Robinson v. State

• Decision Date: 01 July 2015
• Docket Number: NO. PD–0421–14,PD–0421–14
• Citation: 466 S.W.3d 166
• Parties: Leo Demory Robinson, Appellant v. The State of Texas
• Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

466 S.W.3d 166

Leo Demory Robinson, Appellant

v.The State of Texas

NO. PD–0421–14

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

DELIVERED: July 1, 2015

Katherine A. Drew, Assistant Public Defender, Dallas, TX, attorneys for appellant.

Shelly O'Brien Yeatts, Assistant District Attorney, Dallas, TX, Lisa C. McMinn, State's Attorney, Austin, attorneys for the state.

OPINION

Keasler, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Keller, P.J., and Hervey, Yeary, and Newell, JJ., joined.

The court of appeals affirmed Robinson's conviction for failing to report under the sex-offender registration requirements. We must decide what degree of mental culpability the statute requires and whether to consider a trial judge's findings of fact and conclusions of law in a sufficiency of the evidence review. We hold that a conviction under Article 62.012 requires knowledge or recklessness only to the duty-to-register element of the offense, and that an appellate court should disregard the trial judge's findings of fact and conclusions of law in reviewing for sufficiency of the evidence. We therefore affirm the court of appeals' opinion.

I. Background

Robinson was indicted for the offense of failure to comply with sex-offender registration requirements. The indictment alleged that Robinson intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly failed to report his intent to move and his new address where he intended to reside.¹ Robinson waived his right to a jury, elected a bench trial, and pleaded not guilty to the trial judge.

As a result of his previous conviction for burglary of a habitation with intent to commit sexual assault,² Robinson was required to register as a sex offender under Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Chapter 62.³ After his release from confinement for his burglary conviction in early 2010, Robinson began registering annually with the Glenn Heights Police Department, listing his address as his aunt's residence in Glenn Heights, Texas. In February 2010, when responding to a disturbance call at Robinson's aunt's house, Detective Benson conducted a compliance check to ensure Robinson was still living there. While conducting the compliance check, Benson spoke with two people who told him that Robinson had moved out. Benson checked the room where Robinson was staying and found the bed without sheets and the drawers and closet empty.

Arnetha Barnes, Robinson's aunt, testified at his bench trial that, although she did not know the exact day Robinson moved out, he lived there until May 2010. She disputed Benson's description of Robinson's room, claiming she always kept sheets on his bed and some of Robinson's clothes were in the closet even after he moved out.

Tommy Phillips, Robinson's parole officer, testified that Robinson moved to Dallas before May 2010. According to Phillips, in April 2010, Robinson sent a fax to the Glenn Heights Police Department notifying them that Robinson had moved from his aunt's house to Dallas in March 2010. Phillips, however, later testified that the fax contained erroneous information regarding Robinson's change of address and was instead intended to notify the police department of Robinson's intent to move, rather than providing notice of a past move. On May 1, 2010, Barnes told Phillips that Robinson had moved out. Phillips testified that he did not know the exact date Robinson moved from Glenn Heights to Dallas. Phillips further testified that Robinson told him that he was having problems notifying Glenn Heights Police Department of his intent to move because when he attempted to report in person, he was told no one was available to help him and he needed to come back at another time. Phillips conducted his own compliance check on May 1, 2010 at Robinson's Glenn Heights address and was told that Robinson had already moved to “his new place.”

Glenn Heights Detective Howard was the officer who handled Robinson's sex-offender registration. Howard testified that Robinson was required to register as a sex offender annually for life. Although he acknowledged receiving the fax from Robinson's parole officer, Howard noted the fax did not qualify as proper notice under the law—it was not done in person nor was it provided within seven days of moving.

Robinson testified in his defense. He could not provide the exact date of his move. But he did testify that he knew he was required to provide in-person notification of his intent to change his address at least seven days before he moved, and although he attempted to comply with the pre-move notice, the Glenn Heights Police Department refused to accept his notice. He maintained that he repeatedly attempted to provide notice, but each time he was turned away. Robinson testified, “I would see Mr. Howard. He was, like, ‘Come back tomorrow. I don't have time.’ ” Howard refuted Robinson's testimony, claiming that he was not aware of Robinson's attempt to provide notification of his intent to change his address.

