Amador v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd.

• Citation: 200 Cal.Rptr. 298,677 P.2d 224,35 Cal.3d 671
• Decision Date: 26 March 1984
• Docket Number: S.F. 24577
• Court: United States State Supreme Court (California)
• Parties: , 677 P.2d 224 Nelly L. AMADOR, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS BOARD, Defendant and Respondent.

Page 298

200 Cal.Rptr. 298

35 Cal.3d 671, 677 P.2d 224

Nelly L. AMADOR, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS BOARD, Defendant and Respondent.

S.F. 24577.

Supreme Court of California In Bank.

March 26, 1984.

Robert John Hughes, Amanda Hawes and Gallardo & Hawes, San Jose, for plaintiff and appellant.

George Deukmejian and John K. Van de Kamp, Attys. Gen., Charlton G. Holland and Asher Rubin, Deputy Attys. Gen., for defendant and respondent.

BIRD, Chief Justice.

Is a worker disqualified from collecting unemployment insurance benefits when she has been discharged for wilfully refusing to perform work which she reasonably and in good faith believed would jeopardize the health of others?

I.

Nelly Amador appeals from a judgment of the superior court rejecting her petition for a writ of mandate. She sought to compel the Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board (board) to vacate its ruling that she was ineligible for unemployment insurance benefits because she had been discharged for "misconduct." (UNEMP.INS.CODE, § 1256. )¹

The San Mateo County (Chope) Community Hospital hired Nelly Amador as a histotechnician in May of 1976. Histotechnicians prepare tissue samples for microscopic analysis by pathologists, physicians who specialize in the interpretation and diagnosis of changes in tissues caused by disease. ² During Amador's tenure at Chope, she was one of two histotechnicians on the staff.

Amador completed her training in histology at Stanford University. She was licensed as a histotechnician by the American Society of Clinical Pathologists. Prior to her employment at Chope, she worked as a histotechnician for about four years at hospitals operated by Stanford University and by Oxford University.

Beginning about six months after Amador started work at Chope, two doctors asked her on several occasions to perform a procedure known as "grosscutting." Grosscutting consists of the selection and removal of small tissue samples of approximately one centimeter in breadth from organs or other large (gross) specimens removed by a doctor from a patient. On the basis of a microscopic examination of these samples, a pathologist diagnoses the patient's condition.

Amador declined to perform grosscutting on tissue removed from live patients. She explained that in her view grosscutting exceeded her capabilities as a histotechnician. She believed that the accuracy of a pathologist's diagnosis depends in large part on the selection and cutting of the small samples. And, in turn, a patient's life and health could hinge on the quality of the diagnosis. In her view, such life-and-death matters should be handled by physicians or by specially trained technicians. This view accorded with her experience at Stanford and Oxford, where histotechnicians had not been permitted to perform grosscutting.

Amador did not object to grosscutting on organs taken from cadavers. Nor did she decline to process small-size specimens selected and removed from live patients by doctors.

Until September of 1978, Chope respected Amador's objection. Her supervisors rated her performance "standard" in a May 1978 evaluation.

Eventually, however, the other histotechnician complained about having to do all of the grosscutting work. On September 29, Amador was again asked to perform the work. She refused. A Chope official warned her that she could be subject to discipline. She maintained her position and was suspended from work for two days in October. After a full adversary hearing, the county civil service commission (commission) upheld the suspension on February 2, 1979.

Sometime before the hearing, Amador contacted three outside pathologists. One, a professor of pathology at Stanford, had been a teacher of hers. Another had worked with her at the Stanford University Medical Center. The third was an official of the American Society of Clinical Pathologists, from which Amador held her license as a histotechnician. These three physicians supported her refusal to perform grosscutting.

In the week following the decision of the commission, Amador was repeatedly ordered to perform grosscutting or face discharge. Standing on her past experience and on the opinions of the outside pathologists, she continued to refuse. On February 26, Chope discharged her for incompetence and insubordination.

Shortly after her discharge, Amador applied for unemployment benefits. Chope objected, arguing that Amador was ineligible under section 1256 of the code, which provides that employees discharged for "misconduct" are disqualified for benefits. The claims interviewer rejected Chope's argument and awarded benefits.

