Roberts v. State

• Decision Date: 14 February 2013
• Docket Number: No. CR 03–780.,CR 03–780.
• Parties: Karl Douglas ROBERTS, Petitioner v. STATE of Arkansas, Respondent.
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

2013 Ark. 57

426 S.W.3d 372

Karl Douglas ROBERTS, Petitioner

v.STATE of Arkansas, Respondent.

No. CR 03–780.

Supreme Court of Arkansas.

Feb. 14, 2013.

Deborah Anne Czuba, for appellant.

Dustin McDaniel, Att'y Gen., by Laura Shue, Ass't Att'y Gen., for appellee.

PAUL E. DANIELSON, Justice.

Petitioner Karl Roberts moves this court to reopen the proceedings and to reinvest the circuit court with jurisdiction to hear his postconviction petition pursuant to Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 37.5 (2012). ¹ While Roberts previously waived his right to seek postconviction relief, he now seeks to rescind that waiver and asserts that a mandatory review should be extended to postconviction proceedings in death cases; his prior waiver was invalid and involuntary; and a rejection of his attempt to rescind his waiver would violate “the solid footing doctrine.” We grant Roberts's motion.

In May 2000, Roberts was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to the death penalty for the murder of twelve-year-old Andria Brewer. Following his conviction, Roberts filed a waiver of his right to appeal and postconviction review. A hearing was held on Roberts's waiver on July 19, 2000, and the circuit court found that Roberts had the capacity to knowingly and intelligently waive his appeal rights. We conducted an automatic review of the entire record pursuant to State v. Robbins, 339 Ark. 379, 5 S.W.3d 51 (1999), and we affirmed Roberts's waiver of his right to appeal, as well as his conviction and sentence. See Roberts v. State, 352 Ark. 489, 102 S.W.3d 482 (2003).

On May 20, 2003, the circuit court held a hearing pursuant to Ark. R.Crim. P. 37.5. At the hearing, Roberts appeared pro se and waived his right to seek postconviction relief. The circuit court concluded that Roberts had the capacity and was clearly competent to knowingly and intelligently do so, and it found so in its order. The State moved this court to review the record of Roberts's waiver hearing, and this court granted the motion, affirming the circuit court's findings. See State v. Roberts, 354 Ark. 399, 123 S.W.3d 881 (2003) (per curiam).

On January 6, 2004, Roberts moved for a stay of execution in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas, which was granted.² Roberts then filed, on July 16, 2004, a petition for writ of habeas corpus with the federal district court. However, in 2007, the federal district court stayed Roberts's case and held it in abeyance, directing Roberts to seek relief in the state courts regarding all unexhausted claims, by February 1, 2008. See Roberts v. Norris, 526 F.Supp.2d 926 (E.D.Ark.2007).

On February 1, 2008, Roberts filed in the circuit court a petition for postconviction relief, which the circuit court denied without an evidentiary hearing. Roberts appealed from the circuit court's order, and we dismissed the appeal without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction, holding that “where the ninety-day filing period under Rule 37.5(e) has expired and a waiver of postconviction relief has been affirmed by this court, a petitioner must file the appropriate motion to reopen postconviction proceedings before a Rule 37 petition can be brought in circuit court.” Roberts v. State, 2011 Ark. 502, at 9, 385 S.W.3d 792, 794. Roberts then filed on January 3, 2012, the instant motion to reopen the proceedings and to reinvest the circuit court with jurisdiction. We directed that the motion be submitted as a case, and a briefing schedule was established.

Roberts asserts several bases on which this court should reopen his postconviction proceedings and reinvest jurisdiction in the circuit court. Roberts first contends that this court should permit him to simply rescind his prior waiver, claiming that this court twice permitted previous appellants to pursue postconviction relief after a waiver of postconviction review. He further contends, alternatively, that if the rescission of his waiver is insufficient to grant reopening, this court should grant his motion and establish a mandatory postconviction proceeding and review for death-penalty defendants who waive their postconviction rights. Roberts also argues that his motion should be granted because his waiver of his postconviction rights was invalid. Finally, he claims that, because acceptance of his prior waiver violates what he deems “the solid footing doctrine,” this court should grant his motion to reopen the proceedings.

The State counters that Roberts's attempt to rescind his waiver is untimely, averring that Roberts's time in which to file a petition pursuant to Rule 37.5 has long since expired. It urges that Roberts's case is distinguishable from other cases in which we have permitted the rescission of a waiver of postconviction rights, contending that a petitioner's belated change of heart is not a sufficient ground on which to frustrate the finality of judgment. The State further rejects Roberts's efforts to persuade this court to adopt and engage in mandatory postconviction review. The State maintains that the record supports a finding that Roberts's waiver of postconviction relief was valid, in light of the full and fair hearings before the circuit court. Finally, the State contends, acceptance of Roberts's waiver in no way violates what Roberts terms “the solid footing doctrine.” For these reasons, the State claims, Roberts's motion to reopen the proceedings should be denied.

