Rodrigue v. Rodrigue, Civil Action No. 95-2862.
| Decision Date | 12 February 1999 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 95-2862. |
| Citation | 55 F.Supp.2d 534 |
| Parties | George Godfrey RODRIGUE, Jr. v. Veronica Hidalgo RODRIGUE. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Louisiana |
Alfred S. Lippman, Lippman, Mahfouz & Martin, Morgan City, LA, Marc David Winsberg, Halpern, Danner & Winsberg, LLC, Metairie, LA, Cynthia LeBourgeois, Lafayette, LA, Charles Dean Domingue, Robert Lawrence Waddell, Domingue, Delaune & Waddell, Lafayette., LA, Kyle D. Schonekas, Patrick S. McGoey, Schonekas, Evans & McGoey, LLC, New Orleans, LA, for George G. Rodrigue, Jr.
Monica Tufano, Surprenant, Dennis Martin Laborde, Baldwin & Haspel, LLC, New Orleans, LA, Dane S. Ciolino, Loyola Law School, New Orleans, LA, for Richard Steiner.
Robert E. Barkley, Jr., Mark Powell Seyler, Barkley & Thompson, LC, New Orleans, LA, Diane Sorola, Lafayette, LA, Warren Allan Goldstein, New Orleans, LA, for Veronica Hidalgo Rodigue.
ORDER AND REASONS
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that George Rodrigue's Motion for Summary Judgment on the Issue of Federal Copyright Law Preemption (document # 96) is GRANTED and Veronica Hidalgo Rodrigue's Motion for Summary Judgment (document # 92) is DENIED.
George Rodrigue and Veronica Hidalgo, were married in 1967 and lived together under Louisiana's community property regime until their divorce in 1994. Termination of the marital community was effective June 9, 1993. George is an artist who created numerous paintings during and after the existence of the community, some for which George obtained certificates of copyright.
The matter is before the court on cross motions for summary judgment. Veronica claims that, by operation of Louisiana community property law and in accordance with 17 U.S.C. § 201(d), she is a co-owner of all copyrights that arose during the community and is therefore entitled to an accounting for George's use of certain recurring images1 which, after the dissolution of the community, continue to be thematically expressed in George's paintings.
George argues that (1) he is the sole "author" of all art work; (2) under 17 U.S.C. § 201(a), the author is vested initially with title to the copyrights on each work; (3) under § 106, the owner has the right to prepare derivative works based on the copyrighted works; and (4) Veronica, therefore, has no interest in the recurring images. Veronica contends that a one-half interest in the copyrights was transferred to her by operation of community property law in accordance with 17 U.S.C. § 201(d). George concedes that Veronica is entitled to an accounting for the artworks produced during the existence of the community, and he contends that he has adequately compensated her for her interest in these works. However, George denies that Veronica has any interest in his continued use of the copyrighted recurring images.
George asserts that there is an irreconcilable conflict between copyright law and community property law with respect to both initial vesting of the copyright and any alleged transfer, and therefore Louisiana community property law is preempted by federal copyright law. George contends that after the copyrights vested in him initially under federal law, there was no subsequent transfer of the copyrights, or any interest in them, to Veronica because: (1) no provision of Louisiana community property law authorizes such a transfer; and (2) such an involuntary transfer is prohibited by 17 U.S.C. § 201(e). Veronica contends that the application of community property law does not pose any conflict with federal copyright law because federal law contemplates that, after vesting initially in the author, copyrights can be transferred by operation of law, and because application of community property law does not stand as an obstacle to the purposes of federal copyright law.
Summary judgment is proper when, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant, "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Amburgey v. Corhart Refractories Corp., 936 F.2d 805, 809 (5th Cir.1991); Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). If the moving party carries the initial burden of establishing there is no genuine issue of fact, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to produce evidence of the existence of a genuine issue for trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The nonmovant cannot satisfy his summary judgment burden with conclusory allegations, unsubstantiated assertions, or only a scintilla of evidence. Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir.1994) (en banc).
