Robinson Helicopter Co. v. Gangapersaud
| Decision Date | 22 June 2022 |
| Docket Number | 2D20-2470 |
| Parties | ROBINSON HELICOPTER COMPANY, INC., Appellant, v. Grace GANGAPERSAUD, as personal representative of the Estate of Deodat P. Gangapersaud deceased, Ryan Persaud; Lavendranauth Persaud; HBD Industries, Inc. ; HBD/Thermoid, Inc.; FSH Maintenance, LLC; Florida Suncoast Helicopters, LLC ; and BC Dental, Inc., Appellees. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Mark R. Antonelli and Emily C. Smith, Coral Gables, and Tim A. Goetz, Torrence, California, for Appellant.
Thomas J. Seider of Brannock Humphries & Berman, Tampa, and T. Patton Youngblood of Youngblood Law Firm, St. Petersburg, for Estate of Deodat P. Gangapersaud by and through Grace Gangapersaud, as Personal Representative thereof, and Ryan Persaud, Appellees.
Stephen F. Rosenthal of Podhurst Orseck, P.A., Miami, for Amicus Curiae The Florida Justice Association.
No appearance for remaining Appellees.
BY ORDER OF THE COURT:
Upon consideration of appellee's motion for rehearing, rehearing en banc, or certification of conflict, appellant's response, and appellee's amicus brief of the Florida Justice Association in support of the motion for rehearing, rehearing en banc, or certification of conflict:
IT IS ORDERED that the motion for rehearing is granted to the extent that the opinion dated January 5, 2022, is withdrawn and the attached opinion is substituted therefor. The motions for rehearing en banc and for certification of conflict are denied.
No further motions will be entertained.
Robinson Helicopter Company, Inc., appeals a nonfinal order denying its motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction in this action brought by Grace Gangapersaud, as personal representative of the Estate of Deodat P. Gangapersaud, and Ryan Persaud (collectively, the Estate). Because we conclude that the trial court erroneously determined that personal jurisdiction existed over Robinson, a nonresident entity based in California, we reverse.
On March 31, 2019, Dr. Brent Mutton was flying an R44 helicopter owned by his dental practice, BC Dental, Inc., from Naples to Cross City, Florida, when the engine unexpectedly lost power, forcing him to land the aircraft in an empty field near Tampa. Over the following days, Dr. Mutton communicated with Robinson, the manufacturer, and FSH Maintenance, LLC, a local service provider, in an effort to repair the helicopter.1 Robinson provided FSH with instructions for diagnosing and repairing the helicopter as well as replacement parts to potentially fix the problem.
On April 4, 2019, mechanics from FSH replaced the helicopter's fuel pump with a replacement part sent by Robinson. After FSH representatives were able to start the engine and hover the helicopter for several minutes, it was decided that FSH would fly the helicopter to its facility in Sarasota for further inspection. But during the flight, the engine failed yet again, forcing the pilot to attempt an emergency landing in a busy intersection in Tampa. During the landing, one of the helicopter's rotor blades struck a utility pole, causing a piece of the blade to break off and fly through the windshield of a pickup truck sitting at the intersection. The passenger, Deodat P. Gangapersaud, was killed instantly; the driver, Ryan Persaud, suffered nonfatal injuries.
The Estate filed this action against Robinson, FSH, and several other defendants in Hillsborough County circuit court. The amended complaint asserted claims against Robinson for strict liability and negligence based on a defective air inlet duct which caused the engine failure as well as a separate negligence claim for failing to properly diagnose, repair, and transport the helicopter.
Robinson moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. In support, Robinson submitted sworn affidavits from three of its employees, Peter Riedl, Patrick Cox, and Peter Hallqvist, contesting the amended complaint's jurisdictional allegations. The Estate opposed the motion, asserting that Robinson purposefully availed itself of the privilege of doing business in Florida and that Robinson's conduct giving rise to the claims against it supported a finding of specific jurisdiction under Florida's long-arm statute.2
At the hearing on Robinson's motion, the Estate focused its argument on the issue of specific jurisdiction.3 According to the Estate, Robinson's involvement in the negligent diagnosis, repair, and transport of the helicopter brought it within the ambit of section 48.193(1)(a)2, Florida Statutes (2018), which provides for specific jurisdiction over a nonresident who "[c]ommit[s] a tortious act within this state." In addition, the Estate also maintained that specific jurisdiction existed under section 48.193(1)(a) 6 because a helicopter which was manufactured by Robinson caused injury within the state.4
The trial court ultimately denied the motion, finding that sufficient jurisdictional facts existed to bring the action within the ambit of the long-arm statute and to establish the constitutionally required minimum contacts. This appeal follows.
