Robinson v. the EState Pinckney Harris

Decision Date24 January 2011
Docket NumberNo. 26914.,26914.
Citation705 S.E.2d 41,391 S.C. 114
CourtSouth Carolina Supreme Court
PartiesSara Mae ROBINSON, Mary Ann Campbell, James Scott, Ellis Scott, William Scott, Shirley Pinckney Hughes, Julius Steven Brown, Leon Brown, Annabell Brown, Loretta Ladson, Kathleen Brown, Mozelle B. Rembert, Patricia Frickling, Ruth Mitchell, Gwendolyn Dunn, Angela Hamilton, Geraldine Jameson, Remus Prioleau, Julius Prioleau, Anthony Prioleau, Judy Brown, Franklin Brown, Kathy Young, Kenneth Prioleau, Willis Jameson, Melvin Pinckney, William “Alonzie” Pinckney, Ruth Fussell, Hattie Wilson, Marie Watson, Gloria Becoat, Angela T. Burnett, and Lawrence Redmond, Respondents,v.The ESTATE OF ELOISE Pinckney HARRIS, Jerome C. Harris, as Personal Representative and sole heir and devisee of the Estate of Eloise P. Harris, Daniel Duggan, Mark F. Teseniar, Nan M. Teseniar, David Savage, Lisa M. Shogry–Savage, Debbie S. Dinovo, Martine A. Hutton, The Converse Company, LLC, Judy Pinckney Singleton, Mary Leavy, Michelle Davis, Leroy Brisbane, Frances Brisbane, and John Doe, Jane Doe, Richard Roe and Mary Roe, who are fictitious names representing all unknown persons and the heirs at law or devisees of the following deceased persons known as Simeon B. Pinckney, Isabella Pinckney, Alex Pinckney, Mary Pinckney, Samuel James Pinckney, Rebecca Riley Pinckney, James H. Pinckney, William Brown, Sara Pinckney, Julia H. Pinckney, Laura Riley Pinckney Heyward, Herbert Pinckney, Ellis Pinckney, Jannie Gathers, Robert Seabrook, Annie Haley Pinckney, Lillian Pinckney Seabrook, Simeon B. Pinckney, Jr., Matthew G. Pinckney, Mary Riley, John Riley, Richard Riley, Daniel McLeod, and all other persons unknown claiming any right, title, estate, interest, or lien upon the real estate tracts described in the Complaint herein, Defendants,of whom the Estate of Eloise Pinckney Harris, Jerome C. Harris and Judy P. Singleton are Petitioners.

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Edward M. Brown, of Charleston, for Petitioners.Donald Higgins Howe, of Howe & Wyndham, of Charleston, George J. Morris, of Charleston, Walter Bilbro, Jr., of Charleston, for Respondents.Charles M. Feeley, of Summerville, Guardian Ad Litem.Justice KITTREDGE.

This is an heirs' property dispute regarding a ten-acre tract of land on James Island in Charleston County, South Carolina. The dispute came before the circuit court in February 2005, when Respondents brought an action to quiet title. The circuit court granted summary judgment to Petitioners. The court of appeals reversed. Robinson v. Estate of Harris, Op. No. 2008–UP–705 (S.C.Ct.App. filed Dec. 16, 2008). We reverse the decision of the court of appeals and reinstate the circuit court's order granting summary judgment to Petitioners.

I.

The facts of this case are, in significant part, the same as those set forth in the related matters of Robinson v. Estate of Harris, 388 S.C. 616, 698 S.E.2d 214 (2010); Robinson v. Estate of Harris, 388 S.C. 630, 698 S.E.2d 222 (2010); Robinson v. Estate of Harris, 388 S.C. 645, 698 S.E.2d 229 (2010) and Robinson v. Estate of Harris, 389 S.C. 360, 698 S.E.2d 801 (2010). As in these companion cases, the underlying dispute is about the identity of the true heirs of Simeon B. Pinckney. Simeon B. Pinckney owned a twenty-acre tract of land on James Island at the time of his death in the early 1920s. The companion cases concern a 4.3–acre tract derived from this property. At issue in this case is an adjacent ten-acre tract derived from the same property.

The ten acres at issue in this case were conveyed by Laura and Herbert Pinckney to Ellis Pinckney by deed dated October 26, 1946. Ellis Pinckney died in 1976. In his will, Ellis Pinckney bequeathed all of his personal and real property to his daughters, Eloise Pinckney Harris and Isadora A. Pinckney, “to share and share alike.” Isadora Pinckney served as executrix, and she was duly discharged of her duties by the probate court by Letters Dismissory dated January 9, 1978.

After Isadora Pinckney's death, Eloise Pinckney Harris served as the executrix for Isadora's estate. The probate court issued Letters Dismissory dated March 25, 1981 releasing Eloise Pinckney Harris from her duties. In addition, the probate court issued a “Devise/Descent of Real Estate and Description” on behalf of Isadora Pinckney, deceased, as grantor, to Eloise Pinckney Harris as the sole devisee and grantee. Through these circumstances, Eloise Pinckney Harris thus became the sole owner of the ten-acre tract now in contention.

The estates of both Ellis Pinckney and Isadora Pinckney were properly probated in the Charleston County Probate Court. Notice of the Letters Dismissory discharging the executrixes of the estates of Ellis Pinckney and Isadora Pinckney were given by publication. None of the Respondents filed any claims or objections regarding the estates pursuant to statutory requirements.

