Robidoux v. Muholland

• Decision Date: 08 April 2011
• Docket Number: No. 10–2031.,10–2031.
• Citation: 642 F.3d 20,32 IER Cases 157
• Parties: Jason J. ROBIDOUX, Plaintiff, Appellant,v.Michael MUHOLLAND; James Corporation d/b/a James Construction, Defendants, Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit

642 F.3d 20

32 IER Cases 157

Jason J. ROBIDOUX, Plaintiff, Appellant,

v.Michael MUHOLLAND; James Corporation d/b/a James Construction, Defendants, Appellees.

No. 10–2031.

United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit.

Heard March 7, 2011.Decided April 8, 2011.

Daniel S. Hendrie, for appellant.

John F. Kelleher with whom Kelly A. Kincaid was on brief, for appellees.Before BOUDIN, Circuit Judge, SOUTER,^* Associate Justice, and STAHL, Circuit Judge.STAHL, Circuit Judge.

Jason J. Robidoux sued James Corporation d/b/a James Construction (“James Construction”) and Michael A. Muholland, Jr. (collectively “defendants”) for personal injuries Robidoux suffered while working at a construction site. The district court allowed the defendants' motion for summary judgment, finding that the Rhode Island Workers' Compensation Act (“Rhode Island Act”) applied to the action and barred the claims. Because we conclude that the Massachusetts Workers' Compensation Act (“Massachusetts Act”) applies to this suit and does not bar Robidoux's claims, we reverse and remand.

I. Facts & Background

Most of the facts relevant to this appeal are undisputed. In May 2006, James Construction, a general contractor incorporated and based in Pennsylvania, was working on a project at the Newport Naval Station in Rhode Island. In search of temporary laborers, James Construction contacted a temporary employment agency, Northeast Temps, Inc. d/b/a Labor Systems (“Labor Systems”), which is a Massachusetts corporation with its principal place of business in Massachusetts. It does also maintain an office in Rhode Island. In response to James Construction's request, Labor Systems dispatched Robidoux, a Massachusetts resident and newly-minted Labor Systems employee, from its Fall River, Massachusetts office to the Rhode Island job site. While working at the Newport Naval Station, Robidoux was supervised by Muholland, a James Construction employee who was neither a Massachusetts resident nor a Rhode Island resident. During Robidoux's work on the project, he discussed his Massachusetts residency with Muholland. At the conclusion of Robidoux's assignment, Muholland signed a work order that displayed Labor Systems' two Massachusetts locations and their corresponding 508 area code telephone numbers.

Almost six months later, on November 15, 2006, James Construction again contacted Labor Systems, at one of the 508 area code telephone numbers, to specifically request Robidoux's services for a different project at the Newport Naval Station. The next day, Robidoux picked up a work order and his personal protective equipment at Labor Systems' Fall River office before traveling on to Rhode Island.

Robidoux's second stint working at the Newport Naval Station lasted approximately six weeks. During the course of this work, Robidoux received his paychecks, with Rhode Island tax withholdings, from Labor Systems. For Robidoux's services, James Construction remitted payments to an Ohio address provided by Labor Systems. Pursuant to a contract between James Construction and Labor Systems, James Construction assumed responsibility for supervising Robidoux while he was at the construction site. Muholland, who was serving as the project's superintendent, provided this supervision. Additionally, the contract required Labor Systems to provide workers' compensation insurance for the employees it provided to James Construction. At the time Labor Systems and James Construction agreed to the contract, Labor System already had workers' compensation insurance policies from Liberty Mutual Insurance Company (“Liberty Mutual”) for Massachusetts and from Beacon Mutual Insurance Company (“Beacon Mutual”) for Rhode Island. James Construction also required Labor Systems to provide a certificate of its Rhode Island workers' compensation insurance.¹

On January 4, 2007, while working with Muholland at the Newport Naval Station site, Robidoux was seriously injured when a 648 pound compactor fell on him. That same day, without Robidoux's knowledge, Labor Systems filed a report of injury so that Robidoux could collect Rhode Island workers' compensation benefits. Consequently, Robidoux began receiving $629.27 a week from Beacon Mutual. These payments lasted for almost seventeen weeks and totaled $10,248.15.

On February 20, 2007, Robidoux filed a claim for Massachusetts workers' compensation benefits with Liberty Mutual. An administrative judge in the Massachusetts Department of Industrial Accidents concluded that Robidoux was entitled to these benefits, and ordered Liberty Mutual to take credit for the monies paid by Beacon Mutual and assume responsibility for future benefits.