Roberts first avers that this court should grant his motion to reopen based simply on the fact that he has now rescinded his prior waiver of his postconviction rights. He points to this court's decisions in the Greene and Robbins cases, claiming that in both instances, we allowed Greene and Robbins to rescind their previously affirmed waivers of postconviction review. Roberts's reliance on these two lines of cases is misplaced, however, as both cases differ procedurally from Roberts's.

In Greene's case, this court did affirm the circuit court's findings of his competency to waive his appellate and postconviction rights, which he waived on July 2, 1999. See State v. Greene, 338 Ark. 806, 1 S.W.3d 442 (1999) (per curiam). However, prior to that decision, we had vacated Greene's sentence and remanded his case for resentencing. See Greene v. State, 335 Ark. 1, 977 S.W.2d 192 (1998). In his appeal from that resentencing, wherein we affirmed his sentence of death, it was noted in our supplemental opinion on denial of rehearing that Greene had rescinded his waiver on December 2, 1999, which was after our affirmation of the waiver but prior to our hearing his appeal from resentencing. See Greene v. State, 343 Ark. 526, 37 S.W.3d 579 (2001). Once Greene's sentence of death was affirmed, he was permitted to seek postconviction relief, as set forth in Ark. R.Crim. P. 37.5(b) (2001). Thus, while Greene had rescinded his waiver, his postconviction petition, more importantly, was timely.

The same holds true in the Robbins line of cases. There, we granted, by formal order of January 14, 1999, the State's motion for review seeking affirmation of Robbins's waiver of postconviction relief. Upon the State's motion for clarification of that order, we held that “[w]hen we granted the State's motion for review ..., we implicitly upheld the trial court's finding that Mr. Robbins knowingly and intelligently waived his right to appointment of an attorney under Rule 37.5.” State v. Robbins, 336 Ark. 377, 378, 985 S.W.2d 296, 297 (1999) (per curiam). We later recalled the mandate of January 14, 1999, on the motion of Robbins's mother, who filed a next-friend petition seeking mandatory review of all death-penalty cases.³See State v. Robbins, 337 Ark. 227, 987 S.W.2d 709 (1999) (per curiam). Following our automatic review of Robbins's conviction and sentence, which were affirmed in State v. Robbins, 342 Ark. 262, 27 S.W.3d 419 (2000), Robbins petitioned this court to reopen his case, and we granted his motion for the reasons set forth in Robbins v. State, 353 Ark. 556, 114 S.W.3d 217 (2003), and ordered the record supplemented. We subsequently affirmed Robbins's death sentence. See Robbins v. State, 356 Ark. 225, 149 S.W.3d 871 (2004). Following our affirmance, Robbins filed a motion for clarification concerning his postconviction rights, and we granted the motion by letter order of April 8, 2004, stating that Robbins was “permitted to pursue post-conviction relief under Ark. R.Crim. P. 37.5.” Again, as was the case in Greene, Robbins's previous waiver of postconviction relief was set aside by virtue of our recall of the affirmation-of-waiver mandate, but in addition, a postconviction petition was permitted under our rules following our affirmation of Robbins's sentence. SeeArk. R.Crim. P. 37.5(b) (2004).

In contrast, Roberts's conviction and sentence were affirmed by this court in Roberts, 352 Ark. 489, 102 S.W.3d 482, wherein we also affirmed the circuit court's finding that Roberts knowingly and intelligently waived his rights of appeal. In accordance with Ark. R.Crim. P. 37.5(b) (2003), the circuit court held a hearing, at which it found that Roberts waived his postconviction rights. See Roberts, 354 Ark. 399, 123 S.W.3d 881. This court then granted the State's motion to review the proceedings and affirmed the circuit court's findings. See id. While Roberts filed a petition for postconviction relief in the circuit court in 2008, which was denied, we dismissed his appeal from that denial without prejudice, holding that he was required to first file a petition to reopen his case with this court. SeeRoberts, 2011 Ark. 502, 385 S.W.3d 792. It is only now that Roberts attempts to rescind his waiver, and he claims that his waiver alone should serve as the basis for reopening his case. But it was not the mere rescission of waiver that permitted Greene and Robbins to file postconviction petitions, it was also the fact that in both of those cases, the parties were procedurally permitted to file for...