Eloise Pinckney Harris subsequently died, and her son, Petitioner Jerome C. Harris, was appointed as the personal representative of her estate. Eloise Pinckney Harris devised the bulk of her estate to Jerome C. Harris.

The dispute over ownership of the ten-acre area began in 2004 when Jerome C. Harris was appointed the personal representative of his mother's estate and reportedly sought to distribute the property to himself as the sole devisee. At that time, Respondents filed a petition to stay the issuance of a deed of distribution. Respondents claimed the property had been improperly willed to the decedent, Eloise Pinckney Harris, because her predecessors-in-interest, Isadora Pinckney and Ellis Pinckney, had no legitimate interest in the property.

Respondents filed an action seeking to quiet title to the ten acres. The essence of Respondents' complaint is that the 1946 conveyance to Ellis Pinckney was invalid. Specifically, Respondents claim their ancestor, Isabella Pinckney, was the only lawful wife of Simeon B. Pinckney and that Laura, Herbert, and Ellis Pinckney committed fraud when they claimed to be Simeon's lawful heirs.

II.

The circuit court granted summary judgment to Petitioners because (1) Respondents' action was barred by South Carolina Code section 15–3–340 (2005) and (2) almost sixty years had passed since the conveyance to Ellis Pinckney and two estates were properly probated in Charleston County without any claims by Respondents. The court of appeals reversed and remanded, finding section 15–3–340 was not applicable to this case.1 The court of appeals refused to uphold the circuit court's order on the basis of laches, finding “there is no mention of laches in the appealed order.” While it is true the word “laches” does not appear in the circuit court order, we find it manifest that the circuit court considered, and relied on, laches. Moreover, we find this action, like the companion cases, is barred by laches. See Hallums v. Hallums, 296 S.C. 195, 198–99, 371 S.E.2d 525, 527 (1988) ( “Laches is neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, under circumstances affording opportunity for diligence, to do what in law should have been done. Whether a claim is barred by laches is to be determined in light of [the] facts of each case, taking into consideration whether the delay has worked injury, prejudice, or disadvantage to the other party; delay alone in assertion of a right does not constitute laches.” (internal citation omitted)).

III.

The circuit court's order plainly referenced the excessive period of time that passed between the 1946 conveyance to Ellis Pinckney and Respondents' first objection to that conveyance in 2005. For example, the circuit court noted that Respondents “sat idlely [sic] by for a period in excess of fifty- five (55) years assumedly knowing that they may have a right in the real property of Ellis Pinckney.” In addition, the circuit court observed that:

It has been almost sixty (60) years since the real property that is the subject of this action was conveyed to Ellis Pinckney. There is no provision in the Code of Laws of South Carolina that accords anyone the right, legally or equitably, to bring an action sixty (60) years after the fact. [Respondents] knew of their rights well in advance of this day. It was incumbent upon the [Respondents] to file the appropriate action in a court of competent jurisdiction to have those rights adjudicated.

Accordingly, we believe that the doctrine of laches formed a part of the circuit court's reasoning in dismissing Respondents' complaint. Under the circumstances presented, Respondents' inaction for many decades constitutes laches.

IV.

Consistent with our decisions in the companion cases regarding the 4.3–acre tract derived from the same ancestor, we hold Respondents' action to quiet title was barred by the doctrine of laches. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the court of appeals and reinstate the circuit court's order granting summary judgment to Petitioners.

REVERSED.

TOAL, C.J., and Acting Justices JAMES E. MOORE and E.C. BURNETT, III, concur. BEATTY, J., dissenting in a separate opinion.Justice BEATTY, dissenting.

Sara Mae Robinson and others (Respondents) brought this action against numerous defendants in a dispute over heirs' property. Three of those defendants, The Estate of Eloise Pinckney Harris, Jerome C. Harris, and Judy P. Singleton (Petitioners), have petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari to review a decision of the Court of Appeals that reversed a circuit court order granting summary judgment to Petitioners on the ground the complaint was untimely. See Robinson v. Estate of Eloise Pinckney Harris, Op. No.2008–UP–705 (S.C.Ct.App. filed Dec. 16, 2008) (“Harris/Singleton appeal”). We granted the petition for review and the majority has now reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals. I respectfully dissent.

I. FACTS

The property at issue in this case is 10 acres located on James Island that was previously part of a 20–acre area owned by Simeon B. Pinckney at the time...

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9 cases
  • Faison v. Lewis
    • United States
    • New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
    • May 12, 2015
    ...forged deeds void and thus apply no statute of limitations to bar actions to invalidate such deeds (see e.g. Robinson v. Estate of Harris, 391 S.C. 114, 131, 705 S.E.2d 41, 50 [2011] ). On this appeal, however, we need not consider laches because we must accept as true plaintiff's claims th......
  • Faison v. Lewis
    • United States
    • New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
    • May 12, 2015
    ...forged deeds void and thus apply no statute of limitations to bar actions to invalidate such deeds (see e.g. Robinson v. Estate of Harris, 391 S.C. 114, 131, 705 S.E.2d 41, 50 [2011] ). On this appeal, however, we need not consider laches because we must accept as true plaintiff's claims th......
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    • U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina
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    ...time, under circumstances affording opportunity for diligence, to do what in law should have been done.' " Robinson v. Estate of Harris, 391 S.C. 114, 118, 705 S.E.2d 41, 43 (2011) (quoting Hallums v. Hallums, 296 S.C. 195, 198, 371 S.E.2d 525, 527 (1988)). "[W]hether laches applies in a pa......
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