Deere v. State

Decision Date22 July 2021
Docket NumberNo. 11-19-00227-CR,11-19-00227-CR
Citation631 S.W.3d 762
Parties Tammi Dawn DEERE, Appellant v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee
CourtTexas Court of Appeals

Benjamin R. Smith, District Attorney, for Appellee.

Jacob Blizzard, Beaumont, for Appellant.

Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J., Trotter, J., and Williams, J.

W. BRUCE WILLIAMS, JUSTICE

This is an appeal from Appellant's jury conviction of possession of methamphetamine. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 481.112(b) (West 2017). The trial court assessed Appellant's punishment at two years' incarceration in the State Jail Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice and a fine of $1,500.

In six issues on appeal, Appellant contends that (1) the evidence was insufficient to find Appellant guilty of possession of methamphetamine, (2) the trial court erred in denying Appellant's for-cause jury challenges, (3) the trial court erred in requiring Appellant to make objections—in front of the venire panel—to jurors that her counsel would have stricken with peremptory strikes had he not had to expend them on persons for whom challenges for cause were denied, (4) the trial court erred in omitting certain instructions from the court's charge, (5) the trial court erred in overruling her optional-completeness objection and excluding the audio portion of the video of the traffic stop that led to discovery of the controlled substance, and (6) Appellant was denied due process after a prospective juror made an inflammatory comment during voir dire about past dealings with Appellant. We affirm.

Background Facts

Appellant was pulled over for speeding; the radar in the police officers' patrol unit showed that Appellant was driving thirty-six miles per hour in a thirty-mile-per-hour zone. Two officers approached her car, and one of them asked her for her driver's license and insurance. Appellant reached into her purse, pulled out her license, and gave it to the officer. There was no one else in the car. The officers went back to their vehicle, and after a period of time, one of the officers returned to Appellant's car and asked to search her car. Appellant agreed, placed her purse in the passenger seat, and exited the car. The officer searched Appellant's car and purse and found what appeared to be methamphetamine in a small plastic bag inside her purse. The substance was later tested and confirmed to be methamphetamine. Appellant was arrested and charged with possession of a controlled substance. This appeal followed.

Analysis
I. Sufficiency of the Evidence

In her first issue on appeal, Appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant was guilty of possessing methamphetamine. We review a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence under the standard of review set forth in Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). Brooks v. State , 323 S.W.3d 893, 912 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) ; Polk v. State , 337 S.W.3d 286, 288–89 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2010, pet. ref'd). Under the Jackson standard, we review all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson , 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781 ; Isassi v. State , 330 S.W.3d 633, 638 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010).

When conducting a sufficiency review, we consider all of the evidence admitted at trial, including pieces of evidence that may have been improperly admitted. Winfrey v. State , 393 S.W.3d 763, 767 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) ; Clayton v. State , 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). We defer to the factfinder's role as the sole judge of the witnesses' credibility and the weight their testimony is to be afforded. Brooks , 323 S.W.3d at 899. This standard accounts for the factfinder's duty to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts. Jackson , 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781 ; Clayton , 235 S.W.3d at 778.

It is not necessary that the evidence directly prove the defendant's guilt; circumstantial evidence is as probative as direct evidence in establishing a defendant's guilt, and circumstantial evidence can alone be sufficient to establish guilt. Carrizales v. State , 414 S.W.3d 737, 742 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (citing Hooper v. State , 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) ). Each fact need not point directly and independently to guilt if the cumulative force of all incriminating circumstances is sufficient to support the conviction. Hooper , 214 S.W.3d at 13.

To establish unlawful possession of a controlled substance, the State bears the burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that "(1) the accused exercised control, management, or care over the controlled substance; and (2) the accused knew the matter possessed was contraband." Poindexter v. State , 153 S.W.3d 402, 405 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005), overruled in part on other grounds by Robinson v. State , 466 S.W.3d 166, 173 & n.32 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015).