On January 9, 2009, Robidoux filed a diversity action in the District of Massachusetts alleging that the injuries he suffered at the construction site were caused by the defendants' negligence. On July 29, 2010, the district court allowed the defendants' motion for summary judgment. Robidoux v. Muholland, 733 F.Supp.2d 198 (D.Mass.2010). Employing Massachusetts choice of law principles, the district court determined that “Rhode Island [as opposed to Massachusetts] has a substantially more significant relationship to this litigation and, therefore, this court must apply Rhode Island law.” Id. at 203. The court went on to conclude that, except in circumstances not present in the case at hand, the Rhode Island Act grants “special employers,” such as James Construction, “immunity from private action by injured employees.” Id. Similarly, the court concluded that the Rhode Island Act prohibits a plaintiff from suing co-employees such as Muholland. Id. at 204. Robidoux subsequently appealed.

II. Discussion

“Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Cortés–Rivera v. Dep't of Corr. and Rehab. of the Commonwealth of P.R., 626 F.3d 21, 26 (1st Cir.2010). This court reviews a grant of summary judgment de novo. Id. Choice of law determinations are questions of law, which we also review de novo. See Crellin Tech., Inc. v. Equipmentlease Corp., 18 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir.1994). Both parties agree that Massachusetts choice of law principles govern this case.

A. A Conflict Exists Between the Relevant Massachusetts and Rhode Island Law

“[T]he usual first step in applying conflict of law principles is to ascertain whether there is a conflict among the laws of the various States involved.” Cohen v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 389 Mass. 327, 450 N.E.2d 581, 584 n. 7 (1983).

The Rhode Island Act provides that, except in circumstances not alleged in this appeal, “[t]he right to compensation ... and the remedy for an injury granted by [the Rhode Island Act], shall be in lieu of all rights and remedies as to that injury now existing ... against an employer, or its ... employees.” R.I. Gen. Laws § 28–29–20. The defendants assert, as the district court concluded, that this “employer” immunity extends to “special employers”—that is, “person[s] who contract[ ] for services with a general employer for the use of an employee,” id. § 28–29–2(6)(ii)—and their employees. See Sorenson v. Colibri Corp., 650 A.2d 125 (R.I.1994). Accordingly, the defendants contend, the Rhode Island Act bars Robidoux's claims against James Construction, the special employer, and its employee, Muholland. On appeal, Robidoux does not dispute this interpretation of Rhode Island law, and we therefore assume that the Rhode Island Act, if applicable, would bar this action.

The question therefore becomes whether the Massachusetts Act would similarly bar Robidoux's claims against the defendants.² We conclude that it would not.

Generally, “the [Massachusetts Act] bars employees from recovering against their employers for injuries received on the job.” Barrett v. Rodgers, 408 Mass. 614, 562 N.E.2d 480, 482 (1990) (citing Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 152, §§ 23, 24).³ An injured employee retains the right, however, “to bring suit against third parties who may be liable for injuries compensable under the [Massachusetts] Act.” Id. (citing Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 152, § 15). More specifically, “nothing in [section fifteen], or in section eighteen or twenty-four shall be construed to bar an action at law ... against any person other than the insured person employing such employee and liable for payment of the compensation provided by this chapter ... and said insured person's employees.” Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 152, § 15 (emphasis added); cf. Searcy v. Paul, 20 Mass.App.Ct. 134, 478 N.E.2d 1275, 1278 (1985) (“[T]he [above-quoted statutory language] was taken by text and periodical writers as broadly abolishing the so-called ‘common employment’ doctrine and permitting third party actions by ... an injured employee against all but his immediate insured employer.”).

In short, for an employer to be immunized pursuant to the Massachusetts Act “(1) a ‘direct employment relationship must exist’ between the injured party and the person claiming immunity, and (2) ‘the employer must be an insured person liable for the payment of compensation.’ ” Roberts v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 599 F.3d 73, 77 (1st Cir.2010) (quoting Fleming v. Shaheen Bros., Inc., 71 Mass.App.Ct. 223, 881 N.E.2d 1143, 1146 (2008)).

Turning to the second prong of this test, an “insured person” is “an employer who has provided by insurance for the payment to his employees by an insurer of the compensation provided for by this chapter, or is a self-insurer ... or is a member of workers' compensation self-insurance group.” Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 152, § 1(6). Further, Massachusetts law requires that, absent an agreement to the contrary, in circumstances involving a special employer and a general employer, “the liability for the payment of compensation for the injury shall be borne by the general employer or its insurer.” Id. § 18 (emphasis added).

James Construction is not an “insured person liable for the payment of [workers'] compensation.” To...