Robinson v. State

Decision Date22 February 1991
Docket NumberNo. C-88-907,C-88-907
Citation806 P.2d 1128,1991 OK CR 23
PartiesRichard Dale ROBINSON, Petitioner, v. STATE of Oklahoma, Respondent.
CourtUnited States State Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma. Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma
ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

RICHARD DALE ROBINSON, petitioner, pled guilty on March 28, 1988, to Burglary in the Second Degree, After Former Conviction of Two or More Felonies before Judge J.R. Pearman in the District Court of Osage County in Case No. CRF-87-179. Petitioner was sentenced to twenty (20) years imprisonment. On April 4, 1988, a hearing was held on his motion to withdraw his guilty plea and the same was denied. Petitioner appeals.

For his first assignment of error, Petitioner contends that the trial court failed to establish a factual basis for the prior convictions alleged on Page Two of the Information. In support of his proposition, Appellant cites Estell v. State, 766 P.2d 1380 (Okl.Cr.1988) as holding that a factual basis for the prior convictions must be established. Apparently, Appellant believes that the State must establish a "factual basis" for a prior conviction in the same manner that a "factual basis" must be established for the crime to which the defendant is pleading guilty. We recognize that the use of the term, "factual basis" may be misleading as it relates to prior convictions. What is intended is "proof" of the fact of the prior conviction.

Our review of the record revealed that the State presented proof of the fact of the prior convictions during the Preliminary Hearing. At that time, defendant took exception to the court's ruling allowing evidence of the prior convictions. The defendant objected to the evidence of the prior convictions on the ground that they were more than ten (10) years old. The record revealed that Defendant was convicted on June 4, 1973, and received a four year sentence, which would have been completed on June 3, 1977. In 1975, he was convicted twice and on October 9, 1986, he was convicted on a plea of guilty to burglary in the second degree. 1 He contended that, relative to the instant November 5, 1987, charge, his prior convictions are stale under 21 O.S.Supp.1975, § 51A, which reads as follows:

No person shall be sentenced as a second and subsequent offender under Section 51 of Title 21, or any other section of the Oklahoma Statutes, when a period of ten (10) years has elapsed since the completion of the sentence imposed on the former conviction; provided, said person has not, in the meantime, been convicted of a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude or felony. [Emphasis added]

The effect and operation of this Statute were construed by this Court in Venable v. State, 567 P.2d 1006 (Okl.Cr.1977), where we held:

... the conviction of a felony in 1965, whose expiration date was 1967, occurred within the ten years of the instant conviction and operated to revitalize the two prior convictions sustained in 1949 and 1959, within the meaning of that portion of 21 O.S.Supp.1975, § 51A, stating: provided, said person has not, in the meantime, been convicted of a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude or felony.'

Accordingly, evidence of all the former convictions in this case is admissible for the purpose of enhancement.

We are aware that proof of the prior convictions was not presented at the hearing on the plea of guilty. However, this Court, in Ocampo v. State, 778 P.2d 920 (Okl.Cr.1989), held that we must look to the entire record to determine if judgment and sentence rendered on the plea of guilty should be disturbed. The entire record, when considering a plea of guilty, includes all pleadings and proceedings in the case.

Also, both the prosecutor and the defense attorney have a duty to act responsibly and ethically in the process of plea negotiations. If either has any reservations as to whether the defendant is entering a plea in compliance with Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969), or as to whether there may exist any potential problems in connection with the plea procedure, then they have a duty to determine same and to so advise the court. Having not advised the court as such, it will be presumed, not only that there is a constitutionally valid guilty plea but also that the defendant, having been represented by counsel, is fully informed in all particulars.

In the present case, the trial court inquired into Petitioner's alleged prior convictions at the beginning of the proceedings, as follows:

THE COURT: It says here that you are asking the Court to allow you to plead guilty to this burglary charge, and also all the after former convictions that are attached thereto; is that right?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

Further, the court reviewed Appellant's Petition To Enter A Plea of Guilty, which was filled out and signed by Appellant, after discussion with his attorney. Therein, Appellant, in his own handwriting, pled guilty to "Burglary 2nd Degree AFC of 2 or More Felonies." He acknowledged in writing and before the court the range of punishment as "20--Life." Similarly, he acknowledged the plea agreement to be, "Plead to 20 years as charged, to run concurrent with stipulation to Application to Revoke in CRF-86-133." No challenge was made as to the prior convictions at the hearing on the entry of the plea. The court was in substantial compliance with the guidelines established in King v. State, 553 P.2d 529, 534 (Okl.Cr.1976). Accordingly, it was discretionary with the court whether to allow Appellant to withdraw his guilty plea. Darnell v. State, 623 P.2d 617 (Okl.Cr.1981). We find no abuse of discretion.

Appellant next asserts that his plea was involuntary because he was unaware of the full consequences of his plea. Specifically, he contends that at the time he entered his plea, he was not aware that he would be ineligible for parole. He alleges that, because he pled guilty to having former convictions, he could not be eligible for parole. On the other hand, if a jury found him guilty and sentenced him to life, even with all the after formers, he would be eligible for parole in eight years. He...

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8 cases
  • Mansfield v. Champion
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit
    • May 3, 1993
    ...1009 (Okla.Crim.App.1977). The 1964 convictions could thus be so used in conjunction with a later felony. Accord Robinson v. State, 806 P.2d 1128, 1129 (Okla.Crim.App.1991). Mansfield's 1975 conviction falls within the ten-year period required under section 51(B) and, if valid, forms the ba......
  • Holden v. Addison
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Western District of Oklahoma
    • March 12, 2015
    ...is made voluntarily with the understanding of the consequences of the plea." Verduzco, 217 P.3d at 628 (quoting Robinson v. State, 806 P.2d 1128, 1130 (Okla. Crim. App. 1991)). The two other Oklahoma state cases cited by Petitioner, Pickens and Ferguson, are inapposite as they address only ......
  • Wilson v. Kiss
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Oklahoma
    • May 15, 2017
    ...of the guilty plea. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Petitioner's motion to withdraw guilty plea. See Robinson v. State, 1991 OK CR 23, ¶ 6, 806 P.2d 1128, 1130.See Dkt. # 11-9 at 2-3. "It is beyond dispute that a guilty plea must be both knowing and voluntary. The st......
  • Lewis v. State
    • United States
    • United States State Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma. Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma
    • October 29, 2009
    ...v. State, 2007 OK CR 18, ¶ 2, 158 P.3d 482, 483 (85% Rule); Ferguson v. State, 2006 OK CR 36, ¶ 3, 143 P.3d 218, 219 (85% Rule); Robinson v. State, 1991 OK CR 23, ¶ 9, 806 P.2d 1128, 1130-31 (eligibility for probation or 8. Fields v. State, 1996 OK CR 35, ¶¶ 28-30, 923 P.2d 624, 630. 9. Cox......
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