Robbins v. State

• Decision Date: 12 June 2003
• Docket Number: No. CR 98-1394.,CR 98-1394.
• Citation: 353 Ark. 556,114 S.W.3d 217
• Parties: Robert ROBBINS v. STATE of Arkansas.
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

114 S.W.3d 217

353 Ark. 556

Robert ROBBINS v. STATE of Arkansas.

No. CR 98-1394.

Supreme Court of Arkansas.

June 12, 2003.

Dissenting Opinion upon Grant of Rehearing September 24, 2003.

Craig Lambert, Little Rock, for appellant.

Mark Pryor, Att'y Gen., by: Jeffrey A. Weber, Ass't Att'y Gen., for appellee.

ROBERT L. BROWN, Justice.

Petitioner Robert Robbins petitions this court to reopen his case in which this court affirmed his conviction for capital murder and affirmed his death sentence. His basis for reopening his case is that an error occurred in the jury's completion of his sentencing forms and that a decision of this court, Willett v. State, 322 Ark. 613, 911 S.W.2d 937 (1995), requires resentencing. He further argues that this court mistakenly missed the error in the jury's completion of the sentencing forms in the direct appeal of this case, which was prepared by amicus counsel appointed by this court and not by retained or appointed counsel for Robbins. See State v. Robbins, 342 Ark. 262, 27 S.W.3d 419 (2000).

The facts are that Robbins killed his ex-girlfriend, Bethany White, in November 1997, by strangling and suffocating her. The State charged him with capital murder and sought the death penalty. The circuit court adjudged him competent to stand trial. Robbins represented himself at trial with the assistance of court-appointed standby counsel and at all times admitted guilt and sought the death penalty for himself. He even attempted to plea-bargain for the death penalty. The jury convicted him of capital murder and, following the sentencing phase of the trial, returned a death sentence.

This case has resulted in a contorted history and multiple appeals. There have been five appellate reviews by this court. Initially, Robbins sought to waive his right to appeal his conviction and sentence to this court. This court, initially, held that Robbins had successfully waived his right to an appeal, see State v. Robbins, 335 Ark. 380, 985 S.W.2d 293 (1998) (per curiam) (Robbins I), and his right to seek Rule 37 post-conviction relief, see State v. Robbins, 336 Ark. 377, 985 S.W.2d 296 (1999) (per curiam) (Robbins II). Robbins's mother then filed a petition as his next friend and asked this court to recall the mandate, for a stay of execution, and for a re-examination of the case. The State opposed the petition on all fronts, including the mother's lack of standing, and argued that Franz v. State, 296 Ark. 181, 754 S.W.2d 839 (1988), which declined to require mandatory appeals in death penalty cases, controlled. This court recalled the mandate, stayed the execution, and ordered briefing from the State and Robbins. See State v. Robbins, 337 Ark. 227, 987 S.W.2d 709 (1999) (per curiam) (Robbins III).

After considering the arguments of the parties, we overruled Franz v. State, supra, in part and held that in cases where an appellant seeks the death penalty, it was this court's duty to conduct an independent review of the record to determine whether prejudicial error occurred under Arkansas Rules of Appellate Procedure-Criminal 4-3(h), whether any Wicks violations occurred during trial, see Wicks v. State, 270 Ark. 781, 606 S.W.2d 366 (1980) and whether "fundamental safeguards" were in place during the trial. See State v. Robbins, 339 Ark. 379, 386, 5 S.W.3d 51, 55 (1999) (Robbins IV). To discharge this duty, this court appointed amicus counsel to review the record and assist this court in our review. See id.¹

Amicus counsel filed a brief pursuant to this court's direction. In State v. Robbins, 342 Ark. 262, 27 S.W.3d 419 (2000) (Robbins V), this court held that no Rule 4-3(h) errors, Wicks errors, or errors implicating "other fundamental safeguards" occurred during the trial. This court affirmed Robbins's capital murder conviction and death sentence and dissolved the stay of execution. Following Robbins V, Robbins began, for the first time, to contest his death sentence. He engaged legal counsel to pursue habeas corpus relief in federal district court. Robbins argued in the subsequent federal proceeding on his habeas corpus petition that an inconsistency in the jury's verdict forms violated his constitutional rights under this court's decision in Willett v. State, supra. The State responded that Robbins had exhausted his state remedies by not pursuing a petition for rehearing and that the mandate in the case had issued in the case, foreclosing additional review. The federal district court dismissed Robbins's habeas corpus petition without prejudice on the basis that Robbins had not exhausted his state remedies. Specifically, the federal district court noted that state courts had not examined Robbins's inconsistency-in-the-verdict-forms argument under Willett v. State, supra, and that he "may pursue his state remedies, if any."

