Robinson v. City of Los Angeles

• Decision Date: 14 December 1956
• Citation: 146 Cal.App.2d 810,304 P.2d 814
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: Theodore C. ROBINSON et al., plaintiffs and Appellants, v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES, a Municipal Corporation, et al., Defendants and Respondents. Civ. 21757.

Page 814

304 P.2d 814

146 Cal.App.2d 810

Theodore C. ROBINSON et al., plaintiffs and Appellants, v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES, a Municipal Corporation, et al., Defendants and Respondents.

Civ. 21757.

District Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 2, California.

Dec. 14, 1956.

Hearing Denied Feb. 6, 1957.

Herschel E. Champlin, Los Angeles, for appellants.

Roger Arnebergh, City Atty., Bourke Jones, Asst. City Atty., Claude E. Hilker, Deputy City Atty., Los Angeles, for respondent City of Los Angeles.

ASHBURN, Justice.

Plaintiffs-appellants attack as arbitrary and unreasonable ordinance No. 102641, which amended the comprehensive zoning ordinance (No. 90500) of the city of Los Angeles so as to rezone approximately 785 acres of vacant land in the northwesterly portion of San Fernando Valley from RA, A1 and A2 (agricultural uses) to M2 and M2-O (light industrial uses). Properties owned by the plaintiffs, some twelve in number, are not within the rezoned area and are located at distances beyond its confines varying from 980 [146 Cal.App.2d 813] to 1320 feet. Appellants assert that the rezoning was initiated by the city Planning Commission, and say in their opening brief: 'All procedural steps required by the City Charter were observed and no attack was made or issue raised at the trial regarding procedure followed.' The record shows that elaborate hearings were held before the Planning Commission, and further hearings by the City Council, at which the various objections now urged were advanced and considered and held to be not valid reasons for withholding the rezoning.

Appellants' major contentions are that the rezoning has and will depreciate the value of their homes situated in the general neighborhood, and that permitting light industry in that portion of the valley is not consistent with the general welfare because inter alia existing roads and sewers are inadequate to accommodate the traffic which will be developed by the improvement of this vacant land in conformity with the new ordinance.

The trial court made a finding 16, as follows: 'It is true that the Council of the City of Los Angeles considered each and every of the following factors, each of which is true, or may have had them in mind, at the time of passing Ordinance No. 102,641: (a) Industry within the San Fernando Valley was inadequate to supply the necessary industrial employment for the inhabitants thereof. (b) The amount of industrially zoned land as compared to otherwise zoned land was much less proportionately within the San Fernando Valley portion of the City of Los Angeles than in the remainder of the City. (c) The amount of industrially zoned land as compared to population was much less proportionately within the San Fernando Valley portion of the City of Los Angeles than within the remainder of the City. (d) A far greater number of persons were commuting from the San Fernando Valley for their employment than were entering for such purpose. (e) Plots of land available for industrial development within the San Fernando Valley portion of the City of Los Angeles were scattered in location, small in size and diverse in ownership and thus greatly hindered industrial development thereof. (f) The rezoned land here in question is located in one of the least populated portions of the San Fernando Valley, and the possible annoyance as a result of the rezoning thereof will thus be inflicted on the least possible number of persons. (g) The terrain of the rezoned area here in question is essentially flat, and thus lends itself most easily to industrial development. (h) The rezoned area here in question is, in the main, undeveloped other than the agricultural use of portions thereof, and thus when eventually developed would have among the least non-conforming uses of any like size area within the San Fernando Valley. (i) The extension of the existing population numerical trend within the San Fernando Valley indicated a population therein of approximately one million persons by the year 1965. (j) The population directional trend within the San Fernando Valley was toward the west end of the Valley. (k) Most, if not all, of the owners of the land within the rezoned area favored such rezoning, and none expressed any opposition or objection to such rezoning. (l) The Southern Pacific Railroad Line runs through the heart of the rezoned area and thus provides shipping facilities essential to industrial development but detrimental to residential development. (m) The rezoned area was one of the best located in the San Fernando Valley from the standpoint of availability of industrial power. (n) The rezoned area was one of the best located in the San Fernando Valley from the standpoint of availability of industrial quantities and pressures of water. (o) The master plan of the City of Los Angeles indicated ample highway and roadway access to the rezoned area. (p) Large amounts of industrial land within the City of Los Angeles portion of the San Fernando Valley have been used for other than industrial purposes or have been rezoned for residential use, thus magnifying the shortage of industrially zoned land. (q) Light industrial development would not necessarily retard or restrict and could well enhance nearby residential growth. (r) Light industrial development would not necessarily impair and could well increase nearby residential land values. (s) Large buffer areas were provided between the rezoned area and the nearest residential development.' Appellants' counsel does not undertake to show, except by way of general arguments, that the evidence fails to support these findings.

The principles upholding zoning ordinances as valid exercise of the police power in furtherance of the general welfare are well established in this state. See Miller v. Board of Public Works, 195 Cal. 477, 487, 234 P. 381, 38 A.L.R. 1479; Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 211 Cal. 304, 307, 295 P. 14. 'As our civic life has developed so has the definition of 'public welfare' until it has been held to embrace regulations 'to promote the economic welfare, public convenience, and general prosperity of the community.' Chicago, B & Q. R. Co. v. [State of] Illinois, supra [200 U.S. 561, 26 S.Ct. 341, 50 L.Ed. 596]. Thus it is apparent that the police power is not a circumscribed prerogative, but is elastic and, in keeping with the growth of knowledge and the belief in the popular mind of the need for its application, capable of expansion to meet existing conditions of modern life, and thereby keep pace with the social economic, moral, and intellectual evolution of the human race.' Miller v. Board of Public Works, supra, 195 Cal. 477, 485, 234 P. 381, 383. It also has been noted in the following decisions that the police power develops and expands with, and advances to meet, changing conditions: Ayres v. City Council of Los Angeles, 34 Cal.2d 31, 43, 207 P.2d 1, 11 A.L.R.2d 503; Miller v. Board of Public Works, supra, 195 Cal. 477, 484, 234 P. 381.

While a zoning ordinance, or its application to particular property, must have a 'reasonable tendency to promote the public morals, health, safety, or general welfare and prosperity of a community,' Miller v. Board of Public Works, supra, 195 Cal. at page 488, 234 P. at page 385, and be free from arbitrary and discriminatory conception and application, every intendment is in favor of validity of the action of the legislative authority, which will not be overthrown unless plaintiff produces evidence establishing physical facts justifying, or rather requiring, the conclusion that the ordinance is as a matter of law unreasonable and invalid. Wilkins v. City of San Bernardino, 29 Cal.2d 332, 338, 175 P.2d 542; In re Angelus, 65 Cal.App.2d 441, 454, 150 P.2d 908; Lockard v. City of Los Angeles, 33 Cal.2d 453, 460-461, 202 P.2d 38, 7 A.L.R.2d 990; Clemons v. City of Los Angeles, 36 Cal.2d 95, 98, 222 P.2d 439; Skalko v. City of Sunnyvale, 14 Cal.2d 213, 215, 93 P.2d 93; Otis v. City of Los Angeles, 52 Cal.App.2d 605, 614, 126 P.2d 954. The fact that plaintiffs' property may depreciate in value as a result of rezoning does not establish unreasonableness or invalidity, for '[d]amage caused by the proper exercise of the police power is merely one of the prices an individual must pay as a member of society.' Reynolds v. Barrett, 12 Cal.2d 244, 250, 83 P.2d 29, 32; see also authorities last hereinbefore cited. If the matter is debatable, if...