Robinson v. The Estate Of Eloise Pinckney Harris
| Decision Date | 16 August 2010 |
| Docket Number | No. 26862.,26862. |
| Citation | 698 S.E.2d 214,388 S.C. 616 |
| Parties | Sara Mae ROBINSON, Mary Ann Campbell, James Scott, Ellis Scott, William Scott, Shirley Pinckney Hughes, Julius Steven Brown, Leon Brown, Annabell Brown, Loretta Ladson, Kathleen Brown, Mozelle B. Rembert, Patricia Frickling, Ruth Mitchell, Gwendolyn Dunn, Angela Hamilton, Geraldine Jameson, Remus Prioleau, Julius Prioleau, Anthony Prioleau, Judy Brown, Franklin Brown, Kathy Young, Kenneth Prioleau, Willis Jameson, Melvin Pinckney, William “Alonzie” Pinckney, Ruth Fussell, Hattie Wilson, Marie Watson, Gloria Becoat, Angela T. Burnett, and Lawrence Redmond, Petitioners,v.The ESTATE OF Eloise Pinckney HARRIS, Jerome C. Harris, as Personal Representative and sole heir and devisee of the Estate of Eloise P. Harris, Daniel Duggan, Mark F. Teseniar, Nan M. Teseniar, David Savage, Lisa M. Shogry-Savage, Debbie S. Dinovo, Martine A. Hutton, The Converse Company, LLC, Judy Pinckney Singleton, Mary Leavy, Michelle Davis, Leroy Brisbane, Frances Brisbane, and John Doe, Jane Doe, Richard Roe and Mary Roe, who are fictitious names representing all unknown persons and the heirs at law or devisees of the following deceased persons known as Simeon B. Pinckney, Isabella Pinckney, Alex Pinckney, Mary Pinckney, Samuel James Pinckney, Rebecca Riley Pinckney, James H. Pinckney, William Brown, Sara Pinckney, Julia H. Pinckney, Laura Riley Pinckney Heyward, Herbert Pinckney, Ellis Pinckney, Jannie Gathers, Robert Seabrook, Annie Haley Pinckney, Lillian Pinckney Seabrook, Simeon B. Pinckney, Jr., Matthew G. Pinckney, Mary Riley, John Riley, Richard Riley, Daniel McLeod, and all other persons unknown claiming any right, title, estate, interest or lien upon the real estate tracts described in the Complaint therein, Defendants,of whom Debbie S. Dinovo is Respondent. |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED
Donald Higgins Howe, of Howe & Wyndham, LLP, and Walter Bilbro, Jr., both of Charleston, for Petitioners.
William C. Cleveland, III, and John C. Hawk, IV, both of Buist, Moore, Smythe & McGee, of Charleston, for Respondent.
Charles M. Feeley, of Summerville, for Guardian Ad Litem.
In this heirs' property dispute, the Court granted the petition of Sara Mae Robinson and others (“Petitioners”) for a writ of certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals in Robinson v. Estate of Harris, Op. No. 2008-UP-647 (S.C. Ct.App. filed Nov. 24, 2008). In this opinion, the Court of Appeals affirmed a circuit court order that granted summary judgment in favor of Debbie S. Dinovo on the grounds Petitioners' action to set aside a 1966 quiet title action was barred by the three-year statute of limitations as established by section 15-67-90 of the South Carolina Code,1 Dinovo is a bona fide purchaser for value without notice pursuant to the recording statute as established by section 30-7-10 of the South Carolina Code, 2 and Petitioners' action was barred by the doctrine of laches. We affirm.
This action involves a portion of a 20-acre tract of land located on Fort Johnson Road, in James Island, South Carolina. The tract was formerly owned by Simeon B. Pinckney, who died intestate in 1921 and allegedly left a wife, Laura Pinckney, and two sons, Ellis and Herbert Pinckney, as his heirs.
The land held by Simeon B. Pinckney originated from a conveyance to him by deed executed in 1874 (and recorded in 1875) from Thomas Moore. The property was described as being 20 acres, more or less. In 1888, Simeon B. Pinckney conveyed 5 acres of this property to his wife, Isabella Pinckney, leaving approximately 15 acres. A survey conducted in 1923, however, found that exactly 14.3 acres remained.
In 1946, Laura Pinckney, Ellis Pinckney, and Herbert Pinckney executed two cross-deeds that divided the 14.3-acre parcel among themselves, creating a 4.3-acre tract and a 10-acre tract.3 One of the 1946 cross- deeds conveyed the 4.3-acre tract to Herbert Pinckney and the other deed conveyed the 10-acre tract to Ellis Pinckney. In 1966, after Herbert Pinckney died intestate, Laura Pinckney Heyward brought a successful action to quiet title to the 4.3-acre tract held by Herbert.4 None of the Petitioners or their predecessors-in-interest filed responsive pleadings in the 1966 proceeding.
