Robertson v. Industrial Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 19 October 1954
• Citation: 75 So.2d 198
• Parties: S. A. ROBERTSON, Appellant, v. INDUSTRIAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Lititz Mutual Insurance Company, Harford MutualInsurance Company, and Virginia Auto Mutual Insurance Company, Appellees.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

Page 198

75 So.2d 198

45 A.L.R.2d 1292

S. A. ROBERTSON, Appellant, v. INDUSTRIAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Lititz Mutual Insurance Company, Harford MutualInsurance Company, and Virginia Auto Mutual Insurance Company, Appellees.

Supreme Court of Florida, Division A.

Oct. 19, 1954.

Charlton L. Pierce, Tallahassee, for appellant.

William A. O'Bryan, Ausley & Ausley and Ford L. Thompson, Tallahassee, for appellees.

SEBRING, Justice.

At a hearing held before the Insurance Commissioner of Florida at the instigation of the appellees, the appellant's license as an insurance agent in this state was revoked. The appellant did not seek a review of this ruling, but, instead, instituted this action at law for damages against the appellees; charging them with libel and slander, and conspiracy to slander, in connection with their application to the Commissioner for such a hearing, and in the proceedings before the Commissioner resulting in the revocation.

In the complaint filed below the appellant charged, as the basis for his action for slander and conspiracy to slander, that certain allegedly libelous statements were contained in the letter from appellees' general agent to the Commissioner, requesting the hearing to be held with regard to the activities of appellant, in that, in the letter, the agent referred to the appellant as 'a very dangerous man' who was 'endangering the public affairs' and who 'would not stop at anything to gain his ends.'

Upon motion by the appellees, the trial court dismissed the complaint, on the sole ground that the statements made by the agent in the letter, and in the testimony given at the hearing, were absolutely privileged because they occurred in a proceeding quasi-judicial in nature. On this appeal, the correctness of this ruling is questioned.

There can be no doubt that defamatory words published in the course of a judicial proceeding are absolutely privileged, if they are relevant and material to the cause or subject of inquiry, and that no action for damages will lie therefor. Myers v. Hodges, 53 Fla. 197, 44 So. 357; Fisher v. Payne, 93 Fla. 1085, 113 So. 378.

'This rule of privilege as applied to statements made in the course of judicial proceedings is not restricted to trials of actions, but includes proceedings before a competent court or magistrate in the due course of law or the administration of justice which is to result in any determination or action by such court or officer. This privilege extends to the protection of the judge, parties, counsel, and witnesses, and arises immediately upon the doing of any act required or permitted by law in the due course of the judicial proceedings or as necessarily preliminary thereto.' (Emphasis supplied.) Ange v. State, 98 Fla. 538, 123 So. 916, 917.

The issues presented on this appeal are whether the proceeding before the Florida Insurance Commissioner was quasi-judicial or merely administrative in nature; and if quasi-judicial, whether or not the rule of absolute privilege stated above as pertaining to judicial proceedings extends to proceedings before an administrative officer when the particular function being performed by him is quasi-judicial in character.

With regard to the first issue, the holdings in this jurisdiction are uniformly to the effect that an administrative determination, under statutory power, on the issue of whether an occupational license should or should not be revoked constitutes the performance of a judicial or quasi-judicial function. In a case involving the exercise of power under a statute authorizing the state board of dental examiners to determine whether or not the license of certain practitioners should be revoked, this Court unequivocally defined the nature of such a proceeding, as follows:

'It is certain that the function and prerogative of deciding finally the law and the facts of an actual controversy bearing upon a vested legal right sought to be divested or impaired in a proceeding initiated under stat...