Rodgers v. McElroy

Citation153 So.3d 814
Decision Date18 April 2014
Docket Number2121039.
PartiesSamuel RODGERS v. Elizabeth McELROY.
CourtAlabama Court of Civil Appeals

Stewart E. Burns of Burns Garner Law Firm, Gadsden, for appellant.

Carl Ann Smith and A. Mark Bahakel of Smith & Pace, P.C., Birmingham, for appellee.

Opinion

THOMPSON, Presiding Judge.

This is the second time the parties have come before this court on the issue of compensation for Elizabeth McElroy for her service as personal representative of the estate of Ron'Drequez Cortez White in a wrongful-death action arising out of a motor-vehicle accident in which White was killed. The wrongful-death action resulted in a recovery for White's next of kin: his mother, Sandey Greene, and his father, Samuel Rodgers. The issue of McElroy's fee was litigated, after which the Jefferson Circuit Court (“the trial court) awarded her a fee to be paid from the proceeds of the wrongful-death action for “extraordinary services” rendered as personal representative of the estate, pursuant to § 43–2–848(b), Ala.Code 1975. Rodgers appealed the judgment awarding McElroy a fee; this court affirmed the judgment. Rodgers v. McElroy, 141 So.3d 1030 (Ala.Civ.App.2012) (“Rodgers I ”).1

Subsequently, our supreme court granted Rodgers's petition for the writ of certiorari “to determine the narrow question whether a personal representative may be compensated out of the proceeds recovered in a wrongful-death action.” Ex parte Rodgers, 141 So.3d 1038, 1040 (Ala.2013). Our supreme court reversed this court's judgment, holding that

§ 43–2–848(b) does not entitle McElroy, the personal representative, to any fee from the wrongful-death proceeds because the recovery in the wrongful-death action was not for the estate. Alabama law mandates the payment of wrongful-death proceeds to the heirs of the deceased. The clear language of the wrongful-death statute provides that proceeds from a wrongful-death action ‘are not subject to the payment of the debts or liabilities' of the decedent. § 6–5–410(c), Ala.Code 1975. There is no allowance in the wrongful-death statute for payment of expenses of the administration of the decedent's estate, which would include personal-representative compensation. See § 43–2–371, Ala.Code 1975 (setting out the order of preference of debts against the estate). Under the combined effect of §§ 6–5–410 and 43–2–848(a) and (b), Ala.Code 1975, McElroy was not entitled to be paid from the proceeds of the wrongful-death recovery either reasonable compensation for her services or extraordinary compensation for her services.”

(Footnote omitted.) Accordingly, on remand from the supreme court, this court reversed the judgment of the trial court and remanded the cause to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with our supreme court's opinion. Rodgers v. McElroy, 141 So.3d 1046 (Ala.Civ.App.2013).

On remand, the trial court held a hearing regarding whether McElroy was entitled to a reasonable fee for her services as personal representative. Afterward, on September 10, 2013, the trial court entered a judgment (“the 2013 judgment”) finding that, although the Alabama Supreme Court had determined that McElroy was not entitled to a fee pursuant to § 43–2–848, “general rules of trust law permit a personal representative compensation in wrongful death actions.” The trial court went on to state:

“Based upon general equitable principles, quantum meruit, and/or pursuant to Alabama Code § 19–3B–708 (1975), Elizabeth McElroy should receive compensation for her services rendered relative to the non-probate creation and administration of a statutory trust. It would be unfair and inequitable for a personal representative and here, an attorney, to perform work for the benefit of others without compensation.”

The trial court then awarded McElroy a fee of $15,750 to compensate her for the services she had rendered as “personal representative, attorney, and statutory trustee of wrongful death proceeds.” The trial court also denied Rodgers's motion seeking distribution of the $15,750 of the wrongful-death proceeds that had not yet been distributed. The balance of the wrongful-death proceeds had already been distributed to Greene and Rodgers.

Rodgers appealed from the 2013 judgment.2 McElroy sought to have the appeal dismissed, contending that White's estate remained open and pending and, therefore, that the judgment was nonfinal. On March 4, 2014, this court reinvested the trial court with jurisdiction to certify the 2013 judgment as final, if appropriate, pursuant to Rule 54(b), Ala. R. Civ. P. The trial court determined that Rule 54(b) certification was appropriate, and it entered an order certifying the 2013 judgment as final on March 18, 2014. Accordingly, the 2013 judgment is now final for purposes of appeal.

On appeal, Rodgers contends that in Ex parte Rodgers, supra, our supreme court made clear that proceeds recovered from a wrongful-death claim must be distributed to the next of kin of the decedent and cannot be paid to the personal representative of an estate as compensation. Therefore, he says, the trial court erred in awarding McElroy a fee under any legal theory.

