Robinson v. State, 2012–KA–00965–COA.
| Decision Date | 08 April 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. 2012–KA–00965–COA.,2012–KA–00965–COA. |
| Court | Mississippi Court of Appeals |
| Parties | Scooter L. ROBINSON a/k/a Scooter Lynn Robinson a/k/a Scooter Robinson, Appellant v. STATE of Mississippi, Appellee. |
Office of State Public Defender by W. Daniel HinchcliffGeorge T. Holmes, Cynthia Dianne Burney, attorneys for appellant.
Office of the Attorney General by Jeffrey A. Klingfuss, attorney for appellee.
BEFORE LEE, C.J., BARNES AND ISHEE, JJ.
BARNES, J., for the Court:
¶ 1. On January 17, 2009, Scooter L. Robinson escaped from police custody in Pearl River County, Mississippi. Local law enforcement agencies were notified of Robinson's escape and worked together to determine his whereabouts. The Mississippi Highway Patrol (MHP) encountered Robinson on the highway and a high-speed pursuit followed. Robinson eventually pulled over, but when Trooper Paul Fernandez asked Robinson (the driver) to step out the car, he sped off. Trooper Fernandez notified local law enforcement of Robinson's location, and they set up a roadblock. Approaching the roadblock and still in high-speed pursuit, MHP rammed Robinson's car in an attempt to stop the vehicle.
¶ 2. When Robinson attempted to go around the roadblock, law enforcement shot at the car's tires in order to disable the vehicle. A deputy with the Pearl River County Sheriff's Department, Donnie Saucier, approached the vehicle. Initially, he went to the passenger side and shot into the front-right tire. Deputy Saucier then went to the driver's side, calling Robinson by name and warning him to stop. Robinson, however, was still trying to maneuver the car to escape. Deputy Saucier reached into the car and grabbed Robinson by his shirt, attempting to apprehend him. Robinson pulled the deputy partially into the vehicle, hit the accelerator, and began dragging the officer. Fearful for his life, Deputy Saucier fired a shot into Robinson's left thigh, and Robinson released him. Deputy Saucier fell to the pavement, sustaining “minor scrapes and bruises.” Law enforcement continued to pursue Robinson, whose car now had four flat tires. Trooper Fernandez hit the vehicle again, and Robinson finally stopped and surrendered to authorities.
¶ 3. On May 14, 2010, Robinson was indicted for failure to stop a motor vehicle upon signal by law enforcement and aggravated assault on a peace officer in violation of Mississippi Code Annotated sections 97–9–72(2) and 97–3–7(2) (Rev.2006), respectively. The indictment was later amended at trial to reflect Robinson's habitual-offender status under Mississippi Code Annotated section 99–19–83 (Rev.2007).1 Prior to trial, various motions were addressed by the trial court. Robinson filed a motion for a continuance in order to retain new counsel, which the trial court denied. The trial judge also considered Robinson's motion to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial, based on the three-year delay between his arrest and the trial. The trial court concluded that Robinson suffered no prejudice as a result of the delay and denied the motion. After a jury trial on June 5–6, 2012, Robinson was convicted on both counts and received two concurrent life sentences as a habitual offender in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections, without eligibility for parole or early release. After the trial court denied Robinson's motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or, in the alternative, a new trial, Robinson filed a timely notice of appeal.
¶ 4. The Mississippi Office of State Public Defender represents Robinson on appeal. Robinson's appellate attorney filed a brief pursuant to Lindsey v. State, 939 So.2d 743, 748 (¶ 18) (Miss.2005), stating that there were no “arguable issues which could be presented to [this] Court on Scooter L. Robinson's behalf[.]” Counsel also submitted a motion for additional time to be given in order to provide Robinson an opportunity to file a pro se brief. This motion was granted, and Robinson was given until January 28, 2013, to file his pro se brief. On January 28, 2013, Robinson filed a motion for additional time to file his brief. Robinson's motion was granted, and Robinson filed his pro se appellant's brief on March 28, 2013, raising several issues.
