Roberts v. RMB Enters., Inc.

• Decision Date: 05 December 2011
• Docket Number: No. CA2011–03–060.,CA2011–03–060.
• Citation: 2011 -Ohio- 6223,967 N.E.2d 1263,197 Ohio App.3d 435
• Parties: ROBERTS, Admr., et al., Appellants, v. RMB ENTERPRISES, INC., et al., Appellees, et al.
• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals

197 Ohio App.3d 435

967 N.E.2d 1263

2011 -Ohio- 6223

ROBERTS, Admr., et al., Appellants,

v.RMB ENTERPRISES, INC., et al., Appellees, et al.

No. CA2011–03–060.

Court of Appeals of Ohio, Twelfth District, Butler County.

Decided Dec. 5, 2011.

Sams, Fischer, Packard & Schuessler, L.L.C., Dwight A. Packard II, Robert S. Fischer, Mason, and Theresa Nelson Ruck, for appellants Judy Roberts and Gregoria Guzman.

Ulmer & Berne L.L.P., James D. Houston, and Frederic X. Shadley, Cincinnati, for appellee RMB Enterprises, Inc.

Gallagher Sharp, Todd M. Haemmerle, and Colleen Mountcastle, Cleveland, for appellees Bill and Don Bowling, Bryan Davis, and Bowling Transportation, Inc., and defendant, Joe Brown.

Stephen C. Lane, for appellee Diamond Trailers, Inc., and defendant Diamond Heavy Haul, Inc.

Droder & Miller, and Bradley Powell, Cincinnati, for appellee Dempster Tire Sales, Inc.

Thomas L. Davis, Columbus, for appellee AK Steel Corp.

Michael DeWine, Attorney General, and Robert Eskridge III, Assistant Attorney General, for Ohio Attorney General.

RINGLAND, Judge.

[Ohio App.3d 439]{¶ 1} Plaintiffs-appellants, Judy Roberts, administrator of the estate of Jonathan Roberts, and Gregoria Guzman, administrator of the estate of Rudolfo [Ohio App.3d 440]Guzman, appeal from the Butler County Court of Common Pleas decision granting summary judgment to defendants-appellees, RMB Enterprises, Inc. (“RMB”), Bowling Transportation, Inc. (“BTI”), Diamond Trailers, Inc. (“DTI”), Dempster Tire Sales, Inc. (“DTS”), AK Steel Corp., Bill and Don Bowling, and Bryan Davis. Davis cross-appeals from the same decision. For the reasons outlined below, we affirm the trial court's decision.

{¶ 2} RMB, a business that is owned by Bill and Don Bowling and that incorporated in 1994 to operate a steel storage warehouse, contracted with AK Steel to provide it with intraplant hauling services at its Middletown facility. BTI, incorporated in 1986 to operate as an over-the-road steel hauler, is also owned by Bill and Don Bowling. BTI leases employees to RMB, its sister corporation, to provide the intraplant hauling services on behalf of RMB at the AK Steel facility. Appellants' decedents, Jonathan Roberts and Rudolfo Guzman, were BTI employees leased to RMB to provide services at the AK Steel facility.

{¶ 3} On the morning of March 3, 2007, Bryan Davis, the lead mechanic providing services for RMB, received word that one of RMB's trailers, a trailer that was designed by DTI and equipped with tires supplied by DTS, had several broken wheel bolts in need of repair. Upon moving the trailer to the warehouse, Guzman, an experienced tire mechanic, and Roberts, a mechanic's helper, attempted to remove the two-piece wheel-assembly unit so that they could fix the broken wheel bolts. However, because Guzman and Roberts failed to deflate the tire before removing the interior bolts securing the two-piece wheel-assembly unit to the axle hub, something which Davis explicitly told Guzman to do, the unit exploded, killing Guzman instantly and causing Roberts to suffer significant injuries.¹ As a result of this incident, appellants received workers' compensation benefits.

{¶ 4} Appellants filed suit against appellees, raising a number of claims, including, but not limited to, wrongful death and personal injury based on intentional tort and negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and products liability. Appellants also sought to recover punitive damages. Appellees moved for summary judgment on all claims, which, after holding a hearing on the matter, the trial court granted.

{¶ 5} Appellants now appeal from the trial court's decision granting summary judgment to appellees, raising nine assignments of error for review. In addition, Bryan Davis, the lead mechanic, cross-appeals from the same decision, raising one assignment of error for review.

[Ohio App.3d 441]Summary–Judgment Standard

{¶ 6} Summary judgment is a procedural device used to terminate litigation when there are no issues in a case requiring a formal trial. Forste v. Oakview Const., Inc., Warren App. No. CA2009–05–054, 2009-Ohio-5516, 2009 WL 3350450, ¶ 7. On appeal, a trial court's decision granting summary judgment is reviewed de novo. Touhey v. Ed's Tree & Turf, L.L.C., 194 Ohio App.3d 800, 2011-Ohio-3432, 958 N.E.2d 212, ¶ 7;Creech v. Brock & Assoc. Constr., 183 Ohio App.3d 711, 2009-Ohio-3930, 918 N.E.2d 541, ¶ 9. In applying the de novo standard, a reviewing court is required to “us[e] the same standard that the trial court should have used, and * * * examine the evidence to determine whether as a matter of law no genuine issues exist for trial.” Bravard v. Curran, 155 Ohio App.3d 713, 2004-Ohio-181, 803 N.E.2d 846, ¶ 9, quoting Brewer v. Cleveland Bd. of Edn. (1997), 122 Ohio App.3d 378, 383, 701 N.E.2d 1023.

