Robinson v. U.S. Dep't of Educ.
| Decision Date | 11 November 2020 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 20-1482 (CKK) |
| Citation | 502 F.Supp.3d 127 |
| Parties | Anthony ROBINSON, Plaintiff, v. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
Jeffrey Warren Styles, Washington Legal Group, LLC, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff.
Paul Cirino, U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia, Washington, DC, for Defendant.
COLLEEN KOLLAR-KOTELLY, United States District Judge In this case, Mr. Anthony Robinson ("Plaintiff") asserts a single claim against the United States Department of Education ("USDE") under the Fair Credit Reporting Act ("FCRA"). USDE, however, has moved to dismiss Plaintiff's claim because of the preclusive effect of a prior judgment rendered against Plaintiff in Robinson v. United States Dep't of Educ. , 917 F.3d 799 (4th Cir. 2019) (" Robinson I "). Upon consideration of the briefing, the relevant authorities, and the record as a whole,1 the Court agrees with USDE that the preclusive effect of Robinson I binds Plaintiff and merits the dismissal of his present FCRA claim for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. As such, the Court will DISMISS Plaintiff's Amended Complaint WITH PREJUDICE .
On December 2, 2014, Plaintiff filed Robinson I in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County, Maryland, against USDE, the Pennsylvania Higher Education Assistance Agency ("PHEAA"), and Equifax, Experian, and TransUnion, LLC (collectively, the "Credit Reporting Agencies"). See Def.’s Mot. at 5 (citing Robinson v. Pennsylvania Higher Education Assistance Agency et al. , No. CAL-14-32388). On January 9, 2015, Robinson I was removed to the District Court for the District of Maryland, where Plaintiff then amended his complaint on June 3, 2015. See generally Def.’s Mot., Ex. A ( Robinson I Am. Compl.). In that amended complaint, Plaintiff alleged that federal student loan accounts with USDE were opened in his name without his authorization. See id. ¶¶ 3, 8–9. Plaintiff further alleged that USDE and PHEAA failed to adequately investigate these disputed loan accounts and, instead, instructed the Credit Reporting Agencies to report Plaintiff's responsibility for the accounts. See id. ¶¶ 10–13. On the basis of this alleged conduct, Plaintiff argued that USDE had violated § 1681s-2(b) of FCRA and was, therefore, liable for damages under that statute. See id. ¶¶ 26–31.
On June 12, 2015, USDE moved to dismiss Plaintiff's FCRA claim, arguing that the agency's sovereign immunity against such a claim deprived the Maryland district court of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Robinson v. Pennsylvania Higher Educ. Assistance Agency, et al. , No. GJH-15-0079, 2017 WL 1277429, at *1–2 (D. Md. Apr. 3, 2017). In addressing this argument, the Maryland district court first acknowledged "the guiding principle that ... ‘the United States may not be sued without its consent and that the existence of consent is a prerequisite for jurisdiction.’ "
Id. at *3 (quoting United States v. Mitchell , 463 U.S. 206, 212, 103 S.Ct. 2961, 77 L.Ed.2d 580 (1983) ). The court further explained that a "waiver of sovereign immunity ‘must be unequivocally expressed in statutory text ... and will not be implied.’ " Robinson , 2017 WL 1277429, at *1–2 (quoting Lane v. Pena , 518 U.S. 187, 192, 116 S.Ct. 2092, 135 L.Ed.2d 486 (1996) ). Within this framework, the Maryland district court concluded that FCRA "do[es] not contain a clear and unequivocal waiver of sovereign immunity," and, as such, it dismissed Plaintiff's FCRA claim against USDE for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Robinson , 2017 WL 1277429, at *4.
Plaintiff subsequently appealed the Maryland district court's dismissal order to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. See Robinson v. United States Dep't of Educ. , 917 F.3d 799, 800 (4th Cir. 2019). Therein, the Fourth Circuit made clear that "[t]he only question presented on appeal [wa]s whether the United States has waived sovereign immunity for suits alleging that the federal government willfully or negligently violated FCRA." Robinson , 917 F.3d at 801. Upon review of FCRA, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the statute's "text and structure make clear that no unambiguous and unequivocal waiver of sovereign immunity has taken place," and, therefore, USDE remains immune from claims under FCRA. Id. at 806. Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the Maryland district court's dismissal of Plaintiff's FCRA claim against USDE for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Id. at 807. Ultimately, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in Robinson I on April 20, 2020. See Robinson v. Dep't of Educ. , ––– U.S. ––––, 140 S. Ct. 1440, 206 L.Ed.2d 842 (2020).
