Sullivan v. State Bar of Cal.
| Decision Date | 06 June 1958 |
| Citation | 50 Cal.2d 491,326 P.2d 138 |
| Court | California Supreme Court |
| Parties | Leo Aubrey SULLIVAN, Petitioner, v. STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, Respondent. S. F. 19879. |
Leo Aubrey Sullivan, Oakland, in pro. per., and Joseph Morozumi, Emeryville, for petitioner.
Garrett H. Elmore, San Francisco, for respondent.
In three proceedings before local administrative committees of The State Bar (for Alameda County) petitioner was found guilty of nine counts of professional misconduct. The complaints, all similar in nature, in general involve charges that petitioner accepted fees and payments on account of fees for the rendition of future professional services, that he failed to devote the necessary attention to the matters involved and neglected to give satisfactory reports to or make adjustments to the clients, in most instances retaining the sums paid to him. We have concluded that petitioner has failed to sustain his burden of showing lack of support for or injustice in the subsequent recommendation, made by the Board of Governors of The State Bar, that he be suspended from practice for a period of three years.
In the first proceeding the local committee found culpability on four counts. They note that although petitioner received full notice of all hearings he at no time made any appearance before the committee and offered no evidence to show any extenuating circumstances for his conduct. Their recommendation was that petitioner be publicly reprimanded and also required to make restitution of fees collected by him, for which he failed to render services required by his employment as counsel in each of the four counts.
In the second proceeding, heard before the same local committee, petitioner likewise offered no evidence. The committee found culpability on three counts, including a finding as to one matter that petitioner had himself retained the sum of $150 entrusted to him for forwarding to opposing counsel in a divorce matter. The committee considered the fact that petitioner 'has for some time been suffering from an illness which periodically confines' him, and made its recommendation 'with the knowledge that other proceedings' were currently pending against petitioner in which further discipline might be imposed. The recommendation was that petitioner be suspended from practice for 60 days and ordered to make restitution of the $150.
In the third proceeding, heard by a different committee, culpability was found on each of the two counts involved. The committee took into consideration 1 the record in the proceeding then pending before the same committee in which petitioner was eventually suspended from practice for three months by order of this court (Sullivan v. State Bar, 1955, 45 Cal.2d 112, 287 P.2d 778), and found that the facts shown in that proceeding, together with those found in the instant one, 'show a continuing course of conduct on the part of' petitioner, that the matters complained of in one court of the present proceeding 'were done at the time' that petitioner was appearing in his own behalf before the same committee in the prior proceeding. The committee also found that it 'has no evidence before it of extenuating circumstances, in connection with the acts complained of,' that petitioner offered no evidence other than his own testimony 'in answer to and relevant to the charges,' and 'failed to produce witnesses and evidence within his power to produce when requested so to do' to corroborate his own testimony. The committee recommended a three-year suspension from practice.
With petitioner's consent the three proceedings were consolidated for hearing by the Board of Governors of The State Bar, which by a vote of 13 board members made its own findings of culpability by petitioner on each of the nine counts. By a vote of 12 to 1, with two members not voting, the board has recommended that petitioner be suspended from the practice of law for a period of three years. In so recommending, the board also took into consideration the three-months' suspension ordered in 1955. Sullivan v. State Bar, 1955, supra, 45 Cal.2d 112, 287 P.2d 778. The matter is now before this court for review.
1. LeBoulanger matter. The board found: In November, 1953, one Crowell employed petitioner to represent Al LeBoulanger, then in jail in Los Angeles awaiting trial on criminal charges; petitioner was paid $500 as a retainer on account of such representation; aside from one short conference with LeBoulanger petitioner 'wilfully and negligently failed to render any services to his client and wilfully and negligently failed to appear on three occasions when his client's case was called for trial.'
The record shows that early in November, 1953, Crowell, a former client of petitioner, asked petitioner if he knew an attorney in Los Angeles or if he would like to take LeBoulanger's case, and petititoner said he would like to handle it, that he had other cases in Los Angeles and thought he could help LeBoulanger. Petitioner later told Crowell he would need $1,000 to go to Los Angeles, that he needed 'something for expenses.' Crowell gave petitioner $500 and received from petitioner a receipt reading, 'Recd. of Mr. Crowell $500, for case of LeBoulanger in L.A. Leo A. Sullivan.' Crowell testified that petitioner told him not to worry about 'the rest' until 'we get this straightened out,' that petitioner thought LeBoulanger had a very good case but he wanted to get down there before LeBoulanger got mixed up with other defendants involved in the same criminal charges. Crowell stated further that the money was paid for petitioner to handle the case, not just to talk to LeBoulanger; that part of the money was for travel; that Crowell intended to pay the remaining $500 at the end of the trial. LeBoulanger by deposition testified that petitioner visited him once in the jail and stated he, petitioner, had been retained by Crowell to defend LeBoulanger, for the latter not to talk, that petitioner was his lawyer and would 'take care of everything from there on,' that he would see LeBoulanger 'before I went up for my plea' and would see about arranging a bond; that was the last LeBoulanger saw of petitioner. Thereafter LeBoulanger was in court on four occasions, but petitioner was not present. The court ultimately appointed the public defender to represent him until petitioner could come to Los Angeles. Subsequently, almost 11 months after the original employment of petitioner, LeBoulanger entered a plea of guilty to one count. He was represented by the public defender, who was formally appointed the same day. Petitioner was not present, although LeBoulanger was informed by his (LeBoulanger's) wife that petitioner was supposed to be there. LeBoulanger was sentenced to 10 years to life, and was in prison at the time of his deposition.
