Rossford Exempted Village School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. State Bd. of Edn.

• Decision Date: 27 May 1992
• Docket Number: No. 91-1051,91-1051
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court
• Parties: , 74 Ed. Law Rep. 293 BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE ROSSFORD EXEMPTED VILLAGE SCHOOL DISTRICT, Appellant, v. STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION et al., Appellees.

Page 705

63 Ohio St.3d 705

590 N.E.2d 1240, 74 Ed. Law Rep. 293

BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE ROSSFORD EXEMPTED VILLAGE SCHOOL DISTRICT, Appellant, v. STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION et al., Appellees.

No. 91-1051.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

Submitted April 14, 1992.

Decided May 27, 1992.

Appellees Jeffery L. Drake, Barbara R. Drake, and Carmen C. Rudolph are the owners of a tract of land located in Perrysburg Township, Wood County, Ohio. The property is situated within the Rossford Exempted Village School District and borders, in part, on the Perrysburg Exempted Village School District. In 1986, the Drakes and Rudolph requested that appellant, Rossford Exempted Village School District Board of Education ("Rossford"), approve a transfer of the property from the Rossford Exempted Village School District to the Perrysburg Exempted Village School District. In accordance with R.C. 3311.24(A), Rossford forwarded this request to the appellee State Board of Education ("state board"). Following a hearing, the state board approved the requested transfer of territory.

Thereafter, Rossford filed an R.C. 119.12 appeal in the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County seeking review of the state board's order approving the transfer. The trial court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The court of appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court and remanded the cause for further proceedings. Upon further appeal, this court, in Rossford Exempted Village School Dist. v. State Bd. of Edn. (1989), 45 Ohio St.3d 356, 544 N.E.2d 651, affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals and, accordingly, the cause was returned to the trial court for further proceedings.

On remand, the trial court affirmed the state board's order, finding that it was supported by reliable, probative and substantial evidence and was in accordance with law. On appeal, the court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court, finding that the trial court did not "abuse its discretion" in affirming the state board's order.

The cause is now before this court pursuant to the allowance of a motion to certify the record.

Kolb, Kolb & Kolb and Matt Kolb, Toledo, for appellant.

Lee I. Fisher, Atty. Gen., Christopher M. Culley and Lauren M. Ross, Columbus, for appellee State Bd. of Educ.

Norman C. Hartsel, Perrysburg, for appellees Drake and Rudolph.

DOUGLAS, Justice.

The issue in this appeal is whether the court of appeals applied the proper standard of review in affirming the judgment of the trial court. For the reasons that follow, we find that the court of appeals applied the correct standard of review and, accordingly, we affirm its judgment.

In Lorain City Bd. of Edn. v. State Emp. Relations Bd. (1988), 40 Ohio St.3d 257, 260-261, 533 N.E.2d 264, 267, we stated that:

"In reviewing an order of an administrative agency, an appellate court's role is more limited than that of a trial court reviewing the same order. It is incumbent on the trial court to examine the evidence. Such is not the charge of the appellate court. The appellate court is to determine only if the trial court has abused its discretion. An abuse of discretion ' " * * * implies not merely error of judgment, but perversity of will, passion, prejudice, partiality, or moral delinquency." ' State, ex rel. Commercial Lovelace Motor Freight, Inc., v. Lancaster (1986), 22 Ohio St.3d 191, 193, 22 OBR 275, 277, 489 N.E.2d 288, 290. Absent an abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court, a court of appeals must affirm the trial court's judgment. See Rohde v. Farmer (1970), 23 Ohio St.2d 82, 52 O.O.2d 376, 262 N.E.2d 685.

"The fact that the court of appeals * * * might have arrived at a different conclusion than did the administrative agency is immaterial. Appellate courts must not substitute their judgment for those of an...