Roberts v. State

• Decision Date: 28 May 2010
• Docket Number: CR–08–1229.
• Citation: 62 So.3d 1071
• Parties: Barbara Ann ROBERTSv.STATE of Alabama.
• Court: Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals

62 So.3d 1071

Barbara Ann ROBERTS

v.STATE of Alabama.

CR–08–1229.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.

May 28, 2010.

Angela Cochran Morgan, Fort Payne, for appellant.Troy King, atty. gen., and Yvonne A.H. Saxon, asst. atty. gen., for appellee.MAIN, Judge.

Barbara Ann Roberts appeals her convictions for two counts of murder made capital because the murder occurred during a kidnapping, see § 13A–5–40(a)(1), Ala.Code 1975; for intentional murder, see § 13A–6–2, Ala.Code 1975; and for first-degree robbery, see § 13A–8–41, Ala.Code 1975. She was sentenced, as to the capital-murder convictions, to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, the sentences to run concurrently; to life imprisonment as to the intentional-murder conviction, the sentence to run concurrently to the sentences for capital murder; and to life imprisonment as to the first-degree-robbery conviction, the sentence also to run concurrently to the other sentences.

I.

Roberts argues that the trial court erred in refusing to continue the jury trial, because, she claims, she was not competent to assist her counsel in preparing her defense or to understand and to consider any plea offers made by the State.

The record indicates that a pretrial hearing was held on Roberts's motion for a continuance, in which defense counsel argued that he was not disputing Roberts's competence to stand trial but was disputing her competence to consider and either accept or reject the State's offer of a plea arrangement or settlement.¹ Defense counsel argued that physicians had changed the medication Roberts was taking for mental problems and that he did not believe that she could appreciate or understand the ramifications of the plea offer or a guilty plea. The prosecutor responded that because defense counsel was “not sure [Roberts] appreciate[d] the situation she [was] in thoroughly, ... the State would be prepared to leave the offer on the table, and if [defense counsel] wishe[d] to have continued dialog with [the State] over the next couple of days or whatever, [the State] would be more than happy to do that.” (R. 89.)

The trial court determined that the case would remain set for trial unless defense counsel presented further reasons for a continuance. Defense counsel stated that if the doctors were of the opinion that “because of the bottlenecking of the facts or the change in the medicines or whatever reason, that we're unable to get viable communication at the crucial time, then I feel that a continuance would be in order.” (R. 91.) The trial court then stated to defense counsel that decisions concerning competency to stand trial are governed by Rule 11, Ala.R.Crim.P., and that the court had reviewed the forensic psychiatrist's report finding Roberts competent to stand trial.

Defense counsel then stated that Roberts was apparently being nonresponsive to Dr. Jason Junkins, who had been treating her, so the family called in Dr. Richard Grant. Defense counsel stated that Roberts told him that “Dr. Grant says there are some issues [with] her bipolar disorder that's causing things to be taken out of context.... [H]e's got to get that regulated, not that she can't stand trial, we're not using that as our guidepost, we're talking about the last part of our negotiations stage.” (R. 94–95.)

The trial court postponed any further ruling, stating:

“THE COURT: Well, if I understand it, then, there is not an issue of her competence to stand trial. And while I have not seen a report from either Dr. Junkins or Dr. Grant, given the current state of the file, the argument you've made, the motion that's on the table, I think the case needs to remain scheduled for trial. Now, if you get a report from Grant or Junkins or the two of them and the D.A. wants to cross-examine either or both of those doctors, then I'll try to schedule some time to do that.”

(R. 95.) Finally, just before the close of the hearing, the prosecutor stated:

“[Prosecutor]: Just based on what we read in the file and what we know of the defendant, we do not anticipate there will be any issues of competency that will need to be addressed by the Court, I think if I hear [defense counsel] right, correctly, there are issues about whether or not she's really able to significantly comprehend what the offer is and what the ramifications of that offer are, and it might be that it's more along those lines and as I've told the Court and the defense, we will seek to continue to work through those issues with them if they wish and try to get that issue off the table quickly, either resolve it by a clear rejection or an understanding that we'll have a plea, and we'll let the Court know either way.”