As the result of subsequent conveyances, the 4.3-acre tract was ultimately divided into four lots. The owners of these lots are as follows: (1) The Converse Company (Lot # 1); (2) Martine A. Hutton (Lot # 2); (3) David Savage and Lisa M. Shogry-Savage (Lot # 3); and (4) Debbie (Shogry) Dinovo (Lot # 4). The instant case involves the interests of Dinovo (“Respondent”).
On February 1, 2005, Petitioners filed an action to quiet title to several tracts of land located on James Island, including the 4.3-acre tract at issue in the instant case. In their Complaint, Petitioners sought “to establish their legitimate relationship as lineal descendants and heirs” of Simeon B. Pinckney. The first twenty-five named Petitioners claimed they were heirs of Simeon B. Pinckney, and the remaining Petitioners claimed they purchased interests in the property and were the legitimate owners of those interests.
In support of these claims, Petitioners alleged the 1946 deeds and 1966 action to quiet title were fraudulent and were undertaken without consideration for the rights or interests of Petitioners and other heirs. Specifically, Petitioners asserted the 4.3-acre tract was fraudulently conveyed to Herbert Pinckney in 1946 and, thereafter, wrongly passed by inheritance to his mother Laura Pinckney Heyward at Herbert's death. Additionally, Petitioners claimed Laura Pinckney Heyward fraudulently procured the 1966 quiet title action to the 4.3-acre tract when neither she nor Herbert Pinckney owned any interest in the tract. Finally, Petitioners alleged they did not become aware of the 1946 deeds, of the 1966 quiet title action, or of any other action affecting their title to the property until 2004.
Based on these allegations, Petitioners sought “(a) a determination of all owners of the four (4) tracts of property, ... a determination of each owner's respective rights and interests in said tracts, and the quieting of the titles to these four (4) tracts and (b) the sale of the respective owners' interests in these four (4) tracts.”
Respondent answered and filed a motion for summary judgment. In her answer, Respondent raised a number of affirmative defenses, including the doctrines of laches, estoppel, waiver, bona fide purchaser for value res judicata, collateral estoppel, and the applicable statute of limitations.
In response to the motion for summary judgment, Petitioners argued their claim was not barred by section 15-67-90 given the 1966 quiet title action was the result of extrinsic fraud. Because they offered affidavits supporting their claim that the 1966 quiet title action was procured through fraud and forgery, Petitioners contended their action was distinguishable from the case of Yarbrough v. Collins, 301 S.C. 339, 391 S.E.2d 873 (Ct.App.1990).5
After a hearing, the circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Respondent. In doing so, the court found Petitioners' claims were barred by: (1) the three-year statute of limitations, codified in section 15-67-90, which prohibits setting aside “for any reason” a judgment quieting title to land; (2) Respondent is a bona fide purchaser for value without notice pursuant to section 30-7-10, the recording statute; and (3) the doctrine of laches. Because Petitioners were not parties to the 1966 quiet title action, the circuit court judge found the doctrines of collateral estoppel and res judicata were not applicable.
Petitioners appealed the circuit court's order to the Court of Appeals.
In a summary opinion, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the circuit court. See Robinson v. Estate of Harris, Op. No. 2008-UP-647 (S.C. Ct.App. filed Nov. 24, 2008). In support of its decision, the court cited: (1) the three-year statute of limitations as codified in section 15-67-90; (2) Yarbrough as interpreting section 15-67-90; (3) Robinson v. Estate of Harris, 378 S.C. 140, 662 S.E.2d 420 (Ct.App.2008) cert. granted (Apr. 10, 2009); and (4) Burnett v. Holliday Brothers, Inc., 279 S.C. 222, 225, 305 S.E.2d 238, 240 (1983), to reference the purpose of the recording statute as codified in section 30-7-10.
This Court granted Petitioners' request for a writ of certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals.
On appeal from the grant of a summary judgment motion, this Court applies the same standard as that required for the circuit court under Rule 56(c), SCRCP; Brockbank v. Best Capital Corp., 341 S.C. 372, 379, 534 S.E.2d 688, 692 (2000).
Rule 56(c) of the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a trial court may grant a motion for summary judgment “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Rule 56(c), SCRCP.
“In determining whether any triable issue of fact exists, the evidence and all inferences which can reasonably be drawn therefrom must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Pye v. Estate of Fox, 369 S.C. 555, 563, 633 S.E.2d 505, 509 (2006).
In essence, Petitioners contend summary judgment was improperly granted given that significant and material questions of fact exist relating to extrinsic fraud and forgery in the underlying 1966 quiet title action and the 1946 cross-deeds upon which the action was based.
In support of this contention, Petitioners argue the circuit court and the Court of Appeals erred in determining that section 15-67-90 constitutes an “absolute bar” to setting aside judgments quieting title to land. Because ...
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