Wood v. State
| Decision Date | 10 March 2020 |
| Docket Number | NO. 2018-CP-00889-COA,2018-CP-00889-COA |
| Citation | 291 So.3d 830 |
| Parties | Daniel WOOD, Appellant v. STATE of Mississippi, Appellee |
| Court | Mississippi Court of Appeals |
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: DANIEL WOOD (PRO SE)
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: MATTHEW WYATT WALTON
BEFORE CARLTON, P.J., TINDELL AND McDONALD, JJ.
CARLTON, P.J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1. Daniel Nathan Wood pleaded guilty to child fondling and child exploitation charges brought against him. Wood was sentenced to serve fifteen years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections (MDOC) for the child-fondling conviction and five years for the child-exploitation conviction, with these sentences set to run concurrently. Wood was also sentenced to ten years of post-release supervision and was ordered to pay a $1,000.00 assessment to the Children's Trust Fund.
¶2. The trial court summarily dismissed Wood's subsequently-filed motion for post-conviction collateral relief (PCR) in which Wood asserted that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel; his guilty plea was involuntary; and he was incompetent to plead guilty. Wood appealed, raising the following issues: (1) the trial court erred in denying his request for new counsel; (2) he received ineffective assistance of counsel; (3) his guilty plea was involuntary; (4) he was incompetent to enter a guilty plea; and (5) the trial court erred in failing to allow him to withdraw his guilty plea. For the reasons addressed below, we affirm.
STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶3. A DeSoto County grand jury indicted Wood in January 2015 for one count of sexual battery in violation of Mississippi Code Annotated section 97-3-95(1)(d) (Rev. 2014), one count of fondling in violation of Mississippi Code Annotated section 97-5-23 (Rev. 2014), and one count of child exploitation in violation of Mississippi Code Annotated section 97-5-33(5) (Rev. 2014).
¶4. Wood was appointed counsel. His lawyer filed a "Motion for Mental Examination" in the trial court, seeking a determination whether Wood could "ascertain[ ] the difference between right and wrong and ... whether ... [Wood had the] capacity to assist his Counsel in this cause." That motion was granted in June 2015, and the trial court ordered that Dr. Criss Lott perform Wood's evaluation. The trial court ordered Dr. Lott to evaluate Wood to determine:
(a) whether or not [Wood] has a factual as well as rational understanding of the nature and object of the legal proceedings against him, and has the ability reasonably to assist his attorney in the preparation of his defense; (b) to describe his mental state at the time of the alleged offense with respect to his ability to know the difference between right and wrong in relation to his actions at that time, and (c) to describe his current mental state as it may be the product of mental illness or substance abuse.
Dr. Lott evaluated Wood in September 2015, addressed the points set forth in the trial court's order in his report, and found that Wood was competent to proceed in this matter. Dr. Lott's report will be discussed in detail below.
¶5. Wood filed a "Petition to Enter Plea of Guilty" on January 7, 2016, pleading guilty to the child-fondling and the child-exploitation charges against him.1 Wood's plea hearing took place on the same day. At the beginning of the plea hearing, the trial court asked Wood if he had any history of mental illness or emotional problems. When Wood responded that he did, the trial court conducted a competency hearing before proceeding with the plea hearing. The details of the competency hearing are discussed below.
¶6. The trial court then continued with Wood's plea hearing. The State presented the factual basis for the child-fondling and sexual-exploitation charges against Wood. When the State was done, the trial court asked Wood whether he had any disagreements with the State's factual basis for these charges against him. Wood responded, "No, sir."
¶7. The trial court then advised Wood of each right that he would be giving up by pleading guilty and specifically asked Wood, "Do [you] understand these rights I've gone over with you and [do] you understand that you're giving those up by pleading guilty here today, Mr. Wood?" Wood replied, "Yes, sir." The trial court then told Wood the possible sentences and other penalties Wood would face by pleading guilty, and Wood confirmed that he understood these potential penalties. The trial court also asked Wood, "Has anyone tried to threaten you or tried to force you or tried to offer you any money, put you under duress, intimidate you in any manner to get you to plead guilty, Mr. Wood?" Wood responded, "No, sir."
¶8. Wood also confirmed at his plea hearing that he had no complaints with his lawyer and that he was satisfied with his lawyer's services, as follows:
Wood admitted that he committed the crimes to which he was pleading guilty, and in response to the trial court's question, "[Was it] [y]our decision to plead guilty or [your lawyer's] decision?" Wood said, "My decision."
