State v. Glass

Decision Date06 May 2022
Docket NumberCR-20-0989
PartiesState of Alabama v. James Brooks Glass, Jr.
CourtAlabama Court of Criminal Appeals

Appeal from Clarke Circuit Court (CC-15-348.60)

WINDOM, PRESIDING JUDGE.

This is an appeal by the State of Alabama from an order of the circuit court granting postconviction relief to James Brooks Glass, Jr. pursuant to Rule 32, Ala. R. Crim. P. Glass's Rule 32 petition attacked his April 2016 guilty-plea conviction for electronic solicitation of a child see § 13A-6-122, Ala. Code 1975, and his resulting sentence of 10 years in prison, which was split to time served followed by 5 years of probation. No direct appeal was taken.

On July 27, 2020, Glass filed a Rule 32 petition, his first. Glass asserted in the petition that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to render judgment or to impose sentence because, he said, he was incompetent at the time he entered his guilty plea. Glass noted that the trial court, following Glass's indictment, ordered a forensic evaluation of Glass, which was completed by Dr. Doug McKeown. Dr. McKeown reported that he had concerns about Glass's ability to assist his counsel and that further investigation would be needed to render an opinion on Glass's competence. The trial court then ordered a neuropsychological evaluation, to be conducted by Dr. Randall Griffith. Dr. Griffith found that Glass had difficulties with mental-health processes, acumen and memory, but nonetheless determined that Glass was competent to stand trial.

The State filed a response to Glass's petition two days after the petition was filed, asserting that Glass's claim was without merit; that, to the extent Glass was raising a procedural due-process claim, his claim was precluded by Rule 32.2(c), Ala. R. Crim. P.; and that, to the extent Glass was raising a substantive due-process claim, his claim was precluded by Rule 32.2(a)(2), Ala. R. Crim. P.

On August 31, 2020, Glass filed a supplement to his petition which included an allegation that he had recently been diagnosed with Niemann-Pick disease type C ("NPC") by Dr. Ricardo Roda, a professor of neurology with Johns Hopkins Medicine. The supplement pleaded that NPC is a progressive genetic disorder that often causes cognitive impairment and could result in dementia. The supplement stated that NPC can manifest at any age but that it was believed Glass's condition first presented itself when he was a juvenile. Glass attached to his supplement a letter from his treating physician and two reports containing the results of genetic testing.

The circuit court conducted a hearing on Glass's petition on August 2, 2021.[1] The lone witness at the hearing was Melissa Renee McMillan-Cox, Glass's mother, who testified about Glass's history of mental and physical complications.

On August 24, 2021, the circuit court issued an order granting Glass relief, stating that it had relied on McMillan-Cox's testimony as well as the mental evaluations conducted before the trial court accepted Glass's guilty plea and the attachments to Glass's supplement to his petition. The State filed a timely appeal.

On appeal, the State argues that the circuit court erred in granting postconviction relief to Glass. Specifically, the State asserts that there was no evidence presented that Glass was incompetent at the he pleaded guilty.[2] This Court agrees.

Glass was afforded an opportunity to prove his claim at an evidentiary hearing.

"When the circuit court conducts an evidentiary hearing, '[t]he burden of proof in a Rule 32 proceeding rests solely with the petitioner, not the State.' Davis v. State, 9 So.3d 514, 519 (Ala.Crim.App.2006), rev'd on other grounds, 9 So.3d 537 (Ala. 2007). '[I]n a Rule 32, Ala. R. Crim. P., proceeding, the burden of proof is upon the petitioner seeking post-conviction relief to establish his grounds for relief by a preponderance of the evidence.' Wilson v. State, 644 So.2d 1326, 1328 (Ala.Crim.App.1994). Rule 32.3, Ala. R. Crim. P., specifically provides that '[t]he petitioner shall have the burden of ... proving by a preponderance of the evidence the facts necessary to entitle the petitioner to relief.' '[W]hen the facts are undisputed and an appellate court is presented with pure questions of law, that court's review in a Rule 32 proceeding is de novo.' Ex parte White, 792 So.2d 1097, 1098 (Ala. 2001). 'However, where there are disputed facts in a postconviction proceeding and the circuit court resolves those disputed facts, "[t]he standard of review on appeal ... is whether the trial judge abused his discretion when he denied the petition."' Boyd v. State, 913 So.2d 1113, 1122 (Ala.Crim.App.2003) (quoting Elliott v. State, 601 So.2d 1118, 1119 (Ala.Crim.App.1992))."