The judge found Robinson guilty and sentenced him to two years' confinement, suspended and probated for five years. The judge made several findings of fact, indicating that he believed portions of Robinson's testimony and other evidence of Robinson's “substantial compliance” with the requirements. The judge also commented on the nature of the law: “[I]t is to a certain extent strict liability if you know [you're] supposed [to] register, which you did, and you do not strictly follow the requirements of article 62.055, then you are guilty according to my reading of the law.”

On appeal, Robinson alleged that, because there was evidence that he attempted to give the required notice, the evidence is legally insufficient to show that his failure to give the required notice was intentional, knowing, or reckless.⁴ Relying on several sister court of appeals' decisions, the Dallas Court of Appeals held that to the extent a culpable mental state (or mens rea) is required for an Article 62.102(a) offense, the culpable mental state applies only to the defendant's actual knowledge of the statutory obligations.⁵ The court of appeals alternatively held that, even if the mens rea requirement applied to the act of notification itself, as opposed to the knowledge of the obligation, the State presented sufficient evidence to support the conviction.⁶ We granted Robinson's petition for discretionary review to review the court of appeals' interpretation of Article 62.102(a) and its legal sufficiency analysis.

II. Culpable mental state required for Article 62.102(a)

Article 62.102(a) states that a person commits the offense of failure to comply with sex-offender registration requirements “if the person is required to register and fails to comply with any requirement of this chapter.”⁷ “If the definition of an offense does not prescribe a culpable mental state, a culpable mental state is nevertheless required unless the definition plainly dispenses with any mental element.”⁸ Because Article 62.102(a) does not contain a culpable mental state and does not clearly dispense with one, § 6.02(c) requires that Article 62.102(a) be read to require intent, knowledge, or recklessness to establish criminal responsibility.⁹ The question then becomes what mental states apply and to what element must they attach—the duty to register or the failure to comply with one of Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Chapter 62's requirements. The answer turns on the gravamen of the failure-to-comply offense.

We distinguish offenses into three different categories of offenses based on the offense-defining statute's gravamen, or focus: “result of conduct,” “nature of conduct,” or “circumstances of conduct” offenses.¹⁰ Result-of-conduct offenses concern the product of certain conduct.¹¹ Nature-of-conduct offenses are defined by the act or conduct that is punished, regardless of any result that might occur.¹² Lastly, circumstances-of-conduct offenses prohibit otherwise innocent behavior that becomes criminal only under specific circumstances.¹³

Article 62.102(a) is a generalized “umbrella” statute that criminalizes the failure to comply with any of the registration requirements set out in Chapter 62.¹⁴ Failing to comply with Chapter 62 is not criminal by its very nature, but rather is made unlawful by the circumstances—the duty to comply by virtue of a reportable conviction. Therefore, the failure-to-register offense is a circumstances-of-conduct offense, and the gravamen of the offense is the duty to register.¹⁵ Although all circumstances-of-conduct offenses naturally contain an additional conduct element, the conduct itself is not necessarily an additional gravamen.

Although McQueen v. State¹⁶ is factually distinguishable, its holding is nonetheless authoritative in resolving the present case. The McQueen Court addressed the unauthorized-use-of-a-vehicle statute that states “[a] person commits an offense if he intentionally or knowingly operates another's boat, airplane, or motor-propelled vehicle without the effective consent of the owner.”¹⁷ That case presented the common issue of deciphering a statute's language to answer the question of how far down the sentence the stated culpable mental state runs. The Court held that “what separates lawful operation of another's motor vehicle from unauthorized use is the actor's knowledge of a ‘crucial circumstance surrounding the conduct’—that such operation is done without the effective consent of the owner.”¹⁸ As a result, this Court held that

some form of culpability must apply to those “conduct elements” which make the overall conduct criminal. Therefore, we hold that Sec. 31.07 encompasses two “conduct elements”, viz: that the defendant intentionally or knowingly operated a vehicle (nature of conduct) knowing that such operation was without the effective consent of the owner (circumstances surrounding conduct).¹⁹

So McQueen established that when the circumstances of the conduct render specific conduct unlawful, a culpable mental state must attach to the circumstances of the conduct.

Bec...