Rocky Mountain Christian Church v. Bd. of County Com'Rs

• Citation: 612 F.Supp.2d 1163
• Decision Date: 30 March 2009
• Docket Number: Civil No. 06-cv-00554-REB-BNB.
• Parties: ROCKY MOUNTAIN CHRISTIAN CHURCH, Plaintiff, and United States of America, Intervenor Plaintiff, v. BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF BOULDER COUNTY, Colorado, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Colorado

612 F.Supp.2d 1163

ROCKY MOUNTAIN CHRISTIAN CHURCH, Plaintiff, and United States of America, Intervenor Plaintiff, v. BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF BOULDER COUNTY, Colorado, Defendant.

Civil No. 06-cv-00554-REB-BNB.

United States District Court, D. Colorado.

March 30, 2009.

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Amy L. Nafziger, Darrell Gene Waas, J. Thomas Macdonald, Thomas J. Ragonetti, Kathryn Irene Hopping, Otten, Johnson, Robinson, Neff & Ragonetti, P.C., Denver, CO, for Plaintiff.

Peter Michael Bryce, Varu Chilakamarri, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Intervenor Plaintiff.

Dwight H. Merriam, Robinson & Cole, LLP, Hartford, CT, Hiram Bissell Carey, III, John R. Bauer, Michael Steven Giaimo, Robinson & Cole, LLP, Boston, MA, David Evan Hughes, Patricia A. Mayne, Boulder County District Attorney's Office, Boulder, CO, for Defendant.

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S RENEWED MOTION FOR JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW

BLACKBURN, District Judge.

This matter is before me on the Defendant's Renewed Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law [# 279]¹ filed January 5, 2009. Both the plaintiff and the intervenor plaintiff filed responses [# 286 & # 293] and the defendant filed replies [# 290 & # 298]. I deny the motion.

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under Rule 50, a court should render judgment as a matter of law when "a party has been fully heard on an issue and there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for that party on that issue." FED. R. CIV. P. 50(a)(1). When reviewing a motion under Rule 50(a), I must review the record "taken as a whole" and I "must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. ..." Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000). I may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence. Id. Further, I must "give credence to the evidence favoring the nonmovant as well as that evidence supporting the moving party that is uncontradicted and unimpeached, at least to the extent that that evidence comes from disinterested witnesses." Id. (internal quotation omitted). In short, the "standard for granting summary judgment mirrors the standard for judgment as a matter of law, such that the inquiry under each is the same." Id. (internal quotations omitted).

II. BACKGROUND

This case was tried to a jury from November 3 to November 19, 2008. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury returned verdicts in favor of the plaintiff, Rocky Mountain Christian Church (RMCC), on three claims under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc-2000cc-5. Specifically, the jury found for the RMCC on the RMCC's claims under (1) RLUPA's equal terms provision, § 2000cc(b)(1); (2) RLUIPA's substantial burden provision, § 2000cc(a); and (3) RLUIPA's unreasonable limitations provision, § 2000cc(b)(3)(B). The jury found in favor of the defendant on all other claims, including the RMCC's constitutional and RLUIPA claims alleging that the defendant, the Board of County Commissioners of Boulder County, Colorado (BOCC), had discriminated against the RMCC on the basis of religion.

At the close of the evidence, I deferred ruling on the BOCC's motion for judgment as a matter of law, as permitted under FED. R. CIV. P. 50(b), and ultimately directed the BOCC to file its motion in writing, which it has done. In its present motion, the BOCC re-asserts its motion for judgment as a matter of law as to the three RLUIPA claims on which the jury found in favor of the RMCC. The BOCC argues that the RMCC failed to present sufficient evidence at trial to support any of the three RLUIPA claims on which the jury found in favor of the RMCC. In addition, the BOCC argues that the three RLUIPA sections on which the RMCC's successful claims are based are unconstitutional as applied in this case. I address first the BOCC's arguments that the evidence was not sufficient to sustain the jury's finding in favor of the RMCC on the three RLUIPA sections cited above. See, e.g., Jean v. Nelson, 472 U.S. 846, 854, 105 S.Ct. 2992, 86 L.Ed.2d 664 (1985) (prior to reaching constitutional questions, federal courts first must consider nonconstitutional grounds for decision).

I note that the BOCC has addressed its asserted affirmative defenses in its response to the RMCC's motion for permanent injunction [# 270]. To ensure a comprehensive analysis of the claims on which the BOCC claims it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, I address the BOCC's affirmative defenses in this order. I address the RMCC's motion for permanent injunction in a separate order.

III. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

A. Equal Terms— § 2000cc(b)(1)

The equal terms provision of RLUPIA provides:

No government shall impose or implement a land use regulation in a manner that treats a religious assembly or institution on less than equal terms with a nonreligious assembly or institution.

42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(b)(1). The BOCC argues that the evidence presented at trial was not sufficient to sustain the jury's verdict in favor of the RMCC on the RMCC's claim under this subsection. I disagree.

The RMCC's claims in this case are based on the BOCC's partial denial of the RMCC's 2004 Special Use Application. In its 2004 special use application, the RMCC sought to expand its facilities from 116,000 square feet to 240,800 square feet. The Church later modified its application to eliminate a proposed 12,000 square feet balcony addition to its sanctuary, reducing its request for additional seating from 1,000 to 150, and by eliminating a proposed 8,000 square feet basement addition. The Church deleted also its request to increase the population of its school from 380 students to 540 students and modified other requests concerning parking, lighting, and a buffer zone on the western side of its property. The BOCC denied most, but not all, of the RMCC's Special Use Application. Hereafter, I will refer to the BOCC's decision on the RMCC's 2004 special use application as the denial of the application.

A plaintiff bringing an as-applied Equal Terms challenge must present evidence that a similarly situated nonreligious comparator received differential treatment under the challenged regulation. If a plaintiff offers no similarly situated comparator, then there can be no cognizable evidence of less than equal treatment, and the plaintiff has failed to meet its initial burden of proof.

Primera Iglesia Bautista Hispana of Boca Raton, Inc. v. Broward County, 450 F.3d 1295, 1311 (11th Cir.2006). The BOCC argues that the RMCC did not establish a sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to conclude that the RMCC was treated on less than equal terms as compared to the Dawson School, the one similarly situated secular comparator advanced by the RMCC. The BOCC argues that the Dawson School is similarly situated to the RMCC, for the purpose of the equal terms claim, only if the evidence demonstrates that the special use applications of both entities have the same effect on the purposes or objectives of the special use criteria in the Boulder Land Use Code. The Land Use Code is the primary source of the land use regulations applied in this case, although there are other relevant sources that were discussed at trail.

The BOCC notes that the BOCC's denial of the RMCC's 2004 special use application hinged on the application of three criteria. The BOCC concluded that the RMCC's proposal 1) was not in harmony with the character of the neighborhood and was not compatible with the surrounding area; 2) was not in accordance with the Comprehensive plan because it constituted intensive development on rural land, and on agricultural lands of national importance; and 3) would result in an over-intensive use of land and excessive depletion of natural resources, namely agricultural lands. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment [# 113], filed June 20, 2007, Exhibit N (BOCC Resolution 2006-23) (this exhibit also was admitted at trial). The BOCC contends that the evidence at trial showed that the special use application of the Dawson School differed from the RMCC application in several respects:

1) The RMCC proposed to expand its facilities by about 124,000 square feet and to add over 500 parking spaces, while the Dawson school proposed to add about 72,600 square feet and relatively few parking spaces.

2) The RMCC proposed a massive complex of large connected buildings, totaling about 240,000 square feet, while the Dawson School proposed multiple small buildings.

3) The visual impact of RMCC's proposed development would be greater than the existing visual impact of the expansion of the Dawson School, which was approved in 1996.

4) The traffic that would be generated by RMCC, if it were permitted to build everything proposed in its 2004 application, would be ten times greater than the traffic generated by the Dawson School.

5) The BOCC notes that the RMCC is in an area known as the Niwot buffer zone, and the Dawson School is not in the Niwot buffer zone.

In response, the RMCC argues that the evidence at trial showed that both the RMCC and the Dawson School are both in the agricultural zone district in the plains planning area of the Boulder County Comprehensive Plan. They both are outside of any designated community service area, and they both sought approval to expand an existing facility under Section 4-601 of the code. The size of the RMCC parcel and the Dawson School parcel were comparable, and the size' of the facilities proposed by RMCC and the Dawson School were comparable. Rosie Koopmann, the plaintiffs expert witness, testified that both parcels were on lands designated as agricultural lands of national importance, both RMCC and the Dawson School sought approval for a double gymnasium of about the same size, and approval of significant classroom space. Further, Koopmann testified that the areas and neighborhoods surrounding...