Robinette v. State, 48S00-9910-CR-614.

• Decision Date: 11 January 2001
• Docket Number: No. 48S00-9910-CR-614.,48S00-9910-CR-614.
• Citation: 741 N.E.2d 1162
• Parties: Glenda Gail ROBINETTE, Appellant (Defendant Below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff Below).
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

741 N.E.2d 1162

Glenda Gail ROBINETTE, Appellant (Defendant Below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff Below).

No. 48S00-9910-CR-614.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

January 11, 2001.

Louis W. Denney, Muncie, Indiana, Attorney for Appellant.

Karen Freeman-Wilson, Attorney General of Indiana, Grant H. Carlton, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, Indiana, Attorneys for Appellee.

BOEHM, Justice.

At a jury trial, Glenda Robinette was found guilty of murder, criminal confinement, and burglary resulting in bodily injury. The trial court entered a verdict of guilty but mentally ill and sentenced Robinette to fifty-five, ten, and thirty years, respectively, to be served concurrently. Because the trial court erroneously admitted videotaped statements Robinette made after being Mirandized and asserting her right to remain silent, we reverse and remand for a new trial.

Factual and Procedural Background

Robinette and Michael Gougeon had dated for five years when Gougeon ended their relationship and started dating Carrie Sherman. In the wee hours of September 6, 1998, Gougeon and Sherman were asleep at Sherman's house when Sherman awoke to see Robinette standing beside her bed holding a gun. Sherman told Robinette to hand her the gun and woke up Gougeon, who walked across the room, turned on the light, and also directed Robinette to surrender the gun. Robinette then shot Gougeon five times. After locating Gougeon's car keys, Robinette escorted Sherman at gunpoint to Gougeon's parked car and ordered Sherman into the car. Sherman complied. Robinette then drove about six blocks to a church parking lot where she ordered Sherman into the trunk. After driving some distance more, Robinette abandoned the automobile. Sherman was discovered nine to eleven hours later by passers-by who heard her knocking and screaming from inside the trunk.

Three days later, Robinette turned herself in to police in Pendleton. She was then transferred to Anderson, where she was twice interviewed by the police after being Mirandized. She refused to sign Miranda waivers and asserted her right to remain silent nearly fifty times during the course of these interviews, stating, "I don't want to talk about it." Despite her unmistakable assertion of this right, she was interrogated first for three hours and fifteen minutes and a second time for forty-five minutes. The videotapes of Robinette's interrogations were admitted into evidence over the objections of defense counsel and are the basis of this appeal.

I. Admission of Videotapes

At trial, the State moved for admission of a videotape of Robinette's first interview with Anderson police officers. Defense counsel objected on the ground that it had not been clarified whether Robinette had formally waived her Miranda rights. The trial court admitted the videotape. The State later moved for admission of a videotape of Robinette's second interview with police. Defense counsel again objected, arguing that, in view of Robinette's use of profanity during questioning, the prejudice of having the videotape admitted outweighed its relevance under Indiana Rule of Evidence 403. Defense counsel also pointed out that Robinette had a constitutional right to remain silent that had been exercised and ignored by police. After noting that Robinette had raised the affirmative defense of mental disease or defect, the State argued that it was significant that Robinette had understood her rights and responded appropriately to questions. The State further asserted that the videotape was probative of her "awareness of her surroundings, awareness of what was going on" close to the time frame of the murders and that the statement, "I'm not talking to you about it," rebutted her contention that she had no memory of the incident. The trial court agreed with the State, proclaiming that "we have a responsibility to let [the State] put [the videotape] on . . . to rebut some of the things that psychiatrists say in their reports. . . . I haven't read the cases, but the notes suggest that the insanity issue trumps everything else."

After the videotapes had been admitted, the trial court, realizing its error, gave a limiting instruction with regard to the first videotape to the effect that the jury should consider it for the "limited purpose of judging Miss Robinette's physical appearance, carriage and demeanor at the time that first tape was made." The trial court further instructed the jury to disregard completely the second videotape. Robinette argues that the trial court's attempt to rectify its error was insufficient.