Robinson contends that its motion should have been granted because the trial court has neither general nor specific jurisdiction over it. While the amended complaint pleaded grounds for both general and specific jurisdiction, the Estate now asserts that "[t]he existence of general personal jurisdiction is not at issue" in this case. Based on this concession, we need only address the issue of specific jurisdiction. Our standard of review for this issue is de novo. See Camp Illahee Invs., Inc. v. Blackman , 870 So. 2d 80, 83 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003). To determine whether personal jurisdiction exists over a nonresident defendant, courts must apply the two-step test set forth in Venetian Salami Co. v. Parthenais , 554 So. 2d 499 (Fla. 1989). First, the court must determine whether the operative complaint "alleges sufficient jurisdictional facts to bring the action within the ambit of the [long-arm] statute." Id. at 502 (quoting Unger v. Publisher Entry Serv., Inc. , 513 So. 2d 674, 675 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987) ). "[I]f it does, the next inquiry is whether sufficient ‘minimum contacts’ are demonstrated to satisfy due process requirements." Id. (quoting Unger , 513 So. 2d at 675 ).
The plaintiff bears the initial burden to allege a basis for personal jurisdiction under the long-arm statute. See Rautenberg v. Falz , 193 So. 3d 924, 928 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016). When alleging specific jurisdiction under section 48.193(1), "due process considerations also require the plaintiff to establish that the nonresident defendant ‘has sufficient minimum contacts with the state so that the exercise of jurisdiction would not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’ " Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft v. Jones , 227 So. 3d 150, 154 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017) (quoting Teva Pharm. Indus. v. Ruiz , 181 So. 3d 513, 516 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016) ).
If the plaintiff meets this initial pleading requirement, the defendant may contest the plaintiff's jurisdictional allegations by filing a "legally sufficient affidavit or other sworn proof" to the contrary.5 Rautenberg , 193 So. 3d at 928 (citing Hilltopper Holding Corp. v. Est. of Cutchin ex rel. Engle , 955 So. 2d 598, 601 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) ). "If the defendant's affidavit fully disputes the jurisdictional allegations, then the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to prove by affidavit or other sworn proof that there is a basis for long-arm jurisdiction." Id. at 929 (citing Hilltopper , 955 So. 2d at 602 ). Should the plaintiff fail to produce sworn proof refuting the defendant's allegations and establishing jurisdiction, the defendant's motion to dismiss must be granted. Hilltopper Holding Corp. , 955 So. 2d at 602.
The Estate raises two grounds for specific jurisdiction over Robinson in this case: first, that Robinson committed a tort within this state, and second, that a product manufactured by Robinson— the helicopter—caused injury within this state. While the trial court's order does not specify under which provision of the long-arm statute it found that it had personal jurisdiction over Robinson, we conclude that jurisdiction does not exist under either theory.
The amended complaint alleges that Robinson's "negligent actions and omissions pertaining to its involvement in the repair and diagnosis of the helicopter," including its "furnishing of parts" to FSH, its "collaboration" with FSH, and "the decision to transport versus fly the helicopter [to FSH's facility in Sarasota]," contributed to the crash. It further alleges that Robinson's actions in this regard "inextricably link[ ] Robinson to, and create[ ] a substantial connection with, Florida." According to the Estate, these allegations establish personal jurisdiction under section 48.193(1)(a)2 of the long-arm statute.
To support a finding of personal jurisdiction under section 48.193(1)(a) 2, "[t]he statute expressly requires that the tort be committed in Florida." Casita, L.P. v. Maplewood Equity Partners L.P. , 960 So. 2d 854, 857 (Fla. 3rd DCA 2007) ; see also Rautenberg , 193 So. 3d at 930 . There is no question here that Robinson did not have any representatives in Florida when any of the events in this case transpired.
"[A] defendant's physical presence," however, is not required "in order to ‘commit a tortious act’ in Florida." Wendt v. Horowitz , 822 So. 2d 1252, 1260 (Fla. 2002). In Wendt , the court held that the commission of a tortious act for the purposes of long-arm jurisdiction "can occur through the nonresident defendant's telephonic, electronic, or written communications into Florida" so long as "the cause of action ... arise[s] from the communications." Id....
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