Robinson v. Bates
| Decision Date | 22 April 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. C-040063.,C-040063. |
| Citation | 828 N.E.2d 657,160 Ohio App.3d 668,2005 Ohio 1879 |
| Parties | ROBINSON, Appellant, v. BATES, Appellee. |
| Court | Ohio Supreme Court |
Scott A. Best, for appellant.
Trenz, McKay & Knabe Co., L.P.A., and Timothy E. McKay, for appellee.
{¶ 1} In this landlord-negligence case, we decide two issues. First, we hold that the open-and-obvious doctrine does not abrogate a landlord's statutory duty to keep leased premises in a fit and habitable condition. Second, in a case of first impression in Ohio, we hold that under the collateral-source rule, a plaintiff's recovery of the reasonable value of her medical treatment is not limited to the amount paid by her insurance.
{¶ 2} While in her driveway to get in her car, plaintiff-appellant, Caroline Robinson twisted her foot and broke a bone. She sued her landlord, defendant-appellee, Helen Gist Bates, trustee, for negligence.
{¶ 3} Several days before Robinson's accident, Bates's grandson, acting as her agent, had hired a contractor to tear down the retaining walls on both sides of the driveway. The construction work had left jagged concrete slabs where the walls had been. For several days after the walls were torn down, Robinson maneuvered around the construction to get in and out of her car. Eventually, she twisted her foot when she stepped on an uneven concrete slab where the retaining wall had been.
{¶ 4} In her first assignment of error, Robinson asserts that the trial court erred when it directed a verdict in favor of Bates.
{¶ 5} To establish actionable negligence at trial, Robinson had to show the existence of a duty, a breach of that duty, and an injury proximately resulting from the breach.1 Typically, a duty may be established by common law, by legislative enactment, or by the particular facts and circumstances of the case.2 Where a legislative enactment imposes a specific duty for the safety of others, failure to perform that duty is negligence per se.3
{¶ 6} Application of negligence per se in a tort action means that the plaintiff has definitively established that the defendant breached a duty that he or she owed to the plaintiff.4 But it is not a demonstration of liability per se because the plaintiff also has to prove proximate cause and damages.5
{¶ 7} A landlord has many duties to a tenant. One statutory duty, under R.C. 5321.04(A)(2), provides, "A landlord who is a party to a rental agreement shall * * * [m]ake all repairs and do whatever is reasonably necessary to put and keep the premises in a fit and habitable condition." The Ohio Supreme Court has held that a landlord's violation of the duties in R.C. 5321.04(A)(2) constitutes negligence per se.6
{¶ 8} In this case, the trial court concluded that after viewing all the evidence in Robinson's favor, reasonable minds could come to but one conclusion and that conclusion was that Robinson had failed to establish her claim. Not so.
{¶ 9} A court of appeals reviews the trial court's ruling on a motion for a directed verdict de novo.7 Where reasonable minds can reach different conclusions regarding the evidence presented and where there is substantial, competent evidence to support the claim of the party against whom the motion is made, the motion for a directed verdict must be denied.8
{¶ 10} The undisputed testimony of the parties established that the landlord's grandson, Walter Rice, hired a contractor to do numerous repairs on the property, a single-family house. The first thing the contractor did was to tear down the retaining walls on either side of the driveway. The loose concrete bricks and other rubble were piled at the end of the driveway towards the garage. A slightly raised and uneven concrete surface remained where the walls formerly stood.
{¶ 11} Rice testified that he told the contractor to put caution tape around the construction. But the contractor did not. Rice also testified that after tearing the walls down, the contractor quit the job. Rice did nothing to remedy the situation, except to move some of the concrete bricks to the edge of the driveway to create more space for cars to park.
{¶ 12} Rice testified that he knew about the construction and the state of the driveway. He admitted that he knew there were stones and debris in the driveway. When asked "Were you aware of the dangerous condition of the driveway?" he answered, "Yes, correct."