In Doyle v. Ohio, the United States Supreme Court held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is violated when the defendant's post-arrest and post-Miranda silence is used to impeach the defendant's exculpatory explanation at trial. 426 U.S. 610, 619, 96 S.Ct. 2240, 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976). The Court explained, "[W]hile it is true that the Miranda warnings contain no express assurance that silence will carry no penalty, such assurance is implicit to any person who receives the warnings." Id. at 618, 96 S.Ct. 2240. In Wainwright v. Greenfield, the Supreme Court extended the rule in Doyle to apply to the use of a defendant's post-arrest silence as evidence of sanity. 474 U.S. 284, 295, 106 S.Ct. 634, 88 L.Ed.2d 623 (1986). The Court concluded that there was no viable distinction between the use of the defendant's post-arrest silence for impeachment purposes and its use as evidence of the defendant's sanity. Rather, "[i]n both situations, the State gives warnings to protect constitutional rights and implicitly promises that any exercise of those rights will not be penalized." Id. at 292, 106 S.Ct. 634.

This Court had occasion to address Doyle and Wainwright in Lynch v. State, 632 N.E.2d 341 (Ind.1994), and Wilson v. State, 514 N.E.2d 282 (Ind.1987). In Lynch, at the outset of his interrogation by police, the defendant had asserted his right not to be questioned without an attorney present. A tape of the interrogation was admitted for the purpose of establishing the defendant's state of mind shortly after he shot his father. The defendant's sanity was an issue in the trial. 632 N.E.2d at 341-42. In Wilson, as evidence of the defendant's sanity, the State elicited testimony as to the defendant's exercise of his right to remain silent and his right to consult with an attorney. 514 N.E.2d at 283. Relying on Doyle and Wainwright, this Court reversed both of these convictions and remanded for new trials. The same result is required here.

The State does not seriously defend the admissibility of the videotapes. Rather, the State argues that any error was harmless because the jury was subsequently instructed that it was to use the first videotape only for purposes of observing Robinette's demeanor and carriage and that they should disregard the second videotape altogether.

The use of a defendant's post-Miranda silence to impeach a defendant's exculpatory explanation or to prove a defendant's sanity is subject to harmless error analysis. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967) ("The question is whether there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction.") (citation omitted); Thomas v. State, 910 F.2d 1413, 1414-15 (7th Cir.1990) ("All the psychiatric evidence indicated insanity, though how strongly was a question for the jury. So we cannot dismiss as harmless the error in admitting the evidence of his silence."). Under the harmless error analysis, the State bears the burden of establishing that the federal constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 629-30, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993) (citing Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24,87 S.Ct. 824); Rawley v. State, 724 N.E.2d 1087, 1090 (Ind.2000). In analyzing whether a Doyle violation is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, this Court examines five factors: (1) the use to which the prosecution puts the post-arrest silence; (2) who elected to pursue the line of questioning; (3) the quantum of other evidence indicative of guilt; (4) the intensity and frequency of the reference; and (5) the availability to the trial judge of an opportunity to grant a motion for mistrial or give curative instructions. Bieghler v. State, 481 N.E.2d 78, 91-92 (Ind.1985) (quoting United States v. Massey, 687 F.2d 1348, 1353 (10th Cir.1982)).

We cannot conclude that the State has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the admission of Robinette's post-Miranda silence as evidence of her sanity was harmless. Robinette offered substantial testimony to the effect that she suffered from a condition rendering her unable to recall or appreciate the crimes she committed.¹ Her two videotaped statements, in which she repeats, "I don't want to talk about it," dozens of times could have easily left jurors with the impression that Robinette had enough of her wits about her to recognize that it was not to her benefit to speak with police. On these tapes she provided the police with general information such as her name, age, and address, yet declined to speak about the crimes with which she was charged. Jurors listened to her repeated refusals to answer for four hours, during which time she was badgered and chastised by police for being uncooperative and occasionally responded belligerently.² Given that Robinette produced experts willing to testify to her lack of mental capacity at the time of the crimes and that the only other evidence of Robinette's sanity around the time of the crime was the testimony of Sherman, the admission of the videotapes could have easily contributed to her conviction. Cf. Thomas, 910 F.2d at 1414-15

(reversing where psychiatric testimony indicated insanity and only evidence of sanity was defendant's silence after being Mirandized, his request for counsel, and his "outwardly calm appearance"). Instructions to consider the...