Robinson v. Peterson
| Decision Date | 10 November 1976 |
| Docket Number | No. 43788,43788 |
| Citation | 555 P.2d 1348,87 Wn.2d 665 |
| Parties | Monty O. ROBINSON, a prisoner in the Pierce County jail at Tacoma, Washington, and all others similarly situated, Petitioners, v. Carl PETERSON, Sheriff of Pierce County, State of Washington, et al., Respondents. |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
Thomas G. Bruce, Pierce County Legal Assistance Foundation, Tacoma, for appellants.
Don F. Herron, Pierce County Prosecuting Atty., Mark L. Bubenik, Deputy Pros. Atty., Tacoma, for respondents.
This action was instituted by persons who were inmates at the Pierce County jail, seeking a writ of mandamus to compel the Pierce County judges to promulgate rules pursuant to RCW 36.63.060, and to provide certain facilities to which the petitioners claimed to be entitled. The sheriff and county commissioners were also joined as defendants.
While the action was pending, rules were adopted by the judges. The petitioners then challenged the adequacy of the rules to meet alleged constitutional requirements. A trial was held in Pierce County, a visiting judge sitting. He denied the petitioners' motion to allow the matter to proceed as a class action, as provided in CR 23.
The respondents were represented by the prosecuting attorney for Pierce County. Before the end of the trial, the prosecutor and the petitioners stipulated to certain changes in the rules as adopted by the superior court. The court found the rules, as amended, to be proper and reasonable with certain exceptions. It then issued a writ of mandate, ordering the respondents to make, fund and implement certain changes in the rules. The petitioners, not being satisfied with this order, appealed to this court. No cross appeal was taken by the respondents, and they have assigned no errors. We do not have befoer us, therefore, the question whether the court properly prescribed changes in the rules and ordered funding of the same.
Since the trial, the petitioners have been discharged from the jail, and the case is moot unless it can be treated as a class action. Since the case involves questions of concern to all jail inmates, whose interests with respect to those questions are not in conflict, and since the joinder of all of them is impractical, the jail population being a constantly changing one; since the parties opposing the class have acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, and since the ability of the petitioners' counsel to adequately represent the class has not been questioned, the doctrine of Johnson v. Moore, 80 Wash.2d 531, 496 P.2d 334 (1972), is appropriately applied here.
Had the matter been allowed to proceed as a class action, the question of mootness would not have arisen. Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 95 S.Ct. 553, 42 L.Ed.2d 532 (1975); Cerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 95 S.Ct. 854, 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975). Inasmuch as there are no monetary claims or property rights involved, the interests of other members of the class not joined are not adversely affected by the lack of notice, their interests being in harmony with and not adverse to those of the petitioners. See CR 23(c). Mattern v. Weinberger, 519 F.2d 150 (3d Cir. 1975); Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 58 F.2d 239 (3d Cir. 1975), Cert. denied 421 U.S. 1011, 95 S.Ct. 2415, 44 L.Ed.2d 679 (1976). The respondents concede that the action has proceeded as a de facto class action and raise no objection on the ground of mootness. For these reasons, and since the action properly could have been allowed to proceed as a class suit, we will treat it as such for purposes of this appeal.
RCW 36.63.060 provides that the judges of the superior courts of the several counties shall, from time to time, prescribe in writing, rules for the regulation and government of the jails, upon subjects which are listed in the section. 1 The statute further provides that the judges shall prescribe '(s)uch other regulations as the judges deem necessary to promote the welfare of the prisoners: Provided, That such rules shall not be contrary to law.'
The superior court judges, in making these rules, sat not as a judicial body but as a specially designated administrative body. The function which they exercised was legislative in character. We must then consider what is the proper scope of review of such actions.
Since judicial administrative agencies are expressly excluded from the coverage of the administrative procedure act, RCW 34.04.010(1), we must look to the common law to find the extent of our reviewing power.