Chope pursued an administrative appeal. At the hearing, it relied primarily on the fact-finding report of the commission, which had found that Chope's orders were "reasonable" and that Amador had committed "insubordination" in disobeying them. In addition, Amador's supervisor and another Chope official testified regarding her repeated refusals to perform the work in spite of warnings of possible disciplinary action.

Amador gave uncontroverted testimony as to the reasons for her refusal. She presented signed statements by two of the outside pathologists, and testified that the third was available to testify by phone. The statements set forth the doctors' opinions that histotechnicians should not perform grosscutting, and indicated that Amador had consulted with them regarding those opinions.

The administrative law judge (ALJ) ruled that Amador had committed misconduct by repeatedly and wilfully violating her employer's orders. He gave collateral estoppel effect to the commission's findings on the reasonableness of Chope's orders and on Amador's "insubordination." He concluded that her deliberate violation of a reasonable order constituted misconduct within the meaning of section 1256.

Amador appealed to the board, which held that the evidence was sufficient to support the ruling on misconduct. She then petitioned the superior court for a writ of mandate. After an independent review of the record, the court denied the petition.

II.

"An individual is disqualified for unemployment compensation benefits if the director finds that he or she left his or her most recent work voluntarily without good cause or that he or she has been discharged for misconduct connected with his or her most recent work." (§ 1256.)

The term "misconduct," as used in the code, is limited to " 'conduct evincing such wilful or wanton disregard of an employer's interests as is found in deliberate violations or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of his employee, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree or recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to his employer. On the other hand mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed "misconduct" within the meaning of the statute.' " (Maywood Glass Co. v. Stewart (1959) 170 Cal.App.2d 719, 724, 339 P.2d 947; accord Lacy v. California Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd. (1971) 17 Cal.App.3d 1128, 1132, 95 Cal.Rptr. 566; Jacobs v. California Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd. (1972) 25 Cal.App.3d 1035, 1037, 102 Cal.Rptr. 364.)

The policy of the code is to provide benefits to "persons unemployed through no fault of their own." (§ 100.) "Accordingly, fault is the basic element to be considered in interpreting and applying the code sections on unemployment compensation." (Rowe v. Hansen (1974) 41 Cal.App.3d 512, 521, 116 Cal.Rptr. 16.)

The determination of fault is not concluded by a finding that the discharge was justified. The claimant's conduct must evince culpability or bad faith. "The conduct may be harmful to the employer's interests and justify the employee's discharge; nevertheless, it evokes the disqualification for unemployment insurance benefits only if it is wilful, wanton or equally culpable." (Jacobs v. California Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., supra, 25 Cal.App.3d at p. 1037, 102 Cal.Rptr. 364; Rowe v. Hansen, supra, 41 Cal.App.3d at p. 521, 116 Cal.Rptr. 16.)

A claimant may not be denied benefits solely on the basis of a "good faith error in judgment." (Delgado v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd. (1974) 41 Cal.App.3d 788, 792, 116 Cal.Rptr. 497; see also Maywood Glass Co. v. Stewart, supra, 170 Cal.App.2d at p. 724, 339 P.2d 947; Drysdale v. Department of Human Resources Development (1978) 77 Cal.App.3d 345, 352, 142 Cal.Rptr. 495; Rowe v. Hansen, supra, 41 Cal.App.3d at p. 520, 116 Cal.Rptr. 16; McCrae v. California Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd. (1973) 30 Cal.App.3d 89, 93, 106 Cal.Rptr. 159.)

Although this case involves a discharge for "misconduct," the law concerning voluntary terminations for "good cause" is also relevant. If a claimant's reasons for refusing work constitute "good cause" sufficient to justify resignation, it follows that they should also justify the less drastic step of refusing a work assignment. ³

In view of the statutory objective of "reducing the hardship of unemployment" (Gibson v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd. (1973) 9 Cal.3d 494, 499, 108 Cal.Rptr. 1, 509 P.2d 945), "the concept of 'good cause' cannot be arbitrarily limited; the board must take account of ' "real circumstances, substantial reasons, objective conditions, palpable forces that operate to produce correlative results, adequate excuses that will bear the test of reason, just grounds for action, and always the element of good faith." ' " (Id., at p. 499, fn. 8, 108 Cal.Rptr. 1, 509 P.2d 945, quoting Cal. Portland Cement Co. v. Cal. Unemp. Ins. Appeals Board (1960) 178 Cal.App.2d 263, 272-273, 3 Cal.Rptr. 37.)

In reviewing a...