Robertson v. Murray (In re Murray)
Decision Date | 31 March 2022 |
Docket Number | 20-01587-KMS,ADV. PROC. 20-00032-KMS |
Parties | IN RE: AMY N. MURRAY DEBTOR v. AMY N. MURRAY DEFENDANT DANA ROBERTSON PLAINTIFF |
Court | U.S. Bankruptcy Court — Southern District of Mississippi |
THIS MATTER is before the Court on the Motion for Summary Judgment (Adv. ECF No. 71)[2] by Plaintiff Dana Robertson Plaintiff's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (Adv. ECF No. 76); Response in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (Adv. ECF No. 82) by Defendant Amy N. Murray; Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Adv. ECF No. 72); Defendant's Brief in Support of the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Adv. ECF No. 73); Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Adv. (ECF No. 80); Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Debtor's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Adv. ECF No. 81); and Defendant's Reply in Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Adv. ECF No. 83). The question is whether issue preclusion applies to a state court default judgment to preclude dischargeability litigation in this Court. Issue preclusion does not apply and Plaintiff-Robertson's Motion for Summary Judgment should be denied and the Defendant-Murray's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment should be granted.
The Court has jurisdiction over the parties to and the subject matter of this proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 1334.[3] This matter is a core proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(I) and (J).
1. On May 26, 2020, Murray filed a petition for relief under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. See Pet., ECF No. 1.
2. On September 15, 2020, Robertson filed a Complaint for Determination of Dischargeability and Objection to Debtor's Discharge ("Complaint") against Murray.[4] See Compl., Adv. ECF No. 1.
3. The Complaint states that Robertson is a judgment creditor in the amount of $500, 000 as a result of a default judgment entered on November 13, 2018, in the Circuit Court of Oktibbeha County, Mississippi, and enrolled in the Circuit Clerk's Judgment Roll ("Default Judgment"). See id. at 2. 4. Robertson alleges that Murray willfully and maliciously injured her or her property or both by making false and defamatory statements that resulted in the judgment debt. See id. at 2-3. Relying on the Default Judgment, she requests a nondischargeable judgment under § 523 (a)(6) in the amount of $500, 000 plus interest, attorney's fees and expenses. Id. at 3.
5. In her motion, Robertson states that the "sole issue in dispute is whether [Murray's] actions rise to the willful and/or malicious standard referenced in § 523(a)(6)." Adv. ECF. No. 71 at 1. She contends that Murray is "procedurally barred from relitigating the award of damages since she ignored the state court proceedings." Id. Robertson's view is that if the Court determines that Murray's actions do not satisfy the willful and malicious standard, then the debt will be dischargeable and the damages issue moot; but if the willful and malicious standard is met, then the debt will be nondischargeable. Id. at 2.
6. Murray asserts in her Motion for Partial Summary Judgment that the doctrine of collateral estoppel is inapplicable and does not preclude the parties from "trying in this bankruptcy court issues necessary to determine the dischargeability of the underlying judgment debt in question." Adv. ECF No. 72 at 1.
Summary judgment is appropriate "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a) (made applicable by Fed.R.Bankr.P. 7056). Ginsberg 1985 Real Estate P'ship v. Cadle Co., 39 F.3d 528, 531 (5th Cir. 1994) (citations omitted). A party asserting that a fact either is genuinely disputed or cannot be genuinely disputed must support the assertion by citations "to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1)(A).
The moving party bears the initial responsibility of informing the court of the basis for its motion and the parts of the record that indicate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). "Once the moving party presents the . . . court with a properly supported summary judgment motion, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to show that summary judgment is inappropriate." Morris v. Covan World Wide Moving, Inc., 144 F.3d 377, 380 (5th Cir. 1998). "The evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). But the nonmovant must meet its burden with more than "metaphysical doubt," "conclusory allegations," "unsubstantiated assertions," or a mere "scintilla" of evidence. Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994).
On cross-motions for summary judgment, each movant must establish the absence of a genuine issue of material fact and the movant's entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. Shaw Constructors v. ICF Kaiser Eng'rs, Inc., 395 F.3d 533, 538-39 (5th Cir. 2004). "If there is no genuine issue and one of the parties is entitled to prevail as a matter of law, the court may render summary judgment." Id. at 539.
The following recitation of facts with authorities are listed in Murray's brief in support her motion and are undisputed except where noted. See Def.'s Br., Adv. ECF No. 73 at 2-4; Pl.'s Br., Adv. ECF No. 81 at 2-4. Because the issues presented by both motions are essentially the same, these undisputed facts will be considered for both motions.
Def.'s Br., Adv. ECF No. 73 at 2-4; Pl.'s Br., Adv. ECF No. 81 at 2-4 (some recitations omitted).
15. The only documents identified by either party in support of their motions are the Complaint, the Default Judgment and the Civil Complaint. Adv. ECF. No. 74.
"Issue preclusion, or collateral estoppel . . . promotes the interests of judicial economy by treating specific issues of fact or law that are validly and necessarily determined between two parties as final and conclusive." United States v. Shanbaum, 10 F.3d 305, 311 (5th Cir. 1994). "The party invoking collateral estoppel bears the burden of proving the defense." Cannady v. Woodall No. 1:20cv130-HSO-RPM, 2021 WL 215490, at *3 (S.D.Miss. Jan. 21, 2021) (citing McCarty v. Wood, 249 So.3d...
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