Rocky River City School District v. Ohio Department of Education, 97-LW-2766

• Decision Date: 03 July 1997
• Docket Number: 97-LW-2766,71444
• Parties: ROCKY RIVER CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT, Plaintiff-Appellee v. OHIO DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, ET AL., Defendants-Appellants CASE
• Court: United States Court of Appeals (Ohio)

ROCKY RIVER CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT Plaintiff-Appellee v. OHIO DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, ET AL Defendants-Appellants

No. 71444.

97-LW-2766 (8th)

Court of Appeals of Ohio, Eighth District Cuyahoga

July 3, 1997

Civil appeal from Common Pleas Court Case No. 282816.

For plaintiff-appellee: Susan C. Hastings, SQUIRE, SANDERS &amp DEMPSEY, 4900 Key Tower, 127 Public Square, Cleveland, Ohio 44114-1304; Loren L. Braverman, SQUIRE, SANDERS & DEMPSEY, 1300 Huntington Center, 41 South High Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215.

For defendants-appellants: John P. Ware, Roger F. Carroll, Assistant Attorney Generals, Education Section, 30 East Broad Street, 15th Floor, Columbus, Ohio 43215-3428.

OPINION

NAHRA J.

Appellants, the Ohio Board of Education, the Superintendent of Public Instruction, and the Directors of the Ohio Department of Education Divisions of School Finance and Special Education, (collectively the "State"), appeal from the trial court's declaratory judgment operating in favor of appellee, the Rocky River City School District Board of Education (the "RRSD"). Because the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, we reverse its judgment and dismiss the case.

This case stems from a mandamus action filed with this court in January, 1994, to wit, State, ex rel. Fleming v. Rocky River School Dist. Bd. of Educ. (July 22, 1996), Cuyahoga App. No. 66757, unreported. Therein, a group of certified tutors sought to recover back wages and other benefits allegedly withheld by its employer, the appellee herein.

In January, 1995, appellee filed this action in common pleas court. Through its complaint, the RRSD sought a declaration of its rights under Ohio Adm. Code 3301-51-06(B)(7)(b) which essentially provides for state reimbursement of employment expenses for a specific class of instructor. Specifically, the RRSD requested the trial court to issue a judgment declaring that the State was liable for fifty percent of any liability imposed on the RRSD in the related mandamus action.

The State moved to dismiss the case asserting that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. By agreement of the parties, the motion was never ruled on. In November, 1995, the parties filed cross motions for summary judgment. In its motion for summary judgment, the State again challenged the jurisdiction of the trial court. On July 22, 1996, we granted a limited writ in the mandamus action and ordered the RRSD to pay approximately twenty thousand dollars in back wages and benefits to the certified tutors. Several months after our order, the trial court below entered summary judgment in favor of the RRSD and declared that the State was liable to reimburse the RRSD for "one-half of the local cost per instructional period `in the event a judgment is entered against [appellee] in [the related mandamus action]'".

The State timely appealed and assigned two errors for our review.

I.

Appellants' first assignment of error states:

The Court of Common Pleas Erred in Refusing to Dismiss Rocky River's Complaint for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction.

The State maintains that at the commencement of the lawsuit, RRSD had not suffered a cognizable injury, e.g., there was no duty to pay back wages to the certified tutors. While framed in the context of a standing argument, ultimately, appellants contend that the lack of actual liability rendered the trial court without jurisdiction because no real controversy existed.

Article IV, Section 4(B), of the Ohio Constitution defines the jurisdiction of the common pleas court and provides in pertinent part:

The courts of common pleas and divisions thereof shall have such original jurisdiction over all justiciable matters * * * as may be provided by law.

Pursuant to this provision, the legislature established the authority for a common pleas court to issue a declaratory judgment in R.C. 2721.02.

Courts of record may declare rights, status and other legal relations whether or not further relief is or could be claimed. * * *.

While the power conferred by R.C. 2721.02 is broad, it is well established that in order to entertain a request for declaratory relief, the following must exist:

(1) a real controversy between the parties, (2) a justiciable controversy, and (3) a situation where speedy relief is necessary to preserve the rights of the parties.

Haig v. Ohio State Bd. of Edn. (1992), 62 Ohio St.3d 507, 511, 584 N.E.2d 704; Perrico Property Sys. v. Independence (1994), 96 Ohio App. 3d 134, 139, 644 N.E.2d 714.

Essentially, the parties disagree as to whether appellee's complaint alleges a real controversy.

A "controversy" exists for purposes of a declaratory judgment when there is a genuine dispute between parties having adverse legal interests of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment.

Wagner v. Cleveland (1988), 62 Ohio App.3d 8, 13, 574 N.E.2d 533, citing, Burger Brewing Co. Liquor Control Comm. (1973), 34 Ohio St.2d 93, 63 O.O.2d 149, 296 N.E.2d 261; Master v. O'Malley (April 4, 1996), Cuyahoga App. No. 68895, unreported, discretionary appeal not allowed, 77 Ohio St.3d 1422 (1996). Where no controversy exists, or where the controversy has not yet arisen, a court will ordinarily not entertain a declaratory judgment action.

As a general rule, the courts will not render a declaratory judgment as to future rights, but just as in ordinary actions will wait until the event giving rise to the rights has happened, or, in other words, until the rights have become fixed under an existing state of facts.

Hence the courts will not, ordinarily, attempt to decide or declare the rights or status of parties upon a state of facts which is contingent or uncertain or until the question as to which a declaration is sought has actually arisen.

Williams v. Ledbetter (1950), 87 Ohio App. 171, 180, 57 Ohio Law Abs. 289, 42 O.O. 391, 94 N.E.2d 377. See, also, Corron v. Corron (1988), 40 Ohio St.3d 75, 79, 531 N.E.2d 708 (in order to seek a declaratory judgment there must be an actual controversy, which upon resolution will confer certain rights or status upon a party) The requirement of an actual controversy embodies the deeply rooted philosophy against rendering purely advisory opinions.

It has become settled judicial responsibility for courts to refrain from giving opinions on abstract propositions and to avoid the imposition [of] judgment [by] premature declarations or advice upon potential controversies.

Fortner v. Thomas (1970), 22 Ohio St.2d 13, 14, 51 O.O.2d 35, 257 N.E.2d 371. See, e.g., Murr v. Celebrezze (June 13, 1989), Franklin App. No. 88AP-1111, unreported (R.C. 2721.02 "does not contemplate the rendition of advisory opinions"). For these reasons, this court has not hesitated to require the accrual of an actual controversy in declaratory judgment actions. See, e.g. Kittrells v. Perry (Sept. 5, 1996), Cuyahoga App. No. 69445, unreported (plaintiff could not demonstrate adverse employment action and consequently no controversy occurred); Rothchild v. Central Motors Corp. (Oct. 7, 1993), Cuyahoga App. No. 63743, unreported, (complaint based upon threatened future conduct did not allege an actual controversy); D.H. Overmyer Telecasting Co. v. American Home Assurance Co. (1986), 29 Ohio App.3d 31, 29 OBR 32, 502 N.E.2d (judgment on liability for legal malpractice must exist before the injured party can commence a lawsuit against the attorney's insurance carrier); cf. Halley v. Ohio Co. (1995), 107 Ohio App.3d 518, 669 N.B.2d 70 (actual controversy existed independent of threatened future injury because breach of duty had already occurred).

In this case, we find that appellee's action was premature and hold that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Appellee commenced this litigation before we had determined liability in the related mandamus action. On the face of its complaint, the RRSD did not...