Soto v. Carrasquillo

• Decision Date: 20 January 1995
• Docket Number: Civ. No. 93-1594 (HL).
• Parties: Flor Maria SOTO, Plaintiff, v. Luis CARRASQUILLO, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico

878 F. Supp. 324

Flor Maria SOTO, Plaintiff, v. Luis CARRASQUILLO, et al., Defendants.

Civ. No. 93-1594 (HL).

United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico.

January 20, 1995.

Jose E. Colon-Santana, Alfredo Marquez-Morales, Juan F. Correa-Luna, Janice M. Gutierrez-Lacourt, Rio Piedras, PR, for plaintiff.

Mabel Ramon-Millan, Dept. of Justice, Federal Litigation Div., San Juan, PR, for defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

LAFFITTE, District Judge.

Before the Court is a motion for summary judgment¹ by Defendants Ismael Betancourt y Lebrón ("Betancourt") and Carlos Flores ("Flores") in this action for damages pursuant to section 1983.² At the time of the tragic incidents which give rise to this action, Betancourt was the Police Superintendent of Puerto Rico and Flores, a police officer, was working at the Rio Grande precinct. Plaintiff is Flor María Soto ("Soto").

On April 17, 1991, Soto went to the Rio Grande police station, claiming to have been physically abused by her husband, Angel Rafael Rodríguez ("Rodríguez"). She was attended to by Flores and officer Luis Carrasquillo ("Carrasquillo"). Carrasquillo is also a defendant in this action but is not a party to this motion for summary judgment. The attending officers did not arrest Rodríguez. Soto alleges that she subsequently went with her two children, aged two and eight, to stay at her mother's house; that on April 19, 1991, Rodríguez appeared at the home of Soto's mother to ask Soto not to imprison him, but she denied that she intended to do so; and that Rodríguez then took the couple's two children with him for the weekend. On April 21, 1991, Soto went to Rodríguez' home to pick up her children and while she was waiting at the front of the house, she heard three gunshots. Rodríguez had shot and killed the two children and then killed himself. Soto alleges that the following two messages were written on the walls of the room where the shootings occurred: "Officer Flores told me that you were going to put me in jail," and "Law 54 only serves to allow women to blackmail men."

Soto alleges that Defendants' actions violated her due process and equal protection rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution. Specifically, Soto claims that Flores and Betancourt have a custom or policy of treating female victims of domestic violence differently from other victims of violence, thereby discriminating on the basis of gender (Count I); that Flores and Carrasquillo displayed intentional indifference and a reckless disregard to their law enforcement duties, thereby violating Soto's equal protection and substantive due process rights (Count I); that Defendants improperly prepared and altered their report on Soto's visit on April 17, 1991, to the Rio Grande station as part of a conspiracy to deprive Soto of her rights to equal protection (Count II); and that Betancourt deprived Soto of her Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by his failure to instruct, supervise, and discipline police officers with regard to Law 54³, Puerto Rico's domestic violence prevention act (Count IV).⁴

In their motion for summary judgment, Betancourt and Flores argue that their conduct did not demonstrate a callous or reckless disregard for Soto's constitutional rights and did not cause Soto's injuries. Soto has opposed the motion for summary judgment. For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Betancourt and Flores' motion for summary judgment.

DISCUSSION

A. Due Process Claim

At the outset, the Court notes that summary judgment is appropriate if "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial responsibility of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Once the moving party has satisfied this requirement, the nonmoving party has the burden of presenting any facts that demonstrate a genuine issue for trial. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); LeBlanc v. Great American Ins. Co., 6 F.3d 836, 841 (1st Cir.1993). An issue is genuine when, based on the evidence, a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). "The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff's position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff." Id. at 252, 106 S.Ct. at 2512.

The initial inquiry in determining whether liability exists under section 1983 has two prongs: "(1) whether the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state law; and (2) whether this conduct deprived a person of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States." Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535, 101 S.Ct. 1908, 1913, 68 L.Ed.2d 420 (1981), overruled on other grounds, Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 106 S.Ct. 662, 88 L.Ed.2d 662 (1986); Voutour v. Vitale, 761 F.2d 812, 819 (1st Cir. 1985). In the case before the Court, this first prong is met. The conduct in question was committed by Defendants in their official capacity as members of the police department. The second prong has two distinct elements. First, there must have been a violation of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. Voutour, 761 F.2d at 819. Second, the defendants' conduct must have caused this deprivation of rights. Id.

