Rodriguez Cirilo v. Garcia

• Decision Date: 13 December 1995
• Docket Number: Civ. No. 94-2230 (HL).
• Citation: 908 F. Supp. 85
• Parties: Celso RODRIGUEZ CIRILO, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Juan B. GARCIA, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico

908 F. Supp. 85

Celso RODRIGUEZ CIRILO, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Juan B. GARCIA, et al., Defendants.

Civ. No. 94-2230 (HL).

United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico.

December 13, 1995.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Kevin G. Little, David Efron Law Offices, Rio Piedras, PR, for plaintiffs.

Isabel Abislaiman-Quilez, Department of Justice, Federal Litigation Division, San Juan, PR, for defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

LAFFITTE, District Judge.

Before the Court is a motion for summary judgment filed by Defendants Juan B. García ("García") and Juan Castro Alicea ("Castro Alicea") in this action for damages under section 1983.¹ Defendants are officers in the Puerto Rico Police Department. This action arises out of Francisco Rodríguez Cirilo's ("Francisco") stabbing of his brother Celso Rodríguez Cirilo ("Celso"). Celso, his wife, and their children are the plaintiffs in this action.

The Court reviews the record in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs and draws all reasonable inferences in their favor. See LeBlanc v. Great American Ins. Co., 6 F.3d 836, 841 (1st Cir.1993). Pursuant to the Mental Health Code of Puerto Rico, commonly known as "Law 116,"² Jorge Rodríguez Nieves ("Jorge") filed a petition on March 16, 1994, to have Francisco involuntarily detained and subjected to a psychiatric examination.³ Jorge, a nephew of Francisco and Celso, stated in his petition that Francisco had a prior record of treatment in a mental health institution and that he had made threats to kill with a machete, knife or other sharp object.⁴ On March 17, 1994, a municipal judge in San Juan granted the petition and issued an order that Francisco be examined.⁵ The order authorized any law enforcement officer to detain Francisco and to take him to a psychiatric hospital.⁶ The order also stated that Francisco could not be detained for more than twenty-four hours.⁷ Additionally, the order provided that if the examining doctor believed that Francisco should be hospitalized for longer than twenty-four hours, the doctor should prepare a report and notify Jorge, who in turn was to notify the court.⁸

On March 17, 1994, Jorge, Jerry Rodríguez Cirilo ("Jerry"), and Juan Luis Rodríguez Cirilo ("Juan Luis") went to the Río Grande police station to have the detention order enforced.⁹ Jerry and Juan Luis are siblings of Francisco. Defendants Garcia and Castro Alicea were at the station and attended to Francisco's family members.¹⁰ The officers called in paramedics to accompany them.¹¹ The paramedics, the police officers, and the family members found Francisco at a local establishment.¹² However, Francisco said that he was being treated at the veteran's hospital and he refused to let the officers take him to a hospital.¹³ The officers did not take Francisco into custody.¹⁴ Jorge tried to convince the officers that Francisco was dangerous and should be detained, but the officers did not heed his pleas.¹⁵ The police officers instead informed the family members that they themselves should take Francisco to the veteran's hospital for treatment.¹⁶ The police officers left and did not enforce the detention order.¹⁷ The family members did not obtain another detention order and Francisco was not taken involuntarily to a hospital for examination.¹⁸ Plaintiffs and other family members, however, had informally asked the police to take Francisco into protective custody.¹⁹

More than two weeks later, on April 6, 1994, Plaintiff Celso visited his mother.²⁰ Francisco was also at their mother's house at the time.²¹ During his visit, Celso suggested that Francisco get some water for their mother.²² A few minutes later, while Celso was on the balcony, Francisco attacked him and stabbed him in the chest with a knife.²³ Celso suffered injuries to his chest and to his digestive and respiratory systems.²⁴ Plaintiffs claim that Defendants' failure to detain Francisco constituted a violation of Celso's due process rights.²⁵ They further allege that Defendants conspired with Francisco. Plaintiffs have also brought Puerto Rico law claims pursuant to the Court's supplemental jurisdiction.²⁶ In their motion for summary judgment, Defendants argue that Celso has not suffered a violation of his constitutional rights. For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Defendants' motion for summary judgment.

DISCUSSION

Summary judgment is appropriate if "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." See Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c). The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial responsibility of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Once the moving party has satisfied this requirement, the nonmoving party has the burden of presenting any facts that demonstrate a genuine issue for trial. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); LeBlanc, 6 F.3d at 841. The nonmovant must do more than show "some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). An issue is genuine when, based on the evidence, a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). "The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff's position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff." Id. at 252, 106 S.Ct. at 2512.