Marshall v. State, 182 So.3d 573, 581 (Ala.Crim.App.2014). Here, there are no disputed facts. The State challenges only the circuit court's application of the law to the facts. Consequently, this Court will review the circuit court's ruling de novo, with no presumption of correctness. Id.

Glass claimed in his petition that he was incompetent at the time he entered his guilty plea.

"'Due process requires that an accused be legally competent to plead guilty. Chavez v. United States, 641 F.2d 1253, 1255-56 (9th Cir. 1981). The plea must be voluntary and intelligent. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 1711, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969). "Courts generally have held that the standard of competence to stand trial parallels the standard of competence to plead guilty." Twelfth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure, 71 Geo. L.J. 339, 540, n.1348 (1982). See also Annot. 31 A.L.R. Fed. 375 (1977). That test is whether the accused has "sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding - and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him." Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 80 S.Ct. 788, 4 L.Ed.2d 824 (1960).'
"Eathorne v. State, 448 So.2d 445, 448 (Ala.Crim.App.1984). Thus, the same guidelines or standard applies to determining competency to stand trial as does to determining competence to plead guilty."

Roberts v. State, 62 So.3d 1071, 1076 (Ala.Crim.App.2010). Glass's claim is a substantive due-process claim, and it implicates the jurisdiction of the trial court. See Nicks v. State, 783 So.2d 895, 908 (Ala.Crim.App.1999). Importantly, there is no presumption of incompetency. Id. (quoting Medina v. Singletary, 59 F.3d 1095, 1106 (11th Cir. 1995)). As the petitioner, Glass bore the burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that, at the time he pleaded guilty, he lacked the ability to assist in his defense by consulting with counsel with a reasonable degree of rational understanding of the facts and the legal proceedings against him. Rules 32.3 and 11.1, Ala. R. Crim. P.

The circuit court stated in its order granting relief that it had relied on three specific sources of evidence: McMillan-Cox's testimony, the mental evaluations that had been conducted by Dr. McKeown and Dr. Griffith, and the attachments to Glass's petition. These sources will be addressed in turn.

First, the circuit court relied in part on the testimony of McMillan-Cox. But, even accepting all of her testimony as true, she failed to offer any new evidence that would shed light on the issue before the circuit court: whether Glass, at the time he pleaded guilty, was competent. Postconviction counsel attempted to elicit such evidence, as McMillan-Cox was specifically asked several times to provide testimony relevant to Glass's claim. Her answers to these questions are set out here in full:

"Q: All right. And, [McMillan-Cox], dating back - it's been about five or so years or six or seven years since the incident, but the plea has been a little over five years, can you tell the Court, can you tell His Honor maybe what [Glass's] mental state, how he acted, his speech his memory was at these stages of his life?
"A: Okay. Well, he had a normal birth. He was slow at speaking and Niemann-Pick affects your speech, your eye movements, it causes brain atrophy generally of the cerebellum, but his is the entire brain. It affects your gait, your swallowing. His hands are beginning to become clubbed, so it affects your muscular atrophy.
"He's mainly on one side, which is a little bit better, but there's where it's kind of at. So I noticed through the years from the time he was little. He was a little slow speaking, a little slow walking, but I didn't think anything about it at that time. And then at age six, when he was in the first grade, he started severely stuttering, and I had him in speech therapy from six to twelve and there was nothing that they could do. They didn't know what to do at that point.
"And so over the years, I know when he was in high school, he struggled academically. He passed but it was a struggle the whole time. So he's had tutors, he's been to psychologists to try to get through any of the difficulties that he had, but we still were not able to pinpoint it. We know something was wrong but couldn't pinpoint it.
"And then when he got into adolescence when he was 16, I noticed the hands. He didn't have control over his little finger or his middle finger. They got real stiff. Also, this is when I noticed the gait issue as it was slowly but surely getting worse until where he is now.
"And then, the memory thing started. He was out of high school and he couldn't seem to focus on any one thing. He was working, and finally got fired from Target [retail store] because he left the keys in the back door three times. I can't tell you how many times he left his keys in his car the same day, locked them and had to get somebody. So it's as if he didn't remember things, and it was this way with school.
"Q: So around, like I
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