Rosario De Leon v. National College of Business

• Decision Date: 28 August 2009
• Docket Number: Civil No.: 06-1457 (DRD).
• Citation: 663 F.Supp.2d 25
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico
• Parties: Luz M. ROSARIO DE LEON, Plaintiff v. NATIONAL COLLEGE OF BUSINESS & TECHNOLOGY, et al., Defendants.

663 F.Supp.2d 25

Luz M. ROSARIO DE LEON, Plaintiff v. NATIONAL COLLEGE OF BUSINESS & TECHNOLOGY, et al., Defendants.

Civil No.: 06-1457 (DRD).

United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico.

August 28, 2009.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Lorenzo J. Palomares-Starbuck, Lorenzo Palomares PSC, San Juan, PR, for Plaintiff.

Ivan E. Aponte-Gonzalez, I. Aponte Law Office, San Juan, PR, for Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

DANIEL R. DOMINGUEZ, District Judge.

Pending before the Court is Defendant's Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants National College's, Carmen Z. Claudio's and Nancy Green's Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket No. 53), and Plaintiff's Response in Opposition to Motion for Summary Adjudication with Incorporated Memorandum of Law (Docket No. 58). After carefully reviewing the record, the Court GRANTS Defendant's Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants National College's, Carmen Z. Claudio's and Nancy Green's Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket No. 53). The Court explains.

I. Procedural and Factual Background

Plaintiff, Luz Rosario de Leon ("Mrs. Rosario/Plaintiff") was enrolled in the Associate's Degree in Nursing offered by defendant, National College of Business and Technology ("National College/Defendant"). National College is a private institution of higher education and a recipient of federal funds. Mrs. Nancy Green ("Mrs. Green"), was Plaintiffs professor in the courses of "Nursing Intervention with Adults and Elders with Health Alterations I" (ENFE 1561), and "Nursing Intervention with Adults and Elders with Health Alterations II" (ENFE 1611P). The first course is the theoretical course and the second course is the practical nurse course. Furthermore, the second course is a practical-internship held at the University Hospital for Adults of the Department of Health of Puerto Rico.

At the beginning of the practical-internship course, Mrs. Green discussed with Plaintiff—and other students enrolled in the same class—the course's evaluation methods. As part of the academic requirements, students had to prepare a Teaching Plan Report using a form that was provided by Mrs. Green. Plaintiff stated that Mrs. Green gave a deadline as to the Teaching Plan and asked if there were any questions. Plaintiff stated that she had no questions regarding the Teaching Plan nor the evaluation methods since it was all clear.

On May 26, 2005, during the practicalinternship course, Plaintiff provided medical assistance to a homeless patient in the hospital, and also provided spiritual assistance, allegedly at the request of the patient (Docket No. 62-2, p. 5). That same day, Mrs. Green met with Plaintiff to discuss the Teaching Plan form(Docket No. 56-3, p. 4). During the meeting, Plaintiff accepted to Mrs. Green that she "gave spiritual help to the patient and he accepted Jesus Christ as his personal savior for forgiveness of sins and for salvation" (Docket No. 56-2, p. 10). Mrs. Green answered in an authoritarian and harsh manner: "Rosario, you cannot do that. Did you read what the nursing book says about spiritual help?" (Docket No. 62-2, p. 5). Mrs. Green further stated: "[y]our problem is that you want to save the world" and "you [are] imposing religion" (Docket No. 56-2, p. 12).

After said incident, Plaintiff contends that she never delivered the written report regarding the Teaching Plan because Mrs. Green never asked for it. In addition to the Teaching Plan, all students had to prepare and present a case study pertaining to one of the patients assisted during the course. Plaintiffs presentation was held on June 23, 2005. The Evaluation Criteria Form used to grade the presentation was a standardized table which included a column for ranking from zero ("F") to four points ("A"). Plaintiffs grade for this evaluation was a 77%, 173 points out of 224 points. Nevertheless, Plaintiff obtained an F ("Fail") as the final grade for the practical course (ENFE 1611P). Plaintiff claims that the "Fail" grade was based on religious discrimination and that Mrs. Green's evaluation was tainted because of Plaintiffs religious beliefs.

In her first cause of action Mrs. Rosario claims that Defendant violated her rights under the First Amendment and under the equal protection provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. The second cause of action is brought under Title VI of the Civil rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d, along with Executive Order No. 13160, June 23, 2000, 65 FR 39775. Finally, Plaintiff alleges in her third cause of action that Defendants' discriminatory actions have also violated any and all the applicable statutes of Puerto Rico.