{¶ 13} Viewing the evidence most strongly in Robinson's favor, we hold that reasonable minds could conclude that Bates had violated her statutory duty to Robinson and committed negligence per se. That conclusion would mean that Bates's duty and breach of that duty were definitively established. It would then be a question of fact for a jury to decide whether Robinson had suffered an injury caused by the state of the driveway. Because a jury certainly could conclude that Robinson had established all the elements of her negligence claim, we hold that a directed verdict in favor of the landlord was unwarranted.
{¶ 14} In urging us to affirm the trial court's directed verdict, Bates points out that Robinson was well aware of the jagged concrete slab because she had passed it for several days while getting in and out of her car. Bates argues that under the open-and-obvious doctrine, she owed no duty to warn Robinson or even to remedy the dangerous condition.
{¶ 15} But open-and-obvious is a common-law doctrine that cannot relieve a landlord of statutory duties. As the Ohio Supreme Court made clear in Armstrong v. Best Buy, the open-and-obvious doctrine concerns only whether a duty exists.9 It does not go to causation or any other element of negligence. It can act as a bar only to a landowner's duty. But the duty that Robinson claims Bates breached was a statutory duty. There can be no debate about whether this duty existed—it is written in the Revised Code.
{¶ 16} If a jury determines that Bates failed to keep the premises in a fit and habitable condition, then it is negligence per se, and Robinson will have definitively established that Bates had a duty and breached it. We agree with Robinson that it would be nonsensical to hold that the open-and-obvious doctrine could somehow eviscerate the landlord's statutory duty to keep leased residential premises in a fit and habitable condition. That holding would allow landlords to flagrantly violate Ohio's Landlord Tenant Act as long as the violations are open and obvious.
{¶ 17} Under similar facts, the Tenth Appellate District held that the open-and-obvious doctrine could not abrogate a landlord's statutory duty to make repairs. In Schoefield v. Beulah Road,10 a tenant's daughter tripped on deteriorated concrete steps in front of her mother's apartment building, fell, and suffered an injury. The steps had been broken for several months, and the tenant, the daughter, and the landlord all were aware of the condition of the steps. In addition, similar to Robinson's accident, the tenant's daughter tripped at night in an area with little lighting.
{¶ 18} The court held that the open-and-obvious doctrine could not operate to somehow negate a landlord's duty under R.C. 5321.04(A)(2). The court held that the open-and-obvious doctrine concerned a landowner's duty to warn and protect against open and obvious dangers, while in the case before it, the court was dealing with a different duty—the duty to repair. The court further held that the violation of a statutory duty constituted negligence per se, making any open-and-obvious issue relevant only to comparative negligence (which this author believes it should be in any case).
{¶ 19} Likewise, in Crawford v. Wolfe, the Fourth Appellate District reversed a summary judgment entered for a landlord.11 The landlord had failed to install handrails on the front steps leading into a house. On an icy day, the tenant slipped and fell, breaking her wrist and spraining her ankle. The court, citing Schoefield, held that "the open-and-obvious-danger doctrine was simply not intended as an exception to the statutory duties imposed on a landlord."12 The court held that the landlord had violated R.C. 5321.04(A)(2) and remanded the case for a trial.
{¶ 20} By similar reasoning, the "step-in-the-dark" rule does not apply to abrogate a landlord's statutory duty. Under this common-law doctrine, darkness itself is considered a warning of danger and can relieve a landowner of the duty to warn of a danger.13 But such a rule cannot relieve a landlord of a statutory duty to keep the premises in a fit and habitable condition.
{¶ 21} We conclude that in the present case, a directed verdict in favor of the landlord was improper. We therefore sustain Robinson's first assignment of error, reverse the entry of the directed verdict, and remand the case for a new trial.
{¶ 22} In her second assignment of error, Robinson argues that the trial court improperly excluded four proffered exhibits.
{¶ 23} The proffered exhibits were itemized bills of Robinson's medical treatment for her foot injury. The bills totaled $1,919. At trial, the parties stipulated that the amount actually paid by Robinson's insurance company to settle her medical bills was $1,350.43.
{¶ 24} The trial court refused to admit the medical bills, reasoning that the lesser amount paid by the insurance company was the only amount the jury should consider for damages. The trial court stated,
{¶ 25} Robinson now argues that the trial court improperly...
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