Robinson v. Merlite Land Sea & Sky, Inc.
| Decision Date | 30 September 1969 |
| Citation | 61 Misc.2d 462,305 N.Y.S.2d 289 |
| Parties | Forrest J. ROBINSON, Plaintiff, v. MERLITE LAND SEA & SKY, INC., Defendant. |
| Court | New York City Court |
Fuller, Hopkins, Lawton & Taussig, New York City, for plaintiff.
Bass & Friend, New York City, for defendant.
Once again the breadth of commerce across our union has engendered a multi-state controversy that requires a court to decide precisely where the Due Process Clause intersects the Full Faith and Credit Clause.
On January 20, 1968, plaintiff and defendant entered into a 'standard franchise agreement.' For purposes of this decision, I shall assume that the agreement was signed in New York City. Plaintiff is a resident of Iowa. Defendant is a New York Corporation with its sole place of business in New York City. The agreement provided, in substance, that plaintiff was to be defendant's 'exclusive franchisee' for the sale of certain gift certificates in Iowa, and that 'all prospective agents developed through (defendant's) recruitment campaign in (Iowa) shall be turned over to' plaintiff.
Alleging that defendant had breached the franchise agreement, on August 20, 1968, plaintiff commenced an action against defendant in the District Court of Iowa, Fayette County. On August 21, plaintiff filed process and his pleading with the Secretary of State of Iowa, who, on August 22, mailed them to defendant in New York City. The papers stated that defendant had sixty days within which to appear and defend. Defendant did nothing. On October 25, the case was called for trial before a judge of the Iowa District Court. The record states that there was 'no appearance' for defendant. An inquest was taken, and judgment entered for plaintiff against defendant in the sum of $3000 plus interest and costs. On October 25, the clerk of the Iowa court sent notice of the default judgment to defendant.
Defendant did not pay, and so, in March, 1969, plaintiff instituted an action in this court on the Iowa judgment. Defendant answered in due course, raising as a defense the invalidity of the Iowa judgment.
If the Iowa court was empowered to enter a judgment against defendant, this court is required, without further ado, to enforce it. U.S. Constitution, art. IV, sec. 1; Title 28, United States Code, sec. 1738.
The question for decision, then, is whether the Iowa court was indeed so empowered. Were it for Iowa to say, the answer would plainly be yes. The Iowa 'long-arm' statute authorizes service of process upon the Secretary of State of Iowa in actions against non-Iowa corporations 'arising from' any 'contract with a resident of Iowa to be performed in whole or in part by either party in Iowa.' Iowa Code, sec. 617.3. Defendant here is a non-Iowa corporation; plaintiff is an Iowa resident; the action arose from a contract to be performed by plaintiff in part in Iowa; and thus, by force of the Iowa statute, the Iowa court had jurisdiction to enter judgment against defendant. But it is for federal law, not Iowa law, to answer the question before me. In particular, it is the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment which must speak, since it limits the power of a state to enter judgment against a defendant not served with process within the state's boundaries. We therefore turn to that Clause and to the great cases that have construed it.
In Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 24 L.Ed. 565 (1878), the Supreme Court held that the Due Process Clause permits a state to enter judgments only against persons served with process within the state. From that simple rule of palpability, the Court moved to other, more flexible tests, such as 'consent,' 'doing business,' and 'presence.' See generally James, Civil Procedure, pp. 636--644 (1965). Then, in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945), the Court explicitly adopted a rule of fairness (Id. at 316, 66 S.Ct., at 158):
'* * * due process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment In personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."
In McGee v. International Life Insurance Co., 355 U.S. 220, 78 S.Ct. 199, 2 L.Ed.2d 223 (1957), the Court showed how minimal the 'contacts' need be still to comport with 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.' And in Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 78 S.Ct. 1228, 2 L.Ed.2d 1283 (1958), the Court demonstrated that if the defendant's 'contacts' with a state are less than that necessary minimum the state's judgment will lack due process and hence not be entitled to full...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Caesar's World, Inc. v. Spencer Foods, Inc.
...it ignores that "portion of the inducement" quoted above.3 A similar argument was likewise rejected in Robinson v. Merlite Land Sea & Sky, Inc., 61 Misc.2d 462, 305 N.Y.S.2d 289 (1969), affirmed, 64 Misc.2d 911, 316 N.Y.S.2d 455 (1970). In that case, an Iowa plaintiff sued a New York firm f......
- Lecci v. Leonard
-
Robinson v. Merlite Land, Sea & Sky, Inc.
...of the City of New York, New York County, entered October 16, 1969, which granted a motion by plaintiff for summary judgment, 61 Misc.2d 462, 305 N.Y.S.2d 289. Solomon H. Friend and Jerold W. Dorfman, New York City, for Fuller, Hopkins, Lawton & Taussig, New York City (Walter L. Hopkins, Ne......