II. Summary Judgment Standard

The framework of Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 provides that it is appropriate to enter summary judgment when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324-25, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Abbadessa v. Moore Business Forms, Inc., 987 F.2d 18, 22 (1st Cir.1993). Pursuant to the language of the rule, the moving party bears the two-fold burden of showing that there is "no genuine issue as to any material facts," and that he is "entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Vega-Rodriguez v. Puerto Rico Tel. Co., 110 F.3d 174, 178 (1st Cir.1997). When the moving party asserts that the competent evidence clearly demonstrates that it is entitled to judgment and after the moving party has satisfied this burden, the onus shifts to the resisting party to show that there still exists "a trial worthy issue as to some material fact." Cortes-Irizarry v. Corporacion Insular, 111 F.3d 184, 187 (1st Cir.1997).

At the summary judgment stage, the trial court examines the entire record "in the light most flattering to the non-movant and indulges all reasonable inferences in that party's favor. Only if the record, viewed in the manner and without regard to credibility determinations, reveals no genuine issue as to any material fact may the court enter summary judgment." Cadle Company v. Hayes, 116 F.3d 957, 959-60 (1st Cir.1997); see also Suarez v. Pueblo Int'l Inc., 229 F.3d 49, 53 (1st Cir.2000); Cortes-Irizarry, 111 F.3d at 187; United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655, 82 S.Ct. 993, 8 L.Ed.2d 176 (1962). "`Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge.'" See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000)(quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)); see also Lytle v. Household Mfg., Inc., 494 U.S. 545, 554-555, 110 S.Ct. 1331, 108 L.Ed.2d 504 (1990); Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 696, n. 6, 82 S.Ct. 1404, 8 L.Ed.2d 777 (1962).

Moreover, "[i]f the adverse party does not [file an opposition], summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against the adverse party." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). Nevertheless, the First Circuit Court of Appeals has made clear that failure to timely oppose a motion for summary judgment, does not, in itself, justify entry of summary judgment against the party; therefore, a District Court is "obliged to consider the motion on the merits, in light of the record as constituted, in order to determine whether judgment would be legally appropriate." See Kelly v. United States, 924 F.2d 355, 358 (1st Cir.1991); see also Lopez v. Corporacion Azucarera de Puerto Rico, 938 F.2d 1510, 1517 (1st Cir.1991) (holding that before granting an unopposed summary judgment motion, the court must inquire whether the moving party has met its burden to demonstrate undisputed facts entitling it to summary judgment as a matter of law). In the case of failure to oppose a motion for summary judgment, the consequence "is that the party may lose the right to file an opposition." See Mullen v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 972 F.2d 446, 451-52 (1st Cir.1992) (discussing unopposed motion for summary judgment). Finally, a party that fails to properly oppose a motion for summary judgment, does so at its own risk and peril. See Corrada Betances v. Sea-Land Service, Inc., 248 F.3d 40, 43 (1st Cir.2001); Hebert v. Wicklund, 744 F.2d 218, 223 (1st Cir. 1984). However, notwithstanding that there is no opposition to a summary judgement, the Court must entertain the motion on the merits and may not grant the request as a sanction even for failure to file an opposition. See de la Vega v. San Juan Star, 377 F.3d 111 (1st Cir.2004)

Issues of motive and intent as to the conduct of any party will normally preclude the Court from granting summary judgement. Mulero-Rodriguez v. Ponte, Inc., 98 F.3d 670, 677 (1st Cir., 1996) (reversing summary judgement and emphasizing that "determinations of motive and intent ... are questions better suited for the jury")(internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted).

We believe that summary procedures should be used sparingly . . . where motive and intent play leading roles ... It is only when the witnesses are present and subject to cross-examination that their credibility and the weight to be given their testimony can be appraised. Trial by affidavit is no substitute for trial by jury which so long has been the hallmark of `even handed justice.'

Poller v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 368 U.S. 464, 473, 82 S.Ct. 486, 7 L.Ed.2d 458 (1962); cf. Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 288-90, 102 S.Ct. 1781, 72 L.Ed.2d 66 (1982) (discriminatory intent is a factual matter for the trier of fact); see also William G. Coll v. PB Diagnostic Sys., Inc., 50 F.3d 1115, 1121 (1st Cir. 1995); Oliver v. Digital Equip. Corp., 846 F.2d 103, 107 (1st Cir.1988); Lipsett v. University of P.R., 864 F.2d...