Robinson v. State
| Decision Date | 19 September 1994 |
| Docket Number | No. CR,CR |
| Citation | 318 Ark. 33,883 S.W.2d 469 |
| Parties | Montay ROBINSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Arkansas, Appellee. 94-290. |
| Court | Arkansas Supreme Court |
William R. Simpson, Jr., Thomas B. Devine III, Public Defenders, Bret Qualls, Deputy Public Defender, Little Rock, for appellant.
Vada Berger, Asst. Atty. Gen., Little Rock, for appellee.
On April 9, 1993, appellant Montay Robinson was charged, along with Cedric Bradley and Pierre Bradley, with the first degree murder of Terrence Taylor. On his motion, Robinson's case was severed from the Bradleys'. At trial on November 23, 1993, Robinson was convicted as charged and the jury fixed Robinson's sentence at forty years in the Department of Correction. Robinson's sole point for reversal is that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction.
Robinson timely and specifically moved for a directed verdict at the end of the state's case and after he rested his case, Robinson claimed the state had failed to show purposeful conduct on his part. See Ark.R.Crim.P. 36.21(b). Directed verdict motions are treated as challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence. Walker v. State, 313 Ark. 478, 855 S.W.2d 932 (1993).
The test on appeal is whether there is substantial evidence to support the verdict. Riggins v. State, 317 Ark. 636, 882 S.W.2d 664 (1994). Substantial evidence is evidence that is of sufficient force and character to compel reasonable minds to reach a conclusion without resorting to suspicion and conjecture. Id. In determining whether substantial evidence exists, we review only the evidence that supports the conviction and do not weigh it against other conflicting proof favorable to the accused. Id.
At trial, the court instructed the jury on murder in the first degree, stating that, to sustain the charge, the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Robinson, or an accomplice, with the purpose of causing the death of another person, did cause the death of Terrence Taylor. See Ark.Code Ann. § 5-10-102(a)(2) (Repl.1993). Accomplice was defined for the jury as one who directly participates in the commission of an offense or who, with the purpose of promoting or facilitating the commission of an offense, solicits, advises, encourages or coerces the other person to commit the offense, or aids, agrees to aid, or attempts to aid the other person in planning or committing the offense. Ark.Code Ann. § 5-2-403 (Repl.1993). Also, the court correctly instructed that a person acts with purpose with respect to his conduct or as a result thereof when it is his conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature or to cause such a result. Ark.Code Ann. § 5-2-202(1) (Repl.1993). In addition, we mention the settled rule that intent or state of mind is seldom capable of proof by direct evidence and must usually be inferred from the circumstances of the killing. Robinson v. State, 317 Ark. 17, 875 S.W.2d 837 (1994); Walker, 313 Ark. 478, 855 S.W.2d 932.
Here, we hold the evidence is more than sufficient to support Robinson's conviction. The state's proof showed that Robinson and the Bradleys were seen carrying weapons outside the Tangerine Club located in the College Station neighborhood in Little Rock. Pierre Bradley and Robinson were seen carrying 9...
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...§§ 5-2-403(a)(1)-(2) (Repl. 1997). Further, each accomplice is criminally liable for the conduct of the others. See Robinson v. State, 318 Ark. 33, 883 S.W.2d 469 (1994). The relevant factors in determining the connection of an accomplice to a crime are the presence of the accused in the pr......
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