Robinson v. Delgado

• Decision Date: 17 February 2011
• Docket Number: No. 1:02-CV-01538 NJV,1:02-CV-01538 NJV
• Parties: ANTHONY L. ROBINSON, Plaintiff, v. ROGELIO DELGADO, et al, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of California

ANTHONY L. ROBINSON, Plaintiff,
v.
ROGELIO DELGADO, et al, Defendants.

No. 1:02-CV-01538 NJV

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
EUREKA DIVISION

Dated: February 17, 2011

ORDER RE MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS PURSUANT TO 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). (Doc. No. 319)

This is a prisoner civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 which proceeded to trial on May 10, 2010, before the undersigned. A jury verdict was entered on May 17, 2010, and the case is now before the Court on Plaintiff's motion for attorneys' fees and costs. As set forth below, the Court will grant Plaintiff's motion.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is a prisoner serving a sentence of twenty-three years to life for second degree murder with a firearm, with enhancements for being a habitual criminal. During his incarceration, Plaintiff became a member of the House of Yahweh Yadhaim ("HOYY"). After joining HOYY, Plaintiff filed numerous inmate appeals regarding his right to free exercise of his religion under the First Amendment, which form the basis for Plaintiff's claim against Defendants Cate and Hedgpeth. Plaintiff's claim against Defendants Delgado and Olivarria arises from a physical altercation that occurred on March 25, 2001, as they were escorting Plaintiff to and from a prison visitor center.

Plaintiff's original complaint, which was filed pro se, alleged eleven causes of action against ninety-two defendants. The Court appointed counsel to represent Plaintiff on September 18, 2007. (Docket No. 112.) Eventually, two claims remained in the case: (1) an Eighth Amendment

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excessive force claim against Defendants Delgado and Olivarria, which arose from the March 25, 2001 altercation; and (2) a claim against Defendants Cate and Hedgpeth under the First Amendment, the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act ("RLUIPA") based on Defendants' failure to provide Plaintiff with a kosher diet or access to the prison chapel for group worship. Defendants moved to dismiss, or for summary judgment on, these claims on June 18, 2008. (Docket No. 157.) On August 6, 2008, Judge Wilken dismissed Plaintiff's claims against Defendants Cate and Hedgpeth in their individual capacities and denied the remainder of Defendants' motion to dismiss and for summary judgment. (Docket No. 173).

On February 23, 2010, Defendants moved for summary judgment on Plaintiffs First Amendment religious diet claim, his RLUIPA claim, and his First Amendment equal protection claim. (Docket No. 231.) Defendants also moved for dismissal of Plaintiff's injunctive relief claims against Defendant Hedgpeth, Warden of Salinas Valley State Prison, where Plaintiff was incarcerated until June 3, 2008. Id. Plaintiff opposed the motion for summary judgment, but did not oppose the dismissal of the injunctive relief claims against Defendant Hedgpeth. (Docket No. 236.) On April 19, 2010, the Court denied Defendants' motion for summary judgment and dismissed Plaintiff's claims against Defendant Hedgpeth without prejudice. (Docket No. 243.)

This case proceeded to trial on May 10, 2010, in San Francisco. After five days of trial, the jury reached a verdict on May 17, 2010, finding as follows: (1) for Defendants Delgado and Olivarria as to the claim of excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment arising from the incident on March 25, 2001; (2) for Defendant Delgado as to the claim of failure to protect under the Eighth Amendment arising from the incident on March 25, 2001; (3) in favor of Defendant Cate as to the claims for group worship and access to the prison chapel on Plaintiffs Sabbath and religious feast days under the First Amendment, the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and RLUIPA; and (4) in favor of Plaintiff as to the claim that Plaintiff be provided with the same kosher meals as those provided to kosher-observant Jewish inmates under the First Amendment, the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and RLUIPA. (Docket No. 266).