On May 20, 2019, shortly after the Fourth Circuit's March 6, 2019 decision in Robinson I , Plaintiff filed another civil action against USDE in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, captioned Robinson v. United States Dep't of Educ. , No. 2019-CA-003345-B ("Robinson II "). See Compl., ECF No. 1-1. USDE removed Robinson II to this Court on June 5, 2020, see Not. of Removal, ECF No. 1, and Plaintiff eventually amended his complaint on July 31, 2020, see Am. Compl., ECF No. 7.
In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff now alleges, as he did in Robinson I , that USDE reported to the Credit Reporting Agencies that Plaintiff was responsible for federal student loan accounts that Plaintiff had not authorized. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 10–16. Plaintiff further alleges that he disputed these USDE loan accounts, but that USDE failed to adequately investigate the disputed accounts and continued to report to the Credit Reporting Agencies that the disputed accounts belonged to Plaintiff. See id. ¶¶ 16–21. On the basis of these allegations, Plaintiff asserts, for a second time, that USDE violated § 1681s-2(b) of FCRA and, accordingly, presents a claim for damages against the agency under FCRA. See id. ¶¶ 30–35. USDE has now moved to dismiss Plaintiff's FCRA claim in Robinson II , in part, because of the preclusive effect of the judgment in Robinson I . See Def.’s Mot. at 5–9; Def.’s Reply at 4–11. USDE's motion is now ripe for review.
A court must dismiss a case pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) when it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction. In determining whether there is jurisdiction, the Court may "consider the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts evidenced in the record, or the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court's resolution of disputed facts." Coal. for Underground Expansion v. Mineta , 333 F.3d 193, 198 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Herbert v. Nat'l Acad. of Scis. , 974 F.2d 192, 197 (D.C. Cir. 1992) ); see also Jerome Stevens Pharm., Inc. v. Food & Drug Admin. , 402 F.3d 1249, 1253 (D.C. Cir. 2005) ().
In reviewing a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), courts must accept as true all factual allegations in the complaint and construe the complaint liberally, granting plaintiff the benefit of all inferences that can be drawn from the facts alleged. See Settles v. U.S. Parole Comm'n , 429 F.3d 1098, 1106 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (); Leatherman v. Tarrant Cty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit , 507 U.S. 163, 164, 113 S.Ct. 1160, 122 L.Ed.2d 517 (1993) (); Koutny v. Martin , 530 F. Supp. 2d 84, 87 (D.D.C. 2007) .
Despite the favorable inferences that a plaintiff receives on a motion to dismiss, it remains the plaintiff's burden to prove subject matter jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence. Am. Farm Bureau v. United States Envtl. Prot. Agency , 121 F. Supp. 2d 84, 90 (D.D.C. 2000). "Although a court must accept as true all factual allegations contained in the complaint when reviewing a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), [a] plaintiff[’s] factual allegations in the complaint ... will bear closer scrutiny in resolving a 12(b)(1) motion than in resolving a 12(b)(6) motion for failure to state a claim." Wright v. Foreign Serv. Grievance Bd. , 503 F. Supp. 2d 163, 170 (D.D.C. 2007) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted) (quoting Grand Lodge of Fraternal Order of Police v. Ashcroft , 185 F. Supp. 2d 9, 13–14 (D.D.C. 2001) ), aff'd , 2008 WL 4068606 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 17, 2008). A court need not accept as true "a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation" or an inference "unsupported by the facts set out in the complaint." Trudeau v. Fed. Trade Comm'n , 456 F.3d 178, 193 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Papasan v. Allain , 478 U.S. 265, 286, 106 S.Ct. 2932, 92 L.Ed.2d 209 (1986) ).
In brief, the viability of Plaintiff's present claim turns on whether FCRA effectuates a waiver of USDE's sovereign immunity. Plaintiff recently litigated this precise issue in Robinson I , wherein the Fourth Circuit concluded that FCRA does not waive USDE's sovereign immunity. For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff is bound by the issue preclusive effect of the Robinson I judgment and this Court must, therefore, DISMISS Plaintiff's FCRA claim for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
As an initial matter, the parties dispute the Court's ability to consider the issue...
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