Rock v. State Bar of Cal.

• Decision Date: 15 May 1962
• Citation: 371 P.2d 308,57 Cal.2d 639,21 Cal.Rptr. 572
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: , 371 P.2d 308, 96 A.L.R.2d 818 Wallace W. ROCK, Petitioner, v. The STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, Respondent. L. A. 26618.

Page 572

21 Cal.Rptr. 572

57 Cal.2d 639, 371 P.2d 308, 96 A.L.R.2d 818

Wallace W. ROCK, Petitioner, v. The STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, Respondent.

L. A. 26618.

Supreme Court of California, In Bank.

May 15, 1962.

Rehearing Denied June 13, 1962.

Wallace W. Rock, in pro. per.

Garrett H. Elmore and Glenn W. Groenewold, San Francisco, for respondent.

PER CURIAM.

This is a proceeding to review a recommendation of the Board of Governors of the State Bar of California that petitioner be suspended from the practice of law for a period of two years.

The record discloses that:

(1) In 1958 Mrs. Garfield Green retained petitioner to quiet title to a parcel of real property, paying him a total of $240. Mrs. Green telephoned petitioner's office repeatedly during the period from October 1958 to October 1960, but he failed to return her calls. She succeeded in reaching him by telephone, however, on three different occasions. On the first, in 1959, petitioner told her that nothing had yet been done. On the second occasion, which was in early 1960, petitioner told her that the papers were going to be signed the following Thursday and that he would call her then at five o'clock, but he did not do so. On the third occasion, which was in October 1960 after she had made a complaint to the State Bar against him, petitioner told her that a judgment had been rendered in her favor and that he would send her a copy of it, but she never received it.

The Board of Governors found: 'The quiet title complaint was signed on September 26, 1958. It was filed in October and the default was entered on December 17, 1958. Respondent attempted to get a judgment shortly after entry of the default but failed to present the evidence required to obtain a decree. Respondent did not secure the decree until July 1960.'

(2) Mr. Reavis employed petitioner to obtain a divorce for him. Mr. Reavis testified that petitioner agreed to institute the proceedings when he received $125, which sum was paid him by December 15, 1959. Mr. Reavis had agreed to pay $200 for attorney's fees and $45 for costs and actually paid a total of $230. He tried many times, without success, to reach petitioner by telephone. When he finally succeeded in doing so, petitioner told him that his case 'didn't make the calendar.' This statement was false and untrue, and was known by petitioner to be false and untrue, as petitioner had not yet filed the divorce action.

The Board of Governors found: 'Respondent wilfully failed to file a divorce action on behalf of Reavis and wilfully failed to respond to his communications or to make himself reasonably available for conference with his client. Respondent received a fee of $200.00 and $30.00 for costs. Respondent has neglected and refused to perform the services for which he was employed by Reavis.'

(3) Mrs. Olson and Mrs. Woolliscroft, her mother, were referred to petitioner in June 1958 by the Lawyers Reference Service. They sought his services in connection with the flooding of property owned by Mrs. Woolliscroft. Mrs. Olson testified that she had to 'handle' the matter for her mother, because her mother was elderly and hard of hearing. When petitioner required Mrs. Woolliscroft's signature, he sent the papers to Mrs. Olson, and she obtained her mother's signature on them. All checks given to petitioner in the course of the matter were signed by Mrs. Olson. The only time petitioner spoke with Mrs. Woolliscroft was on the occasion when he went out to the property to inspect it. Otherwise everything was handled through Mrs. Olson.

On November 22, 1959, Mrs. Olson wrote a letter to petitioner relative to the matter in which he was representing her and her mother, but he did not reply. She attempted on numerous occasions to reach petitioner by telephone and on many occasions stopped by his office. She testified that on two occasions she spoke with petitioner in his office without previous appointment, and that on each of those occasions he told her that he was going to make an appointment with the judge and would let her know what had happened.

Mrs. Olson's husband was subsequently told by petitioner that a default judgment had been taken in March 1960. He testified that he called petitioner on the telephone 'close to a hundred times'; that he had been able to reach petitioner perhaps half a dozen of those times; and that although petitioner promised to call him several times, he never did so.

On one occasion Mrs. Olson called petitioner at his home, and he refused to talk with her over the telephone.

Mr. and Mrs. Olson also testified that petitioner at no time disclosed to them that the default judgment which had been entered was likely to be set aside, as it in fact was, with petitioner stipulating thereto.

The Board of Governors found that petitioner 'has been grossly negligent in the matters set forth in Counts I, II and III, in violation of his oath and duties as prescribed in Sections 6067 and 6068 of Business and Professions Code. Such gross negligence is a course of conduct constituting moral turpitude.'

These are the questions necessary for us to determine:

First. Did the evidence sustain the findings of the Board of Governors?

Yes. These rules are here applicable:

(1) In a disciplinary proceeding against an attorney, findings of fact by local administrative committees and the Board of Governors are not binding on the Supreme Court, which will weigh and pass upon the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the findings of the board. (Sturr v. State Bar, 52 Cal.2d 125, 127(1), 338 P.2d 897.)

(2) The burden is upon one seeking a review of a recommendation of the Board of Governors to show that its findings are not supported by the evidence or that its recommendation is erroneous or unlawful. (Hatch v. State Bar, 55 Cal.2d 127, 128(1), 9 Cal.Rptr. 808, 357 P.2d 1064; Sullivan v. State Bar, 50 Cal.2d 491, 500(1), 326 P.2d 138; Webb v. State Bar, 47 Cal.2d 866, 868(1), 306 P.2d 458; Bus. & Prof.Code, § 6083, subd. (c).)

In accordance with the foregoing rules, we have examined the...