Robles v. Emp't Dev. Dep't
| Decision Date | 22 June 2012 |
| Docket Number | No. A132773.,A132773. |
| Citation | 207 Cal.App.4th 1029,144 Cal.Rptr.3d 36 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
| Parties | Jose ROBLES, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. EMPLOYMENT DEVELOPMENT DEPARTMENT et al., Defendants and Respondents. |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Gary S. Garfinkle, Lafayette, Maria J. Garfinkle, for Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Cheryl L. Feiner, Deputy Attorney General, for Respondents.
Appellant Jose Robles applied unsuccessfully for unemployment compensation benefits after his employment was terminated effective January 5, 2010. His employer did not oppose the application or appear at the administrative hearings. The trial court adopted the administrative findings and denied Robles's petition for writ of administrative mandate. As a matter of law, the record does not demonstrate that Robles was terminated because of misconduct within the meaning of Unemployment Insurance Code section 1256 (section 1256). Additionally, Robles's employer did not overcome the statutory presumption that he was discharged for reasons other than misconduct. Accordingly, Robles was not disqualified for unemployment compensation benefits and we reverse the judgment.
Jose Robles testified without contradiction to the following at the hearing before an administrative law judge (ALJ) of respondent Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board (Board): He worked as a service technician for Liquid Environmental Solutions for four years until his termination on January 5, 2010. His job was to collect food grease from restaurants and other food outlets. His pay was $20.75 an hour.
Robles's supervisor called him on that last day for a meeting and told him he was suspended because of “the incident.” The incident related to Robles's attempt to buy shoes for a friend in need at the Red Wing Shoe Store, where company employees buy work shoes for the job every year with a $150 shoe allowance. Robles asked the clerk if she would measure his friend's foot because he “intended to give it to my friend” who needed shoes. Robles reasoned that he had a good pair of shoes and his friend needed them more than he did. The clerk told Robles “that was not possible.”
Robles explained that he did not have any “malintention [ sic ] of anything.” He knew the allowance was for him, but he could afford to give it to a friend in need and the company would not be jeopardized because he had other shoes. His intent was to perform a noble gesture for a friend. In his view there was a misunderstanding of company policy but no misconduct. He “attempted to do it and then I was told I cannot do it, ... let it go.”
Robles applied to respondent Employment Development Department (EDD) for unemployment benefits. The EDD's “Record of Claim Status Interview Misconduct” reflects no employer information about the incident; indeed, the EDD investigator did not speak with the employer and indicated a message was left for the employer to call within a certain timeframe, but the employer did not return the call. The document reflects that Robles was terminated for violating a company policy. It relates that Robles attempted to buy safety shoes for a friend at company expense. Robles said he did not get the shoes, and the company did not know the shoes were for a friend. According to the document, Robles was aware of the company policy and that the purchase was for employees only. There were no prior warnings. The record concludes that Robles willfully disregarded his employer's interests.
The EDD's notice of determination states that Robles's claim for unemployment benefits was denied because he “broke a reasonable employer rule.” After considering the available information, the EDD concluded Robles did not meet the qualifications for benefits.
Robles appealed the EDD's determination, denying that he broke a reasonable employer rule and stating his employer did not cite any specific rule that was broken and he was not aware of any such rule. Further, Robles protested that he was not provided with the unspecified “available information” mentioned in the EDD's decision, and such information had not been disclosed to him. Finally, Robles attested that he did not obtain an improper benefit or cause any harm to his employer.
Robles was permitted to view the file, for the first time, just prior to the hearing before the ALJ. Over Robles's 1 objection, the ALJ admitted the record of claim from the EDD file. Thereafter, Robles testified as summarized above. Robles also submitted a copy of his handwritten statement which his supervisor requested. Robles explained the following:
Nonetheless, the supervisor suspended Robles on January 5, 2010. He received a final paycheck with no further explanation, effectively terminating him as of that date.
The ALJ found that Robles was discharged for misconduct connected with work. In particular, Robles understood that the employer intended that its employees use the annual shoe allowance to purchase shoes. Robles breached
Robles appealed to a panel of the Board, which reviewed the record and issued a decision adopting as its own the ALJ's issue statement, findings of fact and reasons for decision. The decision also noted that an employee's misappropriation of employer property is conclusive evidence of misconduct and that here, the claimant was not allowed to use the shoe allowance for his friend because the clerk did not permit the sale.
Finally, Robles petitioned for a writ of administrative mandate. Counsel requested a statement of decision which the court denied. The trial court denied the petition, concluding that the administrative findings were supported by the weight of the evidence. This appeal followed entry of judgment.
When reviewing a decision of the Board, the superior court exercises independent judgment on the evidentiary record of the administrative proceedings and asks whether the findings of the administrative agency are supported by the weight of the evidence. ( Sanchez v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 575, 585, 205 Cal.Rptr. 501, 685 P.2d 61( Sanchez ).) Ordinarily our review of the trial court's ruling on a writ of mandate is confined to asking whether the findings and judgment of the lower court are supported by substantial, credible and competent evidence. However, where the probative facts are not in dispute and clearly require a conclusion that differs from that of the trial court, we may disregard the latter's conclusions. ( Ibid.) Issues of law, of course, are reviewed de novo.
Section 1256 states in part: “An individual is disqualified for unemployment compensation benefits if the director finds that he or she ... has been discharged for misconduct connected with his or her most recent work.”
We liberally construe the provisions of the code to advance the legislative objective of reducing the hardship of unemployment. ( Sanchez, supra, 36 Cal.3d at p. 584, 205 Cal.Rptr. 501, 685 P.2d 61.) To this end, the term “ ‘misconduct’ ” as used in section 1256 is restricted to “ ‘ ' ( Amador v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd. (1984) 35 Cal.3d 671, 678, 200 Cal.Rptr. 298, 677 P.2d 224( Amador ).)
As further explained in Amador, fault 2 is the underlying element to consider in interpreting and applying the unemployment compensation provisions. However, the determination of fault does not hinge on finding that the discharge was justified. Rather, the employee's conduct must demonstrate culpability or bad faith. ( Amador, supra, 35 Cal.3d at p. 678, 200 Cal.Rptr. 298, 677 P.2d 224.) In other words, the test for misconduct is volitional, the key factor pivoting on the true nature of the employee's intent. ( Rowe v. Hansen (1974) 41 Cal.App.3d 512, 520–521, 116 Cal.Rptr. 16.) ( Amador, supra, 35 Cal.3d at pp. 678–679, 200 Cal.Rptr. 298, 677 P.2d 224.)
Here, the EDD initially denied benefits on the theory that Robles was discharged from employment because he “broke a...
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