There are two essential elements to a claim brought pursuant to section 1983: (1) the conduct complained of must have been committed by defendants acting under color of state law and (2) the conduct must have deprived plaintiff of his rights under the Constitution or laws of the United States. Martínez v. Colón, 54 F.3d 980, 984 (1st Cir.1995); Voutour v. Vitale, 761 F.2d 812, 819 (1st Cir.1985). In the case before the Court, Defendants argue that they were not acting under color of state law. The Court disagrees. The conduct of which Plaintiffs complain is Defendants' failure as police officers to detain Francisco when his family members sought to enforce the detention order on March 17, 1994. Francisco's family members went to the Río Grande police station to have the order enforced.²⁷ Following the encounter on March 17, 1994, with Francisco, Defendants filled out a police report of the incident.²⁸ Defendants were acting in their capacity as Puerto Rico police officers. The conduct in question was committed by Defendants while they were acting under color of state law. See Soto v. Carrasquillo, 878 F.Supp. 324, 327 (D.P.R.1995); Martinez Correa v. Lopez Feliciano, 759 F.Supp. 947, 953 (D.P.R.1991). Thus, the first essential element of a section 1983 claim has been met.

1. Alleged deprivation of a federally protected right

The second essential element of a section 1983 claim has two prongs: (1) there must have been a deprivation of a federally protected right and (2) the defendant's conduct must have caused the deprivation. Gutiérrez-Rodríguez v. Cartagena, 882 F.2d 553, 559 (1st Cir.1989); Voutour, 761 F.2d at 819; Soto, 878 F.Supp. at 327. With regard to the first prong, Plaintiffs claim that Celso was deprived of his due process rights. The Due Process Clause does not require the state to protect the life or liberty of its citizens from harms inflicted by private actors. DeShaney v. Winnebago County D.S.S., 489 U.S. 189, 195, 109 S.Ct. 998, 1003, 103 L.Ed.2d 249 (1989); Pinder v. Johnson, 54 F.3d 1169, 1174 (4th Cir.1995); L.W. v. Grubbs, 974 F.2d 119, 121 (9th Cir.1992). "A State's failure to protect an individual against private violence simply does not constitute a violation of the Due Process Clause." DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 197, 109 S.Ct. at 1004. There may, however, be certain limited exceptions to this rule of nonliability. Martínez, 54 F.3d at 984-85; Pinder, 54 F.3d at 1174-76; Grubbs, 974 F.2d at 121. A state may be liable if it fails to protect an individual who is in the state's custody or "functional custody." DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 198-201 & 201 n. 9, 109 S.Ct. at 1004-06 & 1006 n. 9; Martínez, 54 F.3d at 984; see also Souza v. Pina, 53 F.3d 423, 426-27 (1st Cir.1995); Monahan v. Dorchester Counseling Ctr., Inc., 961 F.2d 987, 991-92 (1st Cir. 1992). A state may also be liable if state actors have done anything to make an individual more vulnerable to the harms of a private actor. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 201, 109 S.Ct. at 1006; Martínez, 54 F.3d at 984-85; Souza, 53 F.3d at 427; Monahan, 961 F.2d at 992-93. For there to be liability under this last exception, however, the state actors must have taken affirmative acts that render the individual more vulnerable to private harms. Martínez, 54 F.3d at 985-86; Graham v. Independent School Dist. No. I-89, 22 F.3d 991, 995 (10th Cir.1994); Grubbs, 974 F.2d at 121; Monahan, 961 F.2d at 992-93; see also Reed v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1122, 1127 (7th Cir.1993) (Affirmative act was police officers' alleged arresting and taking into custody a sober driver, leaving the car to a drunk driver who subsequently crashed into plaintiffs); Dwares v. City of New York, 985 F.2d 94, 98-100 (2nd Cir.1993) (Affirmative acts were police officers' conspiring with and assuring "skinheads" that they would not be arrested for beating up flag burners; these "skinheads" subsequently assaulted plaintiff); Freeman v. Ferguson, 911 F.2d 52, 54-55 (8th Cir.1990) (Police chief directed his officers not to arrest his friend who subsequently killed plaintiffs).

In the case before the Court, Celso suffered harm at the hands of a private actor. Plaintiffs do not argue that Defendants had a constitutional duty to protect Celso because he was in the state's custody or "functional custody." Thus, Defendants would be liable only if they took affirmative acts that rendered Celso more vulnerable to private...