Rodefer v. Colbert
| Decision Date | 22 May 2015 |
| Docket Number | Appellate Case No. 2014-CA-3 |
| Parties | VELMA RODEFER Plaintiff-Appellant v. MICHAEL COLBERT, DIRECTOR, OHIO DEPARTMENT OF JOB AND FAMILY SERVICES, et al. Defendants-Appellees |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
(Civil Appeal from Common Pleas Court)
OPINIONJESSE B. BEASLEY, Atty. Reg. No. 0040525, 303 Hacker Road, Dayton, Ohio 45415 Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant
ARA MEKHJIAN, Atty. Reg. No. 0068800, 30 East Broad Street, 26th Floor, Columbus, Ohio 43215 Attorney for Defendants-Appellees
{¶ 1} The estate of Velma Rodefer appeals from the trial court's judgment affirming a decision of the defendants-appellees, Ohio Department of Job and Family Services (ODJFS) and its director, Michael Colbert, regarding Rodefer's application for Medicaid benefits.1 Rodefer contends the trial court's decision, which focused on the value of a life estate for purposes of determining Medicaid eligibility, is not supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence, and is not in accordance with law.
{¶ 2} We conclude that the trial court's judgment upholding the ODJFS decision to delay Rodefer's Medicaid benefits is in accordance with law. ODJFS was not required to follow its administrative regulation regarding calculation of life estates for Medicaid purposes when the regulation could not be applied as written. It had discretion to follow the State Medicaid Manual on this point. Additionally, we note that Rodefer has not challenged the part of the trial court's judgment dismissing her civil claims against ODJFS and Colbert. Accordingly, the trial court's judgment will be affirmed.
{¶ 3} In August 2013, Rodefer filed a notice of administrative appeal and a complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief in Darke County Common Pleas Court. The notice of appeal and complaint named ODJFS and its director, Colbert, as defendants. The notice of appeal related to an administrative decision of ODJFS, whichhad upheld a restriction on Rodefer's Medicaid coverage. Specifically, ODJFS concluded that she had transferred a life interest in real estate to her son for less than fair market value within five years prior to her application for Medicaid benefits. ODJFS found that the life estate should be valued at $117,012 rather than the $22,000 paid by Rodefer's son. In addition, ODJFS restricted Rodefer's nursing home vendor pay from January 2013 through March 2014, with a partial month of restricted coverage in April 2014.
{¶ 4} In arriving at fair market value for the transferred life estate, ODJFS relied on Medicaid Eligibility Procedure Letter (MEPL) #68. The letter was dated November 1, 2012, and contained a life estate valuation table that had not been incorporated into the Ohio Administrative Code. Under this table, a figure of .26955 was used to calculate the value of the life estate, based on Rodefer's age at the time (91). This figure was derived from tables that had been provided in the State Medicaid Manual (SMM). The parties did not dispute the overall value of the real estate, which had been assessed by the Darke County Auditor at $434,100. Multiplying this amount by .26955 resulted in a value for the life estate of approximately $117,012.
{¶ 5} Rodefer's position was that she had calculated the value of the life estate by applying a rule that ODJFS had established in Ohio Adm.Code 5101:1-39-32(F)(5), which required ODJFS to "multiply the equity value of the property by the product that corresponds to the life estate owner's age on the life estate table as defined in 26 C.F.R 20.2031-7 as in effect on April 1, 2005." According to Rodefer, using this life estate table resulted in a remainder figure of .95193. Based on this remainder interest, the ultimate value for the life estate would be approximately $20,867.2
{¶ 6} Count one of Rodefer's complaint alleged that ODJFS's decision was not supported by reliable, probative, or substantial evidence. Counts two, three, and four alleged violations of the state and federal constitutions and asked for a permanent injunction. In court five, Rodefer sought a declaratory judgment that Ohio Adm. Code 5101:1-39-32 was the only properly-enacted rule and that MEPL #68 had no force and effect. Finally, count six alleged that appellees' attempts to deny Rodefer a meaningful hearing violated her right to substantive and procedural due process.
{¶ 7} On December 27, 2013, the trial court granted appellees' motion to dismiss. It agreed with appellees that an administrative appeal and a civil action could not be incorporated into one action. In addition, the trial court upheld the decision of ODJFS. The trial court concluded that while ODJFS had incorrectly relied on MEPL #68, the error was harmless because the life estate multiplier in Ohio Adm. Code 5101:1-39-32 was similar to the multiplier used in MEPL #68. However, the trial court granted Rodefer leave to file an amended complaint adding additional parties and noted that its order was not a final appealable order.