¶9. After he pleaded guilty, but before his sentencing hearing, Wood filed a letter addressed to the trial judge in which Wood asked the court to appoint a new public defender to represent him. Wood asserted that he was too intimidated by his lawyer to ask questions about his guilty plea and that the only reason he pleaded guilty was because his lawyer told Wood there were no other options available to him. Wood also asserted that his lawyer did not discuss Dr. Lott's report with him and that his lawyer would not return phone calls or respond to letters from Wood. Additionally, Wood asserted that his lawyer did not go over Wood's discovery with him. In concluding his letter, Wood asked that the trial court "please grant my request for new coun[se]l based upon [my lawyer's] ineffective assistance in my case."
¶10. Wood's sentencing hearing was held on March 17, 2016. Before the sentencing hearing began, however, there was some discussion about whether Wood was seeking to withdraw his guilty plea. The facts pertaining to this issue are discussed below.
¶11. At Wood's sentencing hearing, the trial court also addressed Wood's written request for new counsel. The trial court allowed Wood to read a statement that Wood had prepared in which he essentially repeated the same assertions about his lawyer that Wood had made in the letter he sent to the trial judge prior to his sentencing hearing.
¶12. After Wood finished making his statement, the trial court read from a transcript from Wood's plea hearing and noted on the record the contradictions between Wood's assertions about his lawyer at his sentencing hearing and Wood's prior sworn testimony from his plea hearing, as follows:
After making this comparison, the trial court denied Wood's request for new counsel, finding that Wood's "complaints against [his lawyer] ... are unfounded and contradictory to what [Wood] told [the court] under oath back in January."
¶13. The trial court then proceeded with the sentencing hearing, announcing, The State presented the testimony of two witnesses: the victim's father and the detective who investigated Wood's case. After the State's witnesses testified, Wood's lawyer explained that he did not have any witnesses but that he did have a statement from Wood's mother about his social and behavioral problems from kindergarten through Wood's post-high school training at Moore School of Technology. The statement from Wood's mother and Dr. Lott's mental evaluation of Wood were admitted into evidence. The trial court then heard oral argument from counsel.
¶14. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court sentenced Wood to serve fifteen years for fondling in violation of section 97-5-23 and five years for child exploitation in violation of section 97-5-33(5) in the custody of the MDOC, with these sentences set to run concurrently.
The trial court also sentenced Wood to ten years of post-release supervision but waived all fines, costs, and assessments except for a $1,000.00 assessment to the Children's Trust Fund.
¶15. Wood filed his PCR motion in March 2018. He asserted (1) that he received ineffective assistance of counsel; (2) that his guilty plea was involuntary; and (3) that he was incompetent to plead guilty. After considering the entire court file, proceedings, and transcripts in Wood's PCR cause and his criminal case, the trial court concluded "that it appears beyond doubt that Wood can prove no set of facts in support of his claims which would entitle him to relief." Accordingly, the trial court summarily dismissed Wood's PCR motion. Wood appealed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶16. "When reviewing a circuit court's denial or dismissal of a PCR motion, we will only...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Wallace v. State
...interrogation by the trial court during the plea colloquy and Wallace's own admissions made under oath and in his plea petition. Wood v. State , 291 So. 3d 830, 841 (¶35) (Miss. Ct. App. 2020) (observing that "in assessing the voluntariness of a plea, the thoroughness of the trial court's i......
-
Crockett v. State
...all in "assessing the voluntariness of a plea [is] the thoroughness of the trial court's interrogation during the plea colloquy." Wood v. State , 291 So. 3d 830, 841 (¶35) (Miss. Ct. App. 2020) (quoting Haney v. State , 281 So. 3d 84, 89 (¶14) (Miss. Ct. App. 2019) ). ¶22. In this case, Cro......
-
Malone v. State
... ... 393, 398 (¶13) (Miss. 2014) (quoting Martin v ... State , 871 So.2d 693, 698 (¶17) (Miss. 2004)) ... "The standard of competency necessary to enter a plea of ... guilty is the same as that for determining competency to ... stand trial." Wood v. State , 291 So.3d 830, 843 ... (¶40) (Miss. Ct. App. 2020). When a defendant has the ... ability to perceive and understand the nature of the ... proceedings, to communicate rationally with the ... defendant's attorney about the case, to recall relevant ... facts, ... ...
-
Williams v. State
...¶2. We will only disturb the circuit court's denial or dismissal of a PCR petition if the factual findings are clearly erroneous. Wood v. State , 291 So. 3d 830, 837 (¶16) (Miss. Ct. App. 2020). The circuit court's legal analysis is reviewed de novo. Id .ANALYSIS¶3. In his petition for reli......