In the case before the Court, Soto claims that her due process rights were violated as a result of Defendants' behavior. The specific injury of which Soto complains is the death of her two children. She claims Defendants' alleged inaction permitted Rodríguez to kill her children. The Court notes, however, that an individual does not have a cause of action under section 1983 for a due process violation based on the injury or death of a family member. See Valdivieso Ortíz v. Burgos, 807 F.2d 6, 7-10 (1st Cir. 1986). A parent does not have a cause of action even though the family member's loss is a shocking one such as an unlawful killing. Pittsley v. Warish, 927 F.2d 3, 8 (1st Cir. 1991); Carmona Pacheco v. Betancourt y Lebrón, 820 F.Supp. 45, 46 (D.P.R.1993). Only the person towards whom the state action was directed, and not those individuals incidentally affected, may bring a section 1983 action for a violation of due process rights. Manarite v. City of Springfield, 957 F.2d 953, 960 (1st Cir.1992); Pittsley, 927 F.2d at 8; Hegarty v. Somerset County, 848 F.Supp. 257, 268 (D.Me.1994); Natriello v. Flynn, 837 F.Supp. 17, 19 (D.Mass.1993); Martínez Correa v. Lopez Feliciano, 759 F.Supp. 947, 958 (D.P.R.1991).

Soto is bringing this action individually and not in a representative capacity with respect to her deceased children. The harm for which Soto complains is the killing of her children. Because the action was directed towards them, their representative might be able to bring an action on their behalf for a violation of their due process rights.⁵ For the actions complained of in her complaint, however, Soto may not bring a valid claim for a violation of her due process rights. Accordingly, the Court hereby dismisses Soto's claim for a violation of her due process rights.

B. Equal Protection Claim

Soto also alleges that as a result of Defendants' actions she suffered a violation of her federally protected right to equal protection.⁶ She claims that Defendants have a policy of treating female victims of domestic violence differently from other victims of violence and that they discriminated against her on the basis of gender. It is a violation of the Equal Protection Clause for a state to selectively deny protective services to a disfavored minority. DeShaney v. Winnebago County D.S.S., 489 U.S. 189, 197 n. 3, 109 S.Ct. 998, 1004 n. 3, 103 L.Ed.2d 249 (1989); Ricketts v. City of Columbia, Missouri, 36 F.3d 775, 779 (8th Cir.1994). Moreover, while there is no constitutional right to police protection, a state may not discriminate in providing this protection. Watson v. City of Kansas City, Kan., 857 F.2d 690, 695 (10th Cir.1988); Cellini v. City of Sterling Heights, 856 F.Supp. 1215, 1220 (E.D.Mich.1994); Thurman v. City of Torrington, 595 F.Supp. 1521, 1527 (D.Conn.1984).

This Court is unaware of any First Circuit cases in which a domestic violence victim has brought a section 1983 action alleging a violation of equal protection. In other courts, however, a growing number of plaintiffs have turned to section 1983 claims to allege an equal protection violation for a police department's failure to provide protection from domestic violence.⁷ Among these cases, the Third, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits have used the following standard in ruling on a motion for summary judgment:

In order to survive summary judgment, a plaintiff must proffer sufficient evidence that would allow a reasonable jury to infer that it is the policy or custom of the police to provide less protection to victims of domestic violence than to other victims of violence, that discrimination against women was a motivating factor, and that the plaintiff was injured by the policy or custom.

Ricketts, 36 F.3d at 779 (quoting Hynson v. City of Chester Legal Dept., 864 F.2d 1026, 1031 (3rd Cir.1988)); Brown v. Grabowski, 922 F.2d 1097, 1117 (3rd Cir.1990) (quoting Hynson, 864 F.2d at 1031); Watson, 857 F.2d at 694; see also Eagleston v. Guido, 41 F.3d 865, 877-78 (2nd Cir.1994) (Applying this same standard in determining whether a directed verdict was appropriate); Pinder v. Commissioners of Cambridge, 821 F.Supp. 376, 384 n. 1 (D.Md.1993); Hynson v. City of Chester, 731 F.Supp. 1236, 1240 (E.D.Pa. 1990) (quoting Hynson, 864 F.2d at 1031). This standard sets forth the two basic elements that a plaintiff must prove in making out a claim under ...