The threshold issue of this case is whether and to what extent United States copyright law conflicts with and therefore preempts Louisiana community property law.2 This court must decide whether it is possible to comply with both federal copyright law and Louisiana community property law, and whether the application of Louisiana community property law is an obstacle to the goals of copyright law.
When state and federal law clash, federal law prevails. U.S. Const. Art. VI, cl.2 (); Ridgway v. Ridgway, 454 U.S. 46, 102 S.Ct. 49, 70 L.Ed.2d 39 (1981). "[T]he question whether a certain state action is preempted by federal law is one of congressional intent." Gade v. National Solid Wastes Management Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 112 S.Ct. 2374, 2381, 120 L.Ed.2d 73 (1992) (internal quotation and citation omitted) (Illinois regulation impliedly preempted as in conflict with purposes and objectives of Occupational Safety and Health Act). "To discern Congress' intent we examine the explicit statutory language and the structure and purpose of the statute." Id. "Pre-emption may be either express or implied, and is compelled whether Congress' command is explicitly stated in the statute's language or implicitly contained in its structure and purpose." Id. 112 S.Ct. at 2383. "[A] federal statute implicitly overrides state law either when the scope of the statute indicates that Congress intended federal law to occupy a field exclusively or when state law is in actual conflict with federal law." Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 115 S.Ct. 1483, 1487, 131 L.Ed.2d 385 (1995) (internal citations omitted) (National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act did not preempt state common law claims). The Supreme Court has also "found implied conflict preemption where it is impossible for a private party to comply with both state and federal requirements and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress." Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted.)
Historically, however, all legal issues relating to families have been the exclusive province of state law not federal law. Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 99 S.Ct. 802, 808, 59 L.Ed.2d 1 (1979). When there is conflict between state family law and federal law, state law is not lightly set aside. Id. Preemption of state law may be necessary when Congress has positively required preemption by direct enactment. Id. However, a "mere conflict in words" between federal law and state family and family property law is not sufficient grounds for overturning state law. Id. Rather, "family property law must do `major damage' to `clear and substantial' federal interests" before state law is overridden. Id. Under the test described in Hisquierdo, in order for federal law to preempt state family law, (1) there must be some sort of express conflict between the two; and (2) the state law must do "major damage" to "clear and substantial" federal interests. Id.
The United States Supreme Court has held that community property law is preempted in some instances where it affects a federally created property right. In Hisquierdo, the Court, relying on the preemptive effect of the Railroad Retirement Act's anti-alienation provision, 45 U.S.C. § 231m, held that benefits arising during marriage and payable to covered railroad workers under that act were not community property subject to division upon divorce. Hisquierdo, 99 S.Ct. at 809-810. Similarly, in McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210, 101 S.Ct. 2728, 69 L.Ed.2d 589 (1981), the Court held that military retirement pay was separate property because the federal military retirement scheme preempted state community property laws. Federal savings bonds regulations were held to preempt state community property laws in Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663, 82 S.Ct. 1089, 8 L.Ed.2d 180 (1962). See also, Yiatchos v. Yiatchos, 376 U.S. 306, 84 S.Ct. 742, 11 L.Ed.2d 724 (1964) () In Ridgway v. Ridgway, 454 U.S. 46, 102 S.Ct. 49, 70 L.Ed.2d 39 (1981), the Court held that federal rules concerning military life insurance benefits preempted state law.3 More recently, in Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833, 117 S.Ct. 1754, 138 L.Ed.2d 45 (1997), the Court held, by a 5-4 margin, that ERISA preempted Louisiana's community property law when a non-participant spouse attempted a testamentary disposition of undistributed pension benefits.
Community property law has not fared well in preemption battles before the Supreme Court. Congress, however, has legislatively overruled the holdings in McCarty and Hisquierdo by making railroad and military retirement benefits subject to community property law. See 45 U.S.C. § 231m (amended 1983) and 10 U.S.C. § 1408(c)(1)(amendment effective retroactively as of the day of the McCarty decision). ...
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