Rocha v. King Cnty., Corp.

• Decision Date: 21 February 2019
• Docket Number: No. 51823-6-II,51823-6-II
• Citation: 7 Wash.App.2d 647,435 P.3d 325
• Parties: Ryan ROCHA, Nicole Bednarczyk, and Catherine Selin, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Appellants, v. KING COUNTY, a municipal corporation, Respondent.
• Court: Washington Court of Appeals

7 Wash.App.2d 647

435 P.3d 325

Ryan ROCHA, Nicole Bednarczyk, and Catherine Selin, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Appellants,

v.KING COUNTY, a municipal corporation, Respondent.

No. 51823-6-II

Court of Appeals of Washington, Division 2.

Filed February 21, 2019

PUBLISHED OPINION

Lee, A.C.J.¶ 1 Nicole Bednarczyk and Catherine Selin appeal the superior court’s order granting King County’s motion for summary judgment and dismissing their disparate impact claim based on economic status and a claim for minimum wage related to jury service in King County. We affirm.

FACTS

¶ 2 Bednarczyk and Selin (collectively the Appellants) were both summoned for jury duty in King County. Selin served 11 days of jury duty. Bednarczyk obtained a letter from her employer explaining that Bednarczyk would not be able to work or be paid during her jury service and that jury service would create a hardship for both Bednarczyk and her employer. Bednarczyk requested an economic hardship excusal from the court. The court granted Bednarczyk’s request.

¶ 3 The Appellants filed a complaint against King County, alleging that King County’s jury pay disparately excluded jurors from service based on economic status and that jurors were entitled to be paid minimum wage for their service.¹ The Appellants also sought a declaratory judgment ruling that (1) King County’s current jury compensation was causing jurors to be disparately excluded based on economic status and (2) King County was violating wage and hour laws by failing to pay jurors minimum wage.²

¶ 4 King County filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the disparate impact and wage claims and that the Appellants did not have standing for their declaratory judgment action. The superior court granted King County’s motion for summary judgment and dismissed the Appellants’ disparate impact and wage claims. The superior court did not specifically address the Appellants’ standing to bring their declaratory judgment actions.

¶ 5 The Appellants appeal the superior court’s order granting summary judgment and dismissing their disparate impact and minimum wage claims.

ANALYSIS

A. LEGAL PRINCIPLES

¶ 6 We review the superior court’s order granting summary judgment de novo. Bavand v. OneWest Bank , 196 Wash.App. 813, 825, 385 P.3d 233 (2016). Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, and admissions on file show the absence of any genuine issue of material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. CR 56(c). We may affirm the superior court’s order granting summary judgment "on any basis supported by the record." Bavand , 196 Wash.App. at 825, 385 P.3d 233.

B. DISPARATE IMPACT

¶ 7 The Appellants argue that the superior court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of King County on the disparate impact claim because RCW 2.36.080(3) allows for a disparate impact claim based on economic status. We hold that the superior court properly granted summary judgment on the Appellants’ disparate impact claim.

1. Disparate Impact Claim Based on Economic Status

¶ 8 There are two types of disparate impact claims: disparate impact under the Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD), chapter 49.60 RCW, and disparate impact under constitutional equal protection principles. The Appellants may not bring a disparate impact claim under the WLAD because the WLAD does not include economic status as a protected class for the purposes of WLAD claims, and the Appellants did not bring an equal protection claim.

¶ 9 Economic status is not recognized as a protected class under the WLAD. RCW 49.60.030(1). WLAD only protects the "right to be free from discrimination because of race, creed, color, national origin, sex, honorably discharged veteran or military status, sexual orientation, or the presence of any sensory, mental, or physical disability or the use of a trained dog guide or service animal by a person with a disability." RCW 49.60.030(1). Protection from discrimination based on economic status is not enumerated in the WLAD. Therefore, as a matter of law, Appellants cannot bring a disparate impact claim based on economic status under the WLAD.

¶ 10 Disparate impact claims may be brought under the equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 12 of the Washington Constitution. State v. Johnson , 194 Wash.App. 304, 307-08, 374 P.3d 1206 (2016). The Appellants did not plead a disparate impact claim under the equal protection clause in the superior court nor do they argue a constitutional disparate impact claim on appeal. Instead, the Appellants merely cite to a voting case addressing a constitutional equal protection claim. Therefore, we decline to address whether the Appellants established a constitutional disparate impact claim. RAP 10.3(a)(6) ; Cowiche Canyon Conservancy v. Bosley , 118 Wash.2d 801, 809, 828 P.2d 549 (1992).