{¶ 7} A trial court may grant summary judgment only when (1) there is no genuine issue of any material fact, (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and (3) the evidence submitted can only lead reasonable minds to a conclusion that is adverse to the nonmoving party. See Civ.R. 56(C); Harless v. Willis Day Warehousing Co. (1978), 54 Ohio St.2d 64, 66, 375 N.E.2d 46. The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of demonstrating that no genuine issue of material fact exists. Dresher v. Burt (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 280, 292–293, 662 N.E.2d 264. Once this burden is met, the nonmoving party must then present evidence to show that there is some issue of material fact yet remaining for the trial court to resolve. Smedley v. Discount Drug Mart, Inc., 190 Ohio App.3d 684, 2010-Ohio-5665, 943 N.E.2d 1078, ¶ 11. In order to meet this burden, the nonmoving party “may not rest on the mere allegations of his pleading, but [its] response, by affidavit or as otherwise provided in Civ.R. 56, must set forth specific facts showing the existence of a genuine triable issue.” Golden v. Milford Exempted Village School Dist. Bd. of Edn., Clermont App. No. CA2010–11–092, 2011-Ohio-5355, 2011 WL 4916588, ¶ 20, quoting Mootispaw v. Eckstein (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 383, 385, 667 N.E.2d 1197. In determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, the evidence must be construed in the nonmoving party's favor. Walters v. Middletown Properties Co., Butler App. No. CA2001–10–249, 2002-Ohio-3730, 2002 WL 1625682, ¶ 10.

{¶ 8} We are mindful of this standard while addressing the following assignments of error.

Assignment of Error No. 1

{¶ 9} “The trial court erred to the prejudice of appellants by granting the motion for summary judgment in favor of appellees RMB and BTI by misinterpreting[Ohio App.3d 442]statutory and administrative laws governing professional employer organizations.”

{¶ 10} In their first assignment of error, appellants argue that the trial court erred by granting summary judgment to RMB and BTI as it relates to their wrongful-death and personal-injury negligence claims. In support of their argument, appellants claim that the trial court “took an impermissible short cut through this case by finding the [professional employer-organization] laws are only applicable to companies that ‘specialize’ in the leasing of employees.” According to appellants, had the trial court properly applied the statutory and administrative laws governing professional-employer organizations to the case at bar, RMB and BTI would not be entitled to workers' compensation immunity under R.C. 4123.74. This argument lacks merit.

{¶ 11} “When construing a statute, the paramount concern is the legislature's intent in enacting the statute.” Wilmington City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Clinton Cty. Bd. of Commrs. (2000), 141 Ohio App.3d 232, 239, 750 N.E.2d 1141, citing State ex rel. Purdy v. Clermont Cty. Bd. of Elections (1997), 77 Ohio St.3d 338, 340, 673 N.E.2d 1351. In order to determine the legislature's intent, the court must look to the statute itself, and “if such intent is clearly expressed therein, the statute may not be restricted, constricted, qualified, narrowed, enlarged or abridged.” State ex rel. McGraw v. Gorman (1985), 17 Ohio St.3d 147, 149, 478 N.E.2d 770, quoting Wachendorf v. Shaver (1948), 149 Ohio St. 231, 78 N.E.2d 370, paragraph five of the syllabus. In turn, a court must “read words and phrases in context and construe them in accordance with rules of grammar and common usage.” Winkle v. Zettler Funeral Homes, Inc., 182 Ohio App.3d 195, 2009-Ohio-1724, 912 N.E.2d 151, ¶ 53, quoting State ex rel. Russell v. Thornton, 111 Ohio St.3d 409, 2006-Ohio-5858, 856 N.E.2d 966, ¶ 11. A court, however, “must keep in mind that a strong presumption exists against any construction which produces unreasonable or absurd consequences.” Burdge v. Kerasotes Showplace Theatres, L.L.C., Butler App. No. CA2006–02–023, 2006-Ohio-4560, 2006 WL 2535762, ¶ 34, citing State ex rel. Belknap v. Lavelle (1985), 18 Ohio St.3d 180, 181–182, 480 N.E.2d 758.

{¶ 12} The Ohio General Assembly passed Am.Sub.H.B. No. 183, 150 Ohio Laws, Part III, 4949, enacting R.C. Chapter 4125, effective November 5, 2004, requiring all “professional employer organizations,” organizations that provide human-resources management, employee benefits, payroll, and workers' compensation services, to, among other things, register with the administrator of workers' compensation and comply with workers' compensation laws. See 94 Ohio Jurisprudence 3d (2011), Workers' Compensation, Section 75. “Professional employer organization,” as defined by R.C. 4125.01(C), “means a sole proprietor, partnership, association, limited liability company, or corporation that enters into [Ohio App.3d 443]an agreement with one or more client employers for the purpose of co-employing all or part of the client employer's workforce at the client employer's work site.”

{¶ 13} As a review of the statutory language found in R.C. Chapter 4125 reveals, the word “professional,” while defined in the context of the phrase “professional...