McElroy, on the other hand, asserts that our supreme court did not hold in Ex parte Rodgers that she was precluded from recovering reasonable compensation as a statutory trustee for the wrongful-death proceeds under § 19–3B–708, Ala.Code 1975, under general principles of trust law, or under other legal and equitable theories that were not addressed in Rodgers's petition for the writ of certiorari to our supreme court. In her brief to this court in this appeal, McElroy contends that,

[a]lthough the issue was not before the Alabama Supreme Court in this case, Justice Bolin (in a special concurrence) confirmed that the recovery of wrongful death proceeds by a personal representative creates a statutory trust out of which the personal representative may be awarded without running afoul of § 43–2–848 [, Ala.Code 1975].”

This issue presents this court with a question of law, which we review de novo.

[W]here the facts before the trial court are essentially undisputed and the controversy involves questions of law for the court to consider, the court's judgment carries no presumption of correctness.” Allstate Ins. Co. v. Skelton, 675 So.2d 377, 379 (Ala.1996). Questions of law are reviewed de novo. BT Sec. Corp. v. W.R. Huff Asset Mgmt. Co., 891 So.2d 310 (Ala.2004).’
Alabama Republican Party v. McGinley, 893 So.2d 337, 342 (Ala.2004).”

Ex parte Terry, 957 So.2d 455, 457 (Ala.2006).

As mentioned, in Ex parte Rodgers, supra, our supreme court granted certiorari review “to determine the narrow question whether a personal representative may be compensated out of the proceeds recovered in a wrongful-death action.” Ex parte Rodgers, 141 So.3d at 1042. In that case, our supreme court first parsed the language in § 43–2–848(b), which provides for the compensation of a personal representative “for extraordinary services performed for the estate,” and § 6–5–410, one of Alabama's wrongful-death statutes. It then wrote:

“Applying the rules of statutory construction, we conclude that § 43–2–848(b) does not entitle McElroy, the personal representative, to any fee from the wrongful-death proceeds because the recovery in the wrongful-death action was not for the estate. Alabama law mandates the payment of wrongful-death proceeds to the heirs of the deceased. The clear language of the wrongful-death statute provides that proceeds from a wrongful-death action ‘are not subject to the payment of the debts or liabilities' of the decedent. § 6–5–410(c), Ala.Code 1975. There is no allowance in the wrongful-death statute for payment of expenses of the administration of the decedent's estate, which would include personal-representative compensation. See § 43–2–371, Ala.Code 1975 (setting out the order of preference of debts against the estate).1 Under the combined effect of §§ 6–5–410 and 43–2–848(a) and (b), Ala.Code 1975, McElroy was not entitled to be paid from the proceeds of the wrongful-death recovery either reasonable compensation for her services or extraordinary compensation for her services.
____________________
1 See Affinity Hosp., L.L.C. v. Williford, 21 So.3d 712, 715–16 (Ala.2009). See also Baggett v. Sellers, 282 Ala. 235, 210 So.2d 796 (1968) (damages recovered as result of wrongful death must be distributed according to statute of distribution); Hatas v. Partin, 278 Ala. 65, 175 So.2d 759 (1965) (personal representative is conduit for collecting damages in a wrongful-death action and passing them over to those entitled under statute); Stephens v. Williams, 226 Ala. 534, 147 So. 608 (1933) (administratrix is statutory representative in a wrongful-death action, suing for sole benefit of beneficiaries named in statute); Kuykendall v. Edmondson, 205 Ala. 265, 87 So. 882 (1921) (distributees of decedent's estate are sole beneficiaries of proceeds in a wrongful-death action); Kennedy v. Davis, 171 Ala. 609, 55 So. 104 (1911) (property right in damages collected in a wrongful-death action vested exclusively in distributees of intestate); Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Street, 164 Ala. 155, 51 So. 306 (1909) (sum recovered as result of a wrongful death not asset of estate, not subject to decedent's debts or liabilities, and sum recovered is distributable in accordance with our statute of distribution).”

Ex parte Rodgers, 141 So.3d at 1043.

Although McElroy relies on Justice Bolin's special concurrence in Ex parte Rodgers to support her position that the trial court in this case was free to compensate her from the wrongful-death proceeds based on principles of trust law, she overlooks that part of the special writing in which Justice Bolin states that his proposed solution to the inequity that results in cases like this one is prospective. Justice Bolin wrote:

“Although I concur with the main opinion, I posit that the unjust result obtained for the personal representative in this case may well be
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