¶ 11 Thus, as a matter of law, the Appellants have failed to show they can bring a disparate impact claim based on economic status under the WLAD or as an equal protection claim.

2. Implied Disparate Impact Cause of Action under RCW 2.36.080(3)

¶ 12 Appellants argue that the amount jurors are paid under the jury pay statute ( RCW 2.36.150 )³ creates a disparate impact based on economic status and violates the no juror exclusion statute ( RCW 2.36.080(3) ). But Appellants did not bring a disparate impact claim under the juror pay statute. Instead, Appellants’ disparate impact claim seems to be rooted in the no juror exclusion statute.

¶ 13 The underlying premise of the Appellants’ argument is that the amount jurors are paid causes jurors of lower economic status to not be able to serve, and, therefore, the amount jurors are paid has a disparate impact on people of lower economic status. This premise is not disputed. But this premise does not give rise to an implied disparate impact claim under RCW 2.36.080(3).

¶ 14 RCW 2.36.080(3) provides, "A citizen shall not be excluded from jury service in this state on account of ... economic status." However, RCW 2.36.080 does not provide a remedy for alleged violations of this provision. Therefore, the Appellants must show that RCW 2.36.080(3) creates an implied cause of action under the test set out by the Supreme Court in Bennett v. Hardy , 113 Wash.2d 912, 784 P.2d 1258 (1990).

¶ 15 A cause of action may be implied when a statute "provides protection to a specified class of persons but creates no remedy." Bennett , 113 Wash.2d at 920, 784 P.2d 1258. To determine if an implied cause of action exists, we engage in a three-part inquiry,

first, whether the plaintiff is within the class for whose "especial" benefit the statute was enacted; second, whether legislative intent, explicitly or implicitly, supports creating or denying a remedy; and third, whether implying a remedy is consistent with the underlying purpose of the legislation.

Id. at 920-21, 784 P.2d 1258.

¶ 16 With regard to the first part of the inquiry, the plain language of the statute protects people from being excluded from jury service based on economic status.

Therefore, the plaintiffs would be within the class for whose benefit RCW 2.36.080(3) was enacted. Accordingly, the first part of the Bennett inquiry is satisfied.

¶ 17 As to the second part of the inquiry, the legislative intent expressed in RCW 2.36.080(1) and RCW 2.36.080(2) shows that implying a remedy based on juror pay is not consistent with legislative intent. RCW 2.36.080(1) protects the opportunity and obligation for jury service:

It is the policy of this state that all persons selected for jury service be selected at random from a fair cross section of the population of the area served by the court, and that all qualified citizens have the opportunity ... to be considered for jury service in this state and have an obligation to serve as jurors when summoned for that purpose.

(emphasis added). RCW 2.36.080(1) demonstrates that the legislature intended to protect the opportunity to be considered for jury service and to impose the obligation to serve as a juror when summoned, not guarantee the right to actually serve on a jury when summoned.

¶ 18 And RCW 2.36.080(2) specifically expresses the legislature’s intent to minimize the burden of jury service—notably without reference to financial considerations. RCW 2.36.080(2) provides,

It is the policy of this state to maximize the availability of residents of the state for jury service. It also is the policy of this state to minimize the burden on the prospective jurors, their families, and employers resulting from jury service. The jury term and jury service should be set at as brief an interval as is practical given the size of the jury source list for the judicial district. The optimal jury term is one week or less. Optimal jury service is one day or one trial, whichever is longer.

RCW 2.36.080(2) demonstrates the legislature’s intent to minimize the burden to jurors by limiting the length of jury service, not by focusing on compensating jurors for potential financial burdens.

¶ 19 Read together, the legislature’s intent is to ensure that state residents have the opportunity to be considered for jury service, that state residents have an obligation to serve as a juror when summoned, and that any burden is minimized by limiting the amount of time that must be spent in jury service. The legislature did not intend to guarantee jurors be able to serve by providing adequate financial compensation. Therefore, it would be inconsistent with the legislative intent to imply a remedy based on jurors’ financial compensation for alleged violations of RCW 2.36.080(3). The second part of the Bennett inquiry is not satisfied.

¶ 20 As to the third part of the inquiry under Bennett , the underlying purpose of the legislation relied on by Appellants is to ensure that state residents have the opportunity...