(R. 97–98.)

Three days later, another hearing was held, and neither doctor nor any witness was presented by the defense concerning Roberts's competency or her ability to understand and appreciate the guilty-plea offer. An unsigned and undated letter was produced that “purport[ed]” to be from Dr. Junkins.² The prosecutor responded that Dr. Doug McKeown, a certified forensic examiner, found that Roberts was competent, that she could appreciate the consequences involved in the case, and that she could assist her counsel in the trial. The prosecutor also argued that while Dr. McKeown was a certified forensic examiner, Dr. Junkins was a doctor of internal medicine and was not qualified to give an opinion concerning competency. Finally, the prosecutor argued that Dr. Junkins was not present and available to be cross-examined concerning his qualifications or opinions. Moreover, Dr. Grant was not present and had presented no evidence. Finally, the prosecutor stated that the offense had occurred over two years before the hearing and that the alleged change in medication apparently occurred approximately 10 to 14 days before the hearing; thus, the prosecutor argued, the trial, which was set for 11 days after the hearing, should not be continued. The trial court stated that it saw nothing in the letter from Dr. Junkins that “addresses the question of competency to stand trial within the meaning of Rule 11 of the Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure.” (R. 106.)

Defense counsel responded that as a result of the change in Roberts's medication, he was unable to have “meaningful conversation with her.” (R. 106.) He stated that his concern was that “at some point later [Roberts] may come back and say, well, that's not exactly what I understood.” (R. 107.) He did not believe that she could knowingly participate in a guilty plea. Defense counsel argued: “I'm not a doctor or professional psychologist or anything, I'm just basing it on what they have told me and my personal experience with her. So I'm not challenging the competency, I'm just saying we've not had any ability in the past, in my opinion, the past couple of weeks, to have meaningful conversation. That's strictly what this is about. Not about competency.” (R. 107.) The trial court determined:

“The question, then, for me to decide is whether to grant a continuance to give you an opportunity to try to work out a settlement of this case. The case has been pending a long time. I think in many cases, lawyers forget how cruel it is for the families of a victim when cases are postponed and postponed again and postponed yet another time. I don't think that the mere—that merely because a defendant lacks the competency to enter a plea of guilty rises to the level of incompetency to stand trial, and because I don't have anything before the Court which satisfies me that she is incompetent to stand trial, I don't feel like I have any reasonable basis to postpone the case.”

(R. 108–09.) ³ The trial court further informed defense counsel that defense counsel could speak to the prosecutor as to any agreement as to a continuance.

The trial commenced 11 days later. Following the jury trial, at the hearing on the motion for a new trial, Roberts raised as error the trial court's failure to grant her continuance based on her incompetency. The prosecutor noted during the hearing that “[t]here was no last minute plea offer from the State,” but rather the State had been attempting to discuss a settlement with her for a year and a half. (R. 1491–92.) The prosecutor stated:

“One of the things I think the Court commented on when this issue was actually before the Court right before trial was the observations the Court made of the defendant during the pretrial hearings. And it was clear, I believe to the Court in those comments, from what I recall and I recall from my own participation in them, that Ms. Roberts was a full participant in those proceedings, providing assistance to her counsel, tugging on his sleeve, telling him what to say, feeding him arguments. I think that is contrary to the view that she was incompetent during that time and, of course, the Court will remember on its own the Court observed, but those are my recollections.”

(R. 1502–03.)

The record indicates that Roberts's motion for continuance was prefaced on her alleged inability to understand or to appreciate the State's plea offer and to participate in any guilty plea.

“Due process requires that an accused be legally competent to plead guilty. Chavez v. United States, 641 F.2d 1253, 1255–56 (9th Cir.1981). The plea must be voluntary and intelligent. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 1711, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969). ‘Courts generally have held that the standard of competence to stand trial parallels the standard of competence to plead guilty.’ Twelfth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure, 71 Geo. L.J. 339, 540, n. 1348 (1982). See also Annot. 31 A.L.R. Fed. 375 (1977). That test is whether the accused has ‘sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding—and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.’ Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 80 S.Ct. 788, 4 L.Ed.2d 824 (1960).”

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