Crowell later asked petitioner 'what he was going to do about the money' (the $500), and complained he did not think 'it was right, what he had done,' and petitioner told him 'it wasn't over yet.' Crowell could not thereafter reach petitioner either personally or by telephone, although he attempted to do so. There is no evidence in the record that petitioner ever prepared any papers or did anything further in the LeBoulanger matter than shown by the above-recited evidence.
Although he failed to testify before the committee, petitioner in his brief now asserts the evidence shows that his agreement with Crowell was to go to Los Angeles and discuss the nature of the charges and the strength of the case pending against LeBoulanger, that he did go to Los Angeles 'and went through all of the proceedings against LeBoulanger'; that he made three trips to Los Angeles, on the last of which he was 'informed that all of the defendants, including LeBoulanger, had made a complete statement admitting their guilt of the charge'; that petitioner so informed Crowell, who 'At all times' knew that petitioner had received information from LeBoulanger 'completely changing the complexion of his case because of his confession.' Further, asserts petitioner, References to the record in this proceeding, made by petitioner in his brief, utterly fail to support his assertions.
2. Sitko matter. The board found: Petitioner was employed by one Mike Sitko to bring an action in his behalf to recover money allegedly stolen from him; petitioner 'wilfully and negligently failed to render any services or take any steps to commence or prosecute such action, and wilfully and negligently ignored and refused to answer repeated 'phone calls from his client relating to said representation.'
The record shows that in June, 1954, Sitko, a hotel owner, discussed with petitioner a criminal complaint against a tenant, which had been dismissed. Sitko testified that petitioner said that for $50 he could get the case 're-opened' and the accused would have to go back to jail. At petitioner's request Sitko paid him $50 and received a receipt therefor which reads: 'June 23rd, Received of Mike Sitko, $50 to investigate case in S.F. Leo Sullivan.' Petitioner promised to call Sitko the next day but failed to do so. Sitko telephoned petitioner twice but failed to reach him. On another day Sitko went to petitioner's office and was told by petitioner to meet him at the Oakland City Hall the next day; however, petitioner failed to appear at the City Hall, although Sitko waited for over an hour and then tried unsuccessfully to reach petitioner...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Hallinan v. Committee of Bar Examiners of State Bar
...572, 371 P.2d 308, 96 A.L.R.2d 818; Hatch v. State Bar, 55 Cal.2d 127, 128, 9 Cal.Rptr. 808, 357 P.2d 1064; Sullivan v. State Bar, 50 Cal.2d 491, 501, 326 P.2d 138; Webb v. State Bar, 47 Cal.2d 866, 868, 306 P.2d 458.) In disciplinary proceedings this court examines and weighs the evidence ......
-
Hulland v. State Bar
...209; see Bailey v. State Bar (1930) 209 Cal. 476, 288 P. 775; Bruns v. State Bar (1941) 18 Cal.2d 667, 117 P.2d 327; Sullivan v. State Bar (1958) 50 Cal.2d 491, 326 P.2d 138. Attempting to collect money for services not to be performed is merely one step removed. The effort to collect unear......
-
Haley v. State Bar of Cal.
...for or injustice in the recommendation of the Board of Governors. (Rule 59(a) of California Rules of Court; Sullivan v. State Bar (1958) 50 Cal.2d 491, 501, 326 P.2d 138(1, 2); Hyland v. State Bar (1963) 59 A.C. 794, 796, 31 Cal.Rptr. 329, 382 P.2d 369.) He does not deny misappropriation of......
-
Rock v. State Bar of Cal.
...is erroneous or unlawful. (Hatch v. State Bar, 55 Cal.2d 127, 128(1), 9 Cal.Rptr. 808, 357 P.2d 1064; Sullivan v. State Bar, 50 Cal.2d 491, 500(1), 326 P.2d 138; Webb v. State Bar, 47 Cal.2d 866, 868(1), 306 P.2d 458; Bus. & Prof.Code, § 6083, subd. In accordance with the foregoing rules, w......