{¶ 8} Subsequently, in January 2014, the trial court reconsidered its decision. It noted that the life estate valuation tables it previously had used from Ohio Adm. Code 5101:1-39-32 were not in effect at the time of Rodefer's transaction. Nonetheless, the trial court still upheld the ODJFS decision. In this regard, it concluded that ODJFS had complied with the overriding requirement that fair market value must be paid in all financial transactions where an individual ultimately seeks public assistance. The trialcourt further held that ODJFS could resort to valuation methods beyond those in Ohio Adm. Code 5101:1-39-32, including other life expectancy tables. The court reiterated that its decision was not a final appealable order and held that Rodefer had permission to file an amended complaint adding additional parties.
{¶ 9} Rodefer filed a notice of appeal on January 24, 2014. That same day, she also dismissed all claims not decided by the trial court's order, pursuant to Civ.R. 41(A)(1). Rodefer did not at any time file an amended complaint adding other parties.
{¶ 10} On March 18, 2014, appellees moved to dismiss this appeal for lack of a final appealable order, and Rodefer replied to the motion. Attached to her response was an entry that the trial court had filed on March 18, 2014. In the entry, which was labeled "Order of Voluntary Dismissal Without Prejudice," the trial court dismissed the claims that had not been decided by its entries in December 2013 and January 2014. Alternatively, the trial court granted Rodefer's motion to amend her notice of administrative appeal and to withdraw counts two through six.
{¶ 11} Appellees subsequently filed a second motion to dismiss with our court, arguing that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to dismiss the action while this appeal was pending. Appellees also again argued that we lacked jurisdiction because there was no final appealable order. In July 2014, we filed a decision overruling appellees' motion to dismiss the appeal. We concluded that the trial court's order was a final appealable order because it resolved all claims between the parties, and no other claims or parties, thereafter, were part of the action after the trial court rendered its decision. See Rodefer v. Colbert, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 2014-CA-3 (July 28, 2014), p. 9. With these facts in mind, we turn now to Rodefer's assignment of error.
{¶ 12} Rodefer's sole assignment of error states: "The Decision by the Appellee, Upheld by the Trial Court, Is Not Supported by Reliable, Probative, and Substantial Evidence, and Is Not in Accordance with Law."
{¶ 13} Rodefer presents four issues under this assignment of error. First, she contends ODJFS and the trial court erred by failing to apply Ohio Adm. Code 5101:1-39-32(F), which she claims is "the only enacted rule applicable to this case," to value the life estate. Second, she asserts that MEPL #68 cannot be used to value the life estate because it was not promulgated in accordance with statutory rule-making requirements. Third, she maintains that the trial court erred in finding ODJFS's reliance on MEPL #68 improper yet still upholding the agency's decision. Fourth, she argues that she cannot be deemed to have transferred her life estate to qualify for Medicaid because she sold it in compliance with ODJFS rules.
{¶ 14} "An appeal from an administrative appeal decision of the Director of the Job and Family Services Agency may be taken in the court of common pleas pursuant to R.C. 119.12." Gruber v. Ohio Dept. of Job & Family Serv., 153 Ohio App.3d 6, 2003-Ohio 2528, 790 N.E.2d 800, ¶ 12 (6th Dist.). "Under R.C. 119.12, the court of common pleas must review an agency order to determine whether 'the order is supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence and is in accordance with law.' " Id. "Anappellate court, on the other hand, is limited to determining whether the common pleas court abused its discretion in reviewing the evidence in support of the administrative order." Id., citing Rossford Exempted Village School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. State Bd. of Edn., 63 Ohio St.3d 705, 707, 590 N.E.2d 1240 (1992). (Other citation omitted). "Issues of law, however, are reviewed de novo." Gruber at ¶ 12, citing Sohi v. Ohio State Dental Bd., 130 Ohio App.3d 414, 421, 720 N.E.2d 187 (1st Dist.1998). The case before us does not involve disputed facts. Instead, the issues are ones of law. As a result, we will review the matter de novo.
{¶ 15} At the outset, we observe that the trial court's January 2014 reconsideration decision was of no effect. As noted in our decision overruling appellees' motion to dismiss this case for lack of a final appealable order, the trial court originally granted judgment in favor of appellees on December 27, 2013 but gave Rodefer...
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