Following dismissal of the federal habeas corpus matter, Robbins filed his petition to reopen his case in this court. The question of whether this court has the authority to re-open this case embraces not only this court's jurisdiction but its inherent authority. Robbins first argues that our holding in Robbins IV requires that the court re-open the case. He contends that the meaning of Robbins IV is that in cases where a criminal defendant seeks the death penalty for himself, our court conducts an independent review to determine if "fundamental error" occurred during trial. He argues that just such an error, a violation of Robbins's constitutional rights under Willett v. State, supra, occurred in this case. It does not matter, he claims, that this error was overlooked in Robbins V. If the error is fundamental in magnitude, he maintains, it does not become any less fundamental by our handing down an opinion that did not address it. Robbins cites this court to Cloird v. State, 349 Ark. 33, 76 S.W.3d 813 (2002), in which we held that this court can reinvest the trial court with jurisdiction to address fundamental errors under the doctrine of error coram nobis. Thus, he contends, this court has the authority to reinvest itself with jurisdiction to address any fundamental error.

The State answers with both a procedural-bar argument and an implicit-holding argument. The State points out that the court's mandate from Robbins V has long since issued and that no petition for rehearing was filed. The State further urges that a petition for rehearing is the only proper procedural vehicle for questioning the validity of this court's decision. Because Robbins failed to petition the court for rehearing, the State claims, he has waived his right to assert a Willett error at this late date.

The State also contends in its implicit-holding argument that this court's silence in Robbins V on the jury-forms issue indicates that this court, indeed, considered the jury forms in this court's full review and found no Willett problem. The State emphasizes that our review in Robbins V was aided by a neutral amicus attorney and the record in this case was subjected to a Rule 4-3(h) review, a Wicks review, and a "fundamental error" analysis. This high level of scrutiny, the State urges, undoubtedly encompassed the precise error that Robbins now wants this court to address. After such a searching analysis, the State concludes that the opinion's silence as to a Willett issue is itself proof that this court did not believe that any such issue was present in the case. At oral argument, counsel for the State admitted that this implicit-holding argument was not made in federal district court and that the State's sole argument was that the Willett issue was procedurally barred due to failure to raise it in a petition for rehearing.

There is no question but that the death penalty is a unique punishment that demands unique attention to procedural safeguards. The United States Supreme Court has made that abundantly clear. See, e.g., Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 329, 105 S.Ct. 2633, 86 L.Ed.2d 231 (1985) ("This Court has repeatedly said that under the Eighth Amendment `the qualitative difference of death from all other punishments requires a correspondingly greater degree of scrutiny of the capital sentencing determination.'") (quoting California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 998-999, 103 S.Ct. 3446, 77 L.Ed.2d 1171 (1983)); Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 884-885, 103 S.Ct. 2733, 77 L.Ed.2d 235 (1983) ("[B]ecause there is a qualitative difference between death and any other permissible form of punishment, there is a corresponding difference in the need for reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case.") (quotations omitted); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305, 96 S.Ct. 2978, 49 L.Ed.2d 944 (1976) ("[T]he penalty of death is qualitatively different from a sentence of imprisonment, however long. Death, in its finality, differs more from life imprisonment than a 100-year prison term differs from one of only a year or two."); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 118, 102 S.Ct. 869, 71 L.Ed.2d 1 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("[T]his Court has gone to extraordinary measures to ensure that the prisoner sentenced to be executed is afforded process that will guarantee, as much as is humanly possible, that the sentence was not imposed out of whim, passion, prejudice, or mistake.").

This court, early on, voiced its belief in the "humane principle applicable in general to criminal cases, and especially those where life is involved," and declined to exalt form over substance when dealing with the death penalty. Bivens v. State, 11 Ark. 455, 457 (1850). More recently, this court has repeatedly set aside strict adherence to procedural rules in connection with postconviction relief out of concern for fairness in death-penalty cases. See, e.g., Sanders v. State, 352 Ark. 16, 98 S.W.3d 35 (February 13, 2003) (holding that a capital defendant should be afforded the protections of Rule 37.5 in this death case even though the rule was not in effect at the time of his...