Appellant contends there was insufficient evidence to affirmatively link Appellant to the methamphetamine. Under the "affirmative links" rule, the defendant's link to the substance must have been more than a fortuitous proximity. Evans v. State , 202 S.W.3d 158, 161–62 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). Appellant's reliance on the affirmative links rule, however, is misplaced. As this court stated in Banks v. State , the affirmative links rule "applies to instances when the accused does not have exclusive possession of the location where the contraband is discovered. Here, the State was not required to present evidence affirmatively linking Appellant to the cocaine because it was found on [her] person—a place that [s]he exclusively controlled." Banks v. State , No. 11-17-00281-CR, 2019 WL 3727550, at *2 (Tex. App.—Eastland Aug. 8, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (citation omitted) (citing Toumey v. State , No. 01-16-00144-CR, 2017 WL 631841, at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Feb. 16, 2017, pet. ref'd) (mem. op., not designated for publication) ). Specifically, the methamphetamine was found in Appellant's own purse, which was in Appellant's exclusive control. Furthermore, Appellant was in her own car with no one else in the vehicle. Under these circumstances, the affirmative links rule does not apply. See id. ; cf Cameron v. State , 703 S.W.2d 254, 255 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 1985, pet. ref'd) (finding that a third party had possession and control of drugs that were found in the third party's purse).

Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the above evidence is sufficient to support a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant knowingly possessed the methamphetamine that was in her exclusive possession. When the arresting officer asked Appellant for her license and registration, he saw Appellant reach into her own purse—which contained the methamphetamine—to pull out her license. From this, a reasonable trier of fact could infer that Appellant was aware that she was in possession of a controlled substance when she pulled out her license. Although Appellant's sister testified that the methamphetamine was hers and not Appellant's, she found out that Appellant had been arrested for methamphetamine the day after Appellant's arrest, but only came forward with this confession a few days before trial. The jury was in the best position to determine the credibility and demeanor of the witnesses and resolve evidentiary conflicts, and under these facts, the jury could have reasonably disbelieved Appellant's sister's testimony. See Lancon v. State , 253 S.W.3d 699, 705 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (citing Marshall v. State , 210 S.W.3d 618, 625 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) ). Even assuming the sister actually placed the methamphetamine in Appellant's purse, under the light most favorable to the verdict, a rational jury could have found that Appellant subsequently realized and knowingly possessed the methamphetamine after it was placed in her purse but before the search. We overrule Appellant's first issue.

II. Challenges for Cause

In her second issue on appeal, Appellant contends that the trial court erred in failing to excuse certain venirepersons for cause. Of the nineteen potential jurors that Appellant challenged for cause, four were actually selected as jurors in Appellant's case. Appellant specifically asserts that the trial court erred in denying Appellant's challenges for cause against three of those jurors.

When reviewing a trial court's decision to grant or deny a challenge for cause, we look at the entire record to determine if there is sufficient evidence to support the trial court's ruling. See Sells v. State , 121 S.W.3d 748, 759 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). A defendant has a constitutional right "to be tried by impartial, indifferent jurors whose verdict must be based upon the evidence developed at trial." Howard v. State , 941 S.W.2d 102, 117 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996), overruled on other grounds by Easley v. State , 424 S.W.3d 535, 538 & n.23 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). A potential juror may be challenged for cause if he or she has a bias or prejudice in favor of or against the defendant or against the law applicable to the case. See TEX. CODE. CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 35.16(a)(9), (c)(2) (West 2006); Gardner v. State , 306 S.W.3d 274, 295 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). The proponent of a challenge for cause bears the initial burden of establishing that the challenge is proper. Gardner , 306 S.W.3d at 295. The test is whether the bias or prejudice would substantially impair the prospective juror's ability to carry out his oath and instructions in accordance with the law. Davis v. State , 329 S.W.3d 798, 807 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). Because this court is only given a cold record for review, the trial court is in the best position to observe the potential juror's demeanor...

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2 cases
  • Morton v. State
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • September 8, 2022
    ...the probative evidence, the argument of counsel and any other relevant information revealed by the record of the trial as a whole." Deere, 631 S.W.3d at 775 (quoting 686 S.W.2d at 171). Analysis I. Limiting Instruction Appellant argues that the trial court erred in denying her request for a......
  • Rincker v. State
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • December 9, 2022
    ...the affirmative links-rule does not apply when contraband is discovered in a place exclusively controlled by the defendant. See Deere, 631 S.W.3d at 768-69. Here, Pantalici found the methamphetamine in a container that was sitting on Appellant's lap and no other occupants were present in th......

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