The common law principles are summarized in 73 C.J.S. Public Administrative Bodies & Procedure § 229 (1951). According to that encyclopedia, in reviewing an agency's order which is of a legislative character, the court should only determine whether the agency acted within constitutional and statutory limits. See Kitsap-Mason Dairymen's Ass'n v. Washington State Tax Comm'n, 77 Wash.2d 812, 814, 467 P.2d 312 (1970). The judicial inquiry, insofar as it goes beyond a consideration of power within the statute, should be limited to a consideration of whether the order is so at odds with fundamental principles as to manifest an abuse of power. In a proper case, a court may declare a rule adopted by an administrative agency void, but it will not interfere with a rule where its adoption is within the authority conferred by the controlling law, and it is not wholly unreasonable, or such a breach of discretion as to transcend the purpose for which the power to adopt it was conferred. The court will not aid in making or revising a rule, or pass on the widsom or policy of a rule, or substitute its opinion for that of the administrative body. It is confined to deciding whether a rule is lawful and reasonable as applied to the facts of a particular justiciable case.
As stated by the United States Supreme Court in American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. United States, 299 U.S. 232, 236, 57 S.Ct. 170, 81 L.Ed. 142 (1936), a court is not at liberty to substitute its own discretion for that of administrative officers who have kept within the bounds of their administrative powers. Error or unwisdom is not equivalent to abuse of power.
Although it has not always used the same terminology, this court generally has applied the same standards, setting aside administrative actions only when they are found to be arbitrary and capricious. Farrell v. Seattle,75 Wash.2d 540, 452 P.2d 965 (1969). One who attacks a rule has the burden of establishing its invalidity, since such a rule enacted pursuant to delegated authority is presumed valid. Gray v. Powell, 314 U.S. 402, 62 S.Ct. 326, 86 L.Ed. 301 (1941); American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. United States, supra. The petitioners do not question the validity of RCW 36.63.060. There is no express claim that the superior court judges failed to follow the statutory guidelines. However, their attack upon the constitutionality of the rules may be viewed as a claimed violation of that guideline which requires that the rules not be contrary to law.
The petitioners cite no Washington case supporting any of their contentions with respect to the rights of jail inmates. Questions concerning the rights of inmates of prisons and the duties of their custodians have not been frequently before this court. This should not be surprising, since the administration of the state institutions and county jails is an executive function and not a judicial one. January v. Porter, 75 Wash.2d 768, 453 P.2d 876 (1969).
We have recently said that prison discipline is an administrative and not a judicial function, and that an inmate is subject to such discipline, including reasonable punishment for infraction of rules. State v. Williams, 57 Wash.2d 231, 356 P.2d 99 (1960). We said in January v. Porter, supra, that parole is a privilege and not a right, and its revocation lies within the exclusive discretion of the parole board. We noted, however, that a parolee is entitled to a hearing, under RCW 9.95.120, 30 days after he is returned to custody.
We have upheld the right of jail officials to examine the letters and packages, incoming and outgoing, of all inmates. State v. Hawkins, 70 Wash.2d 697, 425 P.2d 390 (1967), Cert. denied 390 U.S. 912, 88 S.Ct. 840, 19 L.Ed.2d 883 (1968). We said there that there can be no claim of an invasion of privacy under such circumstances. This is in accord with the general rule. 72 C.J.S. Prisons § 18c (1951).
In a recent case before the Court of Appeals, Division 3, it was said that, while it is not the function of the courts to superintend treatment or discipline of prisoners in penal institutions, where there is a clear abuse of discretion or a violation of a constitutional right, all persons, including prisoners, have a right of access to the courts (Woods v. Burton, 8 Wash.App. 13, 503 P.2d 1079 (1972)). In that case, the court found that, in spite of the fact that in the Wapato jail there were many violations of the minimum standards for the operation of jails prescribed by the Director of the Department of Institutions pursuant to RCW 72.01.420, confinement in the jail was not cruel and unusual punishment within the meaning of U.S.Const. amend. 8 or Const. art. 1, § 14.
In another recent case, Division 2 of the Court of Appeals, citing State v. Williams, supra, held that segregated maximum security confinement is permissible as an administrative punishment for prison escape. State v. Keith, 13 Wash.App. 127, 534 P.2d 128 (1975).
In 72 C.J.S. Prisons § 18 (1951), it is stated as the general rule that ordinarily a jailer, or like prison official is vested with a certain amount of discretion with respect to the safekeeping, security and discipline of his prisoners, and his acts in this respect should be upheld, if reasonably necessary to effectuate the purpose of imprisonment, and that the courts will not interfere, where it does not appear that he has misused his power for the purpose of oppression.
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