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In particular, the jury found that Plaintiff had met his burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that:

(1) His sincerely held religious beliefs require him to abide by certain dietary restrictions (id, Question Nos. 11, 27);

(2) Cate "continues to deny Plaintiff a diet that satisfies the requirements of his sincerely held religious beliefs" (id., Question Nos. 12, 28);

(3) Such refusal constitutes both "substantial interference with Plaintiffs sincerely held religious beliefs" (id., Question No. 13) and a "substantial burden on Plaintiffs exercise of religion" (id., Question No. 29);

(4) Robinson is "similarly-situated to kosher-observant Jewish inmates" with regard to his request for a diet that satisfies the requirements of his sincerely held religious beliefs" (id., Question No. 19);

(5) Cate is "treating Plaintiff differently from kosher-observant Jewish inmates" by refusing to provide him with such a diet (id., Question No. 20); and

(6) Cate's disparate treatment of Robinson constitutes intentional discrimination (id., Question No. 21).

The jury further found that Cate's refusal to provide Robinson with a diet consist with his religious beliefs was neither "justified by a compelling government interest" (id., Question No. 30) nor reasonably related to any legitimate penological interests (id., Question Nos. 12, 28). The jury thus found for Plaintiff on all three kosher diet claims: the claims under the First Amendment, the Fourteenth Amendment, and RLUIPA.

On August 31, 2010, the Court entered a permanent injunction, providing in pertinent part that as follows:

Defendant Matthew Cate, Secretary of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, and his agents and all persons in active concert or participating with any of them who receive actual notice of this Order and Permanent Injunction, are hereby and immediately and permanently ordered to permit Plaintiff to participate in the CDCR's Jewish Kosher Meal Program on the same terms and conditions as kosher-observant Jewish inmates and without regard to the fact that Plaintiff is not a kosher-observant Jew.

(Docket No. 316, p. 19.)

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Plaintiff now seeks attorneys' fees and costs incurred in prosecuting his kosher diet and chapel access claims. He argues that he is the prevailing party and that his counsel should be fully compensated even though he did not prevail on all claims. He also seeks an award of costs. Defendants oppose the motion.

LEGAL STANDARD

Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) a prevailing party in an action brought under certain enumerated statutes, including 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and RLUIPA, is generally entitled to attorneys' fees. "The purpose of § 1988 is to ensure effective access to the judicial process for persons with civil rights grievances." Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 1937 (1983) (citation and internal quotations omitted). "Accordingly, a prevailing plaintiff should ordinarily recover an attorney's fee unless special circumstances would render such an award unjust." Id.(citation and internal quotations omitted).

"In order to qualify as a prevailing party, a plaintiff must have succeeded on the merits of at least some of its claims." Parks Sch. of Bus., Inc. v. Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1489 (9^th Cir. 1995). "In short, a plaintiff 'prevails' when actual relief of the merits of [the plaintiff's] claim materially alters the legal relationship between the parties by modifying the defendant's behavior in a way that directly benefits the plaintiff." Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 111-12, 113 S.Ct. 566, 573 (1992). "Success is [also] measured... in terms of the significance of the legal issue on which the plaintiff prevailed and the public purpose the litigation served." Morales v. City of San Rafael, 96 F.3d 359, 365 (9^th Cir. 1996), amended by 108 F.3d 981 (9^th Cir. 1997) (order). The Ninth Circuit has expressly held that the award of injunctive relief was sufficient to support an award of attorneys' fees where the plaintiffs primarily requested injunctive relief and were for the most part successful in obtaining the relief they sought. Friend v. Kolodzieczak, 72 F.3d 1386, 1390 (9^th Cir. 1995) (finding that where the plaintiffs had sought and received expanded access to Roman Catholic services and sacraments, and gained explicit, written acknowledgment of the right to at least limited use of rosaries and scapulars, the outcome of the lawsuit materially altered the legal relationship between the parties in a manner that was meaningful and substantial so as to support an award of attorneys' fees).

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DISCUSSION

A. FRCP Rule 68 Offer

Defendants initially contend that rejection of their Rule 68 offer bars Plaintiff from recovering attorneys' fees and costs incurred after the offer was made. Defendants rely on the fact that on October 5, 2007, they extended an offer of judgment under Rule 68 in the amount of $250. (Docket No. 115; Decl. Mossler, ¶ 2, Ex. A.) The offer was rejected on October 25, 2007. Id.Defendants argue that Plaintiff's counsel's rejection of their offer under Rule 68 bars counsel from recovery of attorneys' fees and costs incurred after October 5, 2007, and...