Robinson v. Legro

• Decision Date: 27 May 2014
• Docket Number: Supreme Court Case No. 12SC1002
• Citation: 325 P.3d 1053
• Parties: Samuel ROBINSON and Cheri Robinson, Petitioners v. Stephen LEGRO and Renee Legro, Respondents
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

325 P.3d 1053

Samuel ROBINSON and Cheri Robinson, Petitioners

v.Stephen LEGRO and Renee Legro, Respondents

Supreme Court Case No. 12SC1002

Supreme Court of Colorado.

May 27, 2014

Court of Appeals Case No. 11CA1403

Attorneys for Petitioners: Campbell Latiolais & Averbach, LLC, Michael O. Frazier, Denver, Colorado

Attorneys for Respondents: Bloch & Chapleau, LLC, Joseph D. Bloch, Trenton J. Ongert, Denver, Colorado

Attorneys for Amici Curiae: Holsinger Law, LLC, Kent Holsinger, Jack Silver, Alyson Meyer Gould, Denver, Colorado

En Banc

JUSTICE HOOD delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶ 1 When a bicyclist in Eagle County was attacked by two ranch dogs working to protect their sheep, reporters covering the incident billed it as an inevitable clash between ranchers and recreation enthusiasts.¹ The bicyclist and the dogs encountered each other because the federally owned land on which the attack took place was subject to both a sheep grazing permit and a recreational use permit. Colorado's dog bite statute, section 13–21–124, C.R.S. (2013), governs “civil actions against dog owners” and imposes strict liability on a dog owner whose dog causes serious bodily injury or death unless at least one of six exemptions applies. The ranchers here seek to invoke the “working dog” exemption in section 13–21–124(5)(f) because their dogs were predator control dogs. Our task is to construe the phrase “on the property of or under the control of the dog's owner” within this exemption.²

¶ 2 The court of appeals interpreted this phrase to require that the dogs were working as predator control dogs on the dog owner's property or on property under the dog owner's control. SeeRobinson v. Legro, 2012 COA 182, ¶ 34, 328 P.3d 238, 2012 WL 5266059. We disagree with this interpretation.We instead hold that the working dog exemption applies when a bite occurs on the dog owner's property or when the dog is working under the control of the dog owner. Our holding stems from the plain language of section 13–21–124(5)(f), as well as its statutory context.

I. Facts and Procedural History

¶ 3 Petitioners Samuel and Cheri Robinson are sheep ranchers who hold a “Term Grazing Permit” issued by the United States Forest Service.³ The permit allows the Robinsons to graze a certain number of sheep on federal land within the White River National Forest in Eagle County for a period of ten years, at which time they must reapply for the permit. The Robinsons owned several Great Pyrenees dogs to protect their sheep from predators. Predator control dogs bond with and protect livestock by patrolling the grazing area, alerting the livestock to potential threats such as coyotes and bears, and chasing predators away as necessary.

¶ 4 Respondent Renee Legro was attacked on a public road by two of the Robinsons' dogs, Tiny and Pastor, while participating in a mountain bike race sponsored by the Vail Recreation District. The road is located on land that both the Robinsons and the Vail Recreation District were entitled, by permit, to access.⁴ Ms. Legro sustained serious injuries during the attack. Neither the Robinsons nor their employees were near the scene. The Robinsons' shepherd “was about a little over a mile away from the area of the incident,” “down by the river, trying to get the sheep to move along,” at the time of the attack; he did not hear about the incident until the next day. Campers intervened to help Ms. Legro.

¶ 5 Ms. Legro and her husband, respondent Stephen Legro, filed a lawsuit against the Robinsons in Eagle County District Court. They alleged claims of negligence, negligence per se, and loss of consortium. They also brought a strict liability claim under the dog bite statute, section 13–21–124.

¶ 6 The Robinsons filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that: (1) the Colorado Premises Liability Act (“PLA”), section 13–21–115, C.R.S. (2013), preempts the Legros' common law claims; and (2) they are immune from strict liability under the working dog exemption to the dog bite statute. The district court granted the motion. First, the court determined that the PLA preempts the Legros' common law claims because the Robinsons' grazing privileges qualified them as “landowners” ⁵ under the PLA; consequently, it dismissed those claims. Second, while the court assumed that the PLA does not preempt a claim under the dog bite statute, it nonetheless dismissed the Legros' strict liability claim based on the working dog exemption. It concluded that a lessor of land for ranching purposes qualifies for exemption from strict liability pursuant to section 13–21–124(5)(f) and that, because the Robinsons owned the dogs and the dogs were working as predator control dogs at the time of the incident, the Robinsons satisfied all of the requirements of the exemption.

