). Colorado's restitution statute emphasizes restitution as a crucial element of sentencing. See §§ 18-1.3-601 to 603 C.R.S. (2005).³ The General Assembly recognized the value of restitution as a "deterrent to future criminality," as a "mechanism for the rehabilitation of offenders," and as compensation for the "suffering and hardship" of victims and their families. § 18-1.3-601, C.R.S. (2005). As a condition of probation, trial courts must order restitution to compensate victims for "any pecuniary loss suffered by a victim," including the "loss of use of money," and "other losses or injuries proximately caused by an offender's conduct and that can be reasonably calculated and recompensed in money":

"Restitution" means any pecuniary loss suffered by a victim, and includes but is not limited to all out-of-pocket expenses, interest, loss of use of money, anticipated future expenses, rewards paid by victims, money advanced by law enforcement agencies, money advanced by a governmental agency for a service animal, adjustment expenses, and other losses or injuries proximately caused by an offender's conduct and that can be reasonably calculated and recompensed in money. "Restitution" does not include damages for physical or mental pain and suffering, loss of consortium, loss of enjoyment of life, loss of future earnings, or punitive damages.

§ 18-1.3-602(3)(a), C.R.S. (2005) (emphasis added); see § 18-1.3-205, C.R.S. (2005).

The plain language of this statute, when read with Colorado's sentencing statute's requirement that trial courts include "full restitution" as a condition of probation, requires trial courts to include pre-judgment interest in probationary restitution orders because it includes in the definition of restitution "any pecuniary loss suffered by a victim," including "loss of use of money." § 18-1.3-602(3)(a), C.R.S. (2005). The term "loss of use of money" means not only the amount of money stolen, but also the value of the use of the money stolen from the victim from the date the money was stolen to the date of the restitution award. Interest is defined as "[t]he percentage that a borrower of money must pay to the lender in return for the use of the money." Black's Law Dictionary, Seventh Ed., 818 (1999) (emphasis added). Hence, interest represents the proper measure of the value of the use of the money the victim lost because the defendant deprived the victim of the use of her money. In addition to compensating victims for the amount of money stolen, trial courts must therefore include interest in a probationary restitution order to compensate the victim for the "loss of use" of stolen money from the date of the thefts to the date of the judgment because this represents the period of time during which the victim lacked the use of her stolen money.

In addition, a review of the history of the sentencing and restitution statutes supports our interpretation of the term "loss of use of money." An earlier version of the sentencing statute required restitution as compensation only for "actual pecuniary damages" and did not include the term "loss of use of money":

As a condition of every sentence to probation, the court shall provide that the defendant make restitution to the victim of his conduct ... for the actual damages which were sustained.... The amount of restitution shall be equal to the actual pecuniary damages sustained by the victim.

§ 16-11-204.5, 8(A) C.R.S. (1986) (emphasis added).

In Valenzuela v. People, we interpreted this former statute in a case involving fraudulently obtained food stamps to hold that the trial court properly included interest of eight percent in the restitution order from the date the funds were fraudulently obtained to the date of repayment. 893 P.2d 97 (Colo.1995). We reasoned that "[a]warding interest is compensation for actual, pecuniary damage suffered by the victim incidental to the defendant's crime of fraudulently obtaining funds because the victim loses the use of the money involved," and that "[i]nterest is awarded as restitution to compensate the victim for such a loss of use." Id. at 99-100 (emphasis added). We concluded that "because [the defendant] wrongfully deprived the [victim] of the funds, the statutory law [the restitution section of the former sentencing statute] requires that she repay the amount, including interest, to compensate the [victim]...