Robinson v. Leighton

• Decision Date: 07 March 1923
• Citation: 119 A. 809
• Parties: ROBINSON v. LEIGHTON.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

119 A. 809

ROBINSON

v. LEIGHTON.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

March 7, 1923.

Report from Superior Court, Cumberland County, at Law.

Action by Carl M. Robinson against Adam P. Leighton. On report from the superior court of Cumberland county at law. Judgment for defendant.

Argued before CORNISH, C. J., and SPEAR, PHILBROOK, DUNN, WILSON, and DEASY, JJ.

Clement F. Robinson and Arthur L. Robinson, both of Portland, for plaintiff.

William H. Gulliver and William B. Mahoney, both of Portland, for defendant.

DUNN, J. The owners of certain kinds of buildings are required to provide fire escapes from every story above the level of the ground. R. S. c. 30, § 38. The duty remains the same, although the buildings are in the possession of tenants. Carrigan v. Stillwell, 97 Me. 247, 54 Atl. 389, 61 L. R. A. 163.

Phis defendant owned a four-story building within the statute's sway. On the second floor of the building, the plaintiff, a physician and surgeon, had his offices, as a tenant at will. One January afternoon, in 1921, he desired to indicate to a patient the whereabouts of another doctor's office. So he and the patient left the plaintiff's offices, the plaintiff preceding. They walked down an adjoining hallway or corridor, a distance of five or six feet, to a door in the rear wall of the building. The door had a spring lock on the inside. The plaintiff opened the door, and thence stepped down, six inches, onto a fire escape, intending to point out the location of the other doctor's office.

The fire escape was made of iron. It was accessible only from the second story, through the opening of the door. At one end stairs or steps entered from a similar platform on the next story, and there were still other stairs leading from another part toward the ground. In construction, the fire escape comprised a three-foot rail-inclosed frame, extending lengthwise from supporting brackets on the building, in which was set, as a platform or floor, a grating about seven feet long and four feet wide. This grating was made of slats laid an inch apart and held in place by lateral rods. Clamps or plates, two inches in length and one-half inch less in width, bolted together from the bottom to the top of the grating, with the bolt resting against a crossbar, fastened the platform in position. These clamps had become displaced. They were, to use the expression of a witness, "on the wrong side" of the bar. Consequently, when the plaintiff stepped on the grating, it tipped beneath his weight, and he was precipitated, through the open space presenting, to the ground. For the personal injuries thus sustained he is seeking damages. The case, both of law and fact, is referred to the court.

A rule similar to that of caveat emptor applying, it certainly may be defined as a general proposition applicable to premises actually let, that the lessor, in his relation to the lessee, does not warrant their condition, and that he is not liable for any injury suffered by the tenant during his occupancy by reason of defects. There must be proof of exceptional circumstances to make the landlord liable in such cases; some proof of fraud or misrepresentation or direct concealment of a fact known to the lessor, which the lessee did not have any reasonable opportunity of discovering. There must be proof of some direct omission by the lessor of the performance of a duty which he owed to the lessee in order to make the landlord liable. Libbey v. Tolford, 48 Me. 316, 77 Am. Dec. 229; McKenzie v. Cheetham, 83 Me. 543, 22 Atl. 469; Whitmore v. Orono Pulp & Paper Co., 91 Me. 297, 39 Atl. 1032, 40 L. R. A. 377, 64 Am. St. Rep. 229; Bennett v Sullivan, 100 Me. 118, 60 Atl. 886; Hill v. Day. 108 Me. 467, 81 Atl. 581, Ann. Cas. 1913C, 971.

It is established that when the landlord has reserved to himself, for the common use of the tenants of a building, the control of such portions as its stairways, and hallways, and balconies, he owes it to the tenants to see that such parts are maintained in a reasonably safe condition, or at least to exercise common care and prudence to that end. Toole v. Beckett, 67 Me. 544, 24 Am. Rep. 54; McCarthy v. York Bank, 74 Me. 315, 43 Am. Rep. 591; Sawyer v. McGillicuddy, 81 Me. 318, 17 Atl. 124, 3 L. R. A. 458, 10 Am. St. Rep. 260; Miller v. Hooper, 119 Me. 527, 112 Atl. 256.

The plaintiff concedes that no other right than to use the fire escape as an emergency exit was granted to him by contract, and that he never asked permission to use it otherwise. He would base his claim to an indemnity, not upon the theory of the breach of a contractual liability, but on the law of negligence. His insistence is that he was using the fire escape, not as a trespasser, nor yet as a mere licensee, but as a licensee upon the owner's invitation.

If, in its use, he were a trespasser, his position would be that of one coming upon the property of another without right, and, therefore, speaking in a broad phrase, bound to accept the existing situation. Were he allowed to come there for his own interest or convenience, as a mere licensee (Stanwood v. Clancey, 106 Me. 72, 75 Atl. 293, 26 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1213; Patten v. Bartlett, 111 Me. 409, 89 Atl. 375, 49 L. R. A. [N. S.] 1120) the owner owed him no duty, except not to willfully cause him harm (Parker v. Portland Publishing Co., 69 Me. 173, 31 Am. Rep. 262; Dixon v. Swift, 98 Me. 207, 56 Atl. 761; Russell v. M. C. R. R., 100 Me. 406, 61 Atl. 899; Stanwood v. Clancey, supra; Austin v. Baker, 112 Me. 267, 91 Atl. 1005, L. R. A. 1915F, 1130). If he were impliedly invited there, that is, if he were there by the owner's Inducement or enticement, it was the duty of the owner to maintain the place in a reasonably, safe and suitable condition. Stanwood v. Clancey, supra; Austin v. Baker, supra.

Invitations, like contracts, may be...