DISCUSSION
¶ 5. Under the requirements set forth in Lindsey, if counsel for the appellant finds no arguable issues on appeal, he is responsible for filing a brief stating that he has thoroughly reviewed the record and has found nothing to support an appeal. Lindsey, 939 So.2d at 748 (¶ 18). Counsel must then send the defendant a copy of the brief, informing the client that counsel found no arguable issue for an appeal, and advise the client of his right to file a pro se brief. Id. “If the defendant raises any arguable issue in his pro se brief, or if the appellate court finds any arguable issues upon its independent review of the record, the appellate court must, if circumstances warrant, require counsel to file supplemental briefing on the issue.”Jackson v. State, 121 So.3d 313, 317 (¶ 4) (Miss.Ct.App.2013) (citing Lindsey, 939 So.2d at 748 (¶ 18) ).
¶ 6. In the present case, Robinson's appellate attorney filed a brief indicating that he had “diligently searched the procedural and factual history of this criminal action and scoured the record, searching for any arguable issues” that could be presented in good faith, but found none. Counsel asserted that he examined: (1) the reason for Robinson's arrest and the circumstances surrounding his arrest; (2) possible violations of Robinson's right to counsel; (3) the trial transcript; (4) all rulings by the trial court; (5) any possible prosecutorial misconduct; (6) all jury instructions; (7) all exhibits, whether admitted into evidence or not; (8) possible misapplication of the law in sentencing; (9) the indictment and all pleadings in the record; (10) any possible issues involving ineffective assistance of counsel; (11) any issues involving “jury selection, possible dismissal, voir dire, misconduct affecting the jury, jury composition, improper influences, [or] failure to disclose”; (12) any speedy trial issues; (13) any sentencing issues, especially relating to the amended indictment charging the defendant as a habitual offender; and (14) any other potential reviewable issues.
¶ 7. Robinson subsequently filed a pro se brief, in which he claims that: (1) he was denied a speedy trial; (2) the trial court erred in denying his motion for new counsel; (3) he was denied an initial appearance or preliminary hearing; (4) the trial court erred by not affording Robinson a proper sentencing hearing; and (5) his due-process rights were violated by the unreasonable delay between the arrest and indictment. After a thorough review of the record and Robinson's contentions, we find no arguable issues on appeal that would warrant supplemental briefing, and we affirm the trial court's judgment.
¶ 8. Robinson filed a pretrial motion to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial, arguing that he was not given the benefit of counsel between his arrest on January 17, 2009, and his arraignment on October 19, 2011. Thus, he claimed that it was over two years before he was notified of the charges against him. The trial court denied the motion.
¶ 9. Mississippi Code Annotated section 99–17–1 (Rev.2007) states: “Unless good cause be shown, and a continuance duly granted by the court, all offenses for which indictments are presented to the court shall be tried no later than two hundred seventy (270) days after the accused has been arraigned.” The “[r]eview of a speedy trial claim involves a question of fact: whether the trial delay arose from good cause.” Bonds v. State, 938 So.2d 352, 355 (¶ 7) (Miss.Ct.App.2006) (citing Flora v. State, 925 So.2d 797, 814 (¶ 58) (Miss.2006) ). The right to a speedy trial has a threefold purpose:
(1) to protect the accused against oppressive pretrial imprisonment; (2) to relieve the accused of the anxiety and public suspicion due to an unresolved criminal charge; and (3) to protect against the risk that evidence will be lost or memories dimmed by the passage of time[,] thus impairing a defendant's ability to defend himself or herself.
Id. at 356 (¶ 8). In Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972), the United States Supreme Court provided a four-part balancing test for ascertaining whether a defendant's right to a speedy trial has been violated. The four factors are: (1) length of the delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the defendant's assertion of his right to a speedy trial; and (4) prejudice to the defendant.
¶ 10. On appeal, Robinson argues that when the trial court considered his motion for a speedy trial, it neglected to conduct a “detailed analysis” of the factors set forth in Barker. He claims that he was denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial and that the charges should have been dismissed.
¶ 11. We find that Robinson's argument is not supported by the record. Ruling on the motion, the trial court acknowledged that the length of delay was sufficient to trigger an analysis under Barker. See Bonds, 938 So.2d at 356 (¶ 10) . With regard to the second factor, the trial judge opined that the delay in this specific instance was not “deliberate,” although he considered this factor to be “neutral.”
¶ 12. As to Robinson's assertion of his right to a speedy trial, the record reflects that Robinson filed a pro se motion to dismiss for violation of his right to a speedy trial on May 23, 2011, along with a “Motion for a Fast and Speedy Trial,” which merely requested a trial within 270 days of his arraignment. Robinson was subsequently arraigned on October 19, 2011. Defense counsel...
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