¶ 7 On appeal, the court of appeals affirmed the summary judgment order in part and reversed it in part. Robinson, ¶ 1. With respect to the Legros' common law claims, the court agreed that they were preempted because the Robinsons are “landowners” under the PLA, and the PLA is the exclusive statute governing tort actions for injuries occurring on “landowner” property. Id. at ¶¶ 18, 20.⁶ With respect to the strict liability claim under the dog bite statute, the court examined the relationship between the PLA and the dog bite statute and concluded that both statutes may be given effect in this case if, on remand, the Legros seek to amend their complaint by adding a PLA claim.⁷Id. at ¶¶ 25–27. The court of appeals then disagreed with the district court's conclusion that the working dog exemption applied to the Robinsons, reversed the dismissal of the Legros' strict liability claim based on the record before it, and remanded for further proceedings. Id. at ¶ 44.

¶ 8 The court of appeals stated that “whether the property was under the Robinsons' ‘control’ owing to their grazing activities” was “the dispositive issue” for whether the subsection (5)(f) exemption applies to the Robinsons. Id. at ¶ 29. The court rejected the interpretation that “under the control of” relates to control of the dog, not control of the property “because it would be illogical to conclude that the General Assembly intended to exclude from liability the owner of a dog that bites a person when the dog is under the owner's control.” Id. at ¶ 32 n. 3. The court then defined “control” in the context of property to mean, at a minimum, “sufficient control over the property such that a dog owner has the right to exclude persons from the property.” Id. at ¶ 38.

¶ 9 We granted certiorari to assess whether the court of appeals properly interpreted the phrase “on the property of or under the control of the dog's owner” in the working dog exemption to the dog bite statute.

II. Standard of Review

¶ 10 We review de novo questions of statutory construction. Klinger v. Adams Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. 50, 130 P.3d 1027, 1031 (Colo.2006). We also review summary judgment orders de novo. Feiger, Collison & Killmer v. Jones, 926 P.2d 1244, 1250 (Colo.1996).

III. Analysis

¶ 11 For the first time, we are asked to construe the language of the working dog exemption to Colorado's dog bite statute. We begin by discussing the dog bite statute and the working dog exemption. We then apply basic canons of statutory construction and consider the context of the statutory language to interpret the phrase “on the property of or under the control of the dog's owner” because the applicability of the subsection (5)(f) exemption to the Robinsons in this case depends upon the meaning of that key phrase.

¶ 12 Enacted in 2004, section 13–21–124 imposes strict liability on a dog owner whose dog causes serious bodily injury or death to a person who is lawfully on either public or private property, unless at least one of six exemptions applies. See§ 13–21–124(2), (5). Here, it is undisputed that the dogs that bit Ms. Legro were predator control dogs, and the Robinsons therefore seek to invoke the working dog exemption:

A dog owner shall not be liable to a person who suffers bodily injury, serious bodily injury, or death from being bitten by the dog ... [w]hile the dog is working as a hunting dog, herding dog, farm or ranch dog, or predator control dog on the property of or under the control of the dog's owner.

§ 13–21–124(5)(f) (emphasis added).

¶ 13 To interpret the meaning of the working dog exemption, we apply long-standing principles of statutory construction. SeePeople v. Voth, 2013 CO 61, ¶ 21, 312 P.3d 144, 149. Our function is to ascertain and give effect to the General Assembly's intent. People v. Vigil, 758 P.2d 670, 672 (Colo.1988); see also State v. Nieto, 993 P.2d 493, 502 (Colo.2000) (describing legislative intent as “the polestar of statutory construction”).

¶ 14 When faced with a statutory construction issue, we look first to “the plain and ordinary meaning of the statutory language.” People v. Madden, 111 P.3d 452, 457 (Colo.2005). We prefer “a commonly accepted meaning” over “a strained or forced interpretation.” Voth, 312 P.3d at 149. At the same time, “we must read and consider the statutory scheme as a whole to give consistent, harmonious and sensible effect to all its parts.” Charnes v. Boom, 766 P.2d 665, 667 (Colo.1988); accord People v.Luther, 58 P.3d 1013, 1015 (Colo.2002) (“We presume that the General Assembly intended the entire statute to be effective and intended a just and reasonable result.”); People v. Terry, 791 P.2d 374, 376 (Colo.1990) (emphasizing that courts must avoid “constructions that would render meaningless a part of the statute”).

¶ 15 The disputed phrase within section 13–21–124(5)(f) is “on the property of or under the control of the dog's owner.” Read in context, a dog owner is not strictly liable for a dog bite that occurs “[w]hile the dog is working as a hunting dog, herding dog, farm or ranch dog, or predator control dog on the property of or under the control of the dog's owner.”§ 13–21–124(5)(f) (emphasis added).

¶ 16 The...