Rodriguez-Oquendo v. Toledo-Davila

• Decision Date: 23 February 1999
• Docket Number: No. Civ. 97-2432(JAF).,Civ. 97-2432(JAF).
• Citation: 39 F.Supp.2d 127
• Parties: EEdgar RODRIGUEZ-OQUENDO, Elsa Perez-Adorno, and the marital society which they comprise, Plaintiffs, v. Pedro A. TOLEDO-DAVILA, his wife, and their marital society; Salvador Padilla, his wife, and their marital society; and their marital society; and Jose Gomez-Gonzalez, his wife, and their marital society; John Doe and Richard Roe, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico

39 F.Supp.2d 127

EEdgar RODRIGUEZ-OQUENDO, Elsa Perez-Adorno, and the marital society which they comprise, Plaintiffs, v. Pedro A. TOLEDO-DAVILA, his wife, and their marital society; Salvador Padilla, his wife, and their marital society; and their marital society; and Jose Gomez-Gonzalez, his wife, and their marital society; John Doe and Richard Roe, Defendants.

No. Civ. 97-2432(JAF).

United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico.

February 23, 1999.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Robert Millan, San Juan, PR, for plaintiffs.

Jose Diaz Espinosa, Federal Litigation Division, Dept. of Justice, Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Jose Fuentes-Agostini, Secretary of Justice, San Juan, PR, for defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

FUSTE, District Judge.

Plaintiffs, Edgar Rodríguez-Oquendo ("Rodríguez"); his wife, Elsa Pérez-Adorno ("Pérez"); and their conjugal partnership, bring an action against Defendants Pedro Toledo-Dávila ("Toledo"), Superintendent of the Puerto Rico Police Department; Salvador Padilla, a police officer of the Puerto Rico Police Department; José Gómez-Gónzalez ("Gómez"), a police officer of the Puerto Rico Police Department; and two unknown police officers of the Puerto Rico Police Department. Plaintiffs bring this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants in their individual capacities. Plaintiffs also bring claims pursuant to Article 1802 of the Puerto Rico Civil Code, 31 L.P.R.A. § 5141 (1991).

Defendants move to dismiss Pérez and the conjugal partnership's federal section 1983 claim pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), alleging a lack of standing. Secondly, Defendants move for summary judgment on Plaintiff Rodríguez' section 1983 claim against Toledo, asserting the affirmative defense of qualified immunity.

I. Facts

Plaintiffs allege that on or about September 26, 1996, at approximately 7:30 A.M., they were en route to their jobs at the Puerto Rico Treasury Department. Rodríguez left his wife, Pérez, in a shop to buy breakfast while he parked his car in the Covadonga Parking lot located next to the Treasury Department. While he was in the parking lot, Rodríguez states that two men in civilian clothing, Defendants Padilla and Gómez, approached him and began to ask him questions about his car. Rodríguez states that he thought the Defendants were going to rob him and, therefore did not respond and walked quickly towards the parking lot exit.

Plaintiffs state that, without identifying themselves as police officers, Defendants Padilla and Gómez followed him and began to curse at him. Finally, when they were on the sidewalk near the Treasury Department, they hit him in the head and started to beat him.

Pérez, Rodríguez' wife, witnessed the Defendants beating Rodríguez, and asked them to leave her husband alone. Several employees of the Treasury Department witnessed the incident, as well as a television crew of Channel 11. A security guard from the Puerto Rico Telephone Company intervened to stop the beating.

After the beating, Defendants Padilla and Gómez identified themselves as police officers, and arrested Rodríguez. Rodríguez states that they tightly handcuffed him in a painful manner and took him to the 116th Precinct in Puerta de Tierra, San Juan, where he sat shackled for about one-and-a-half hours.

Rodríguez states that, although he was seriously injured, he did not receive medical care until a security guard from the Treasury Department demanded that the police take Rodríguez to the hospital. Defendants Padilla and Gómez took Rodríguez to a medical facility. Upon Plaintiff Rodríguez' release from the medical facility, Padilla and Gómez charged him with disturbing the peace, resisting arrest, making threats, and aggravated assault. Plaintiff Rodríguez denied these charges, and approximately one month later, all the charges were dismissed.

Plaintiffs allege that as a result of Defendants' violent actions, Rodríguez suffered physical pain, and suffered and continues to suffer from mental anguish. Furthermore, Plaintiff Pérez began to have psychiatric problems allegedly as a result of witnessing the assault, and miscarried a seven-month pregnancy. Plaintiffs state that Defendants have deprived them of their rights under the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Furthermore, Plaintiffs claim that Defendant Toledo, as a matter of policy and practice, and with deliberate indifference, has failed adequately to discipline, train or supervise police officers with respect to citizens' rights. Plaintiffs state that this failure on the part of Defendant Toledo caused the Defendant officers to engage in the unlawful conduct alleged.

II. Legal Standard for Motion to Dismiss

A defendant may move to dismiss an action against it based only on the pleadings for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed. R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). In assessing a motion to dismiss, "[w]e begin by accepting all well-pleaded facts as true, and we draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the [non-movant]." Washington Legal Foundation v. Massachusetts Bar Foundation, 993 F.2d 962, 971 (1st Cir.1993); see also Coyne v. Somerville, 972 F.2d 440, 442-43 (1st Cir.1992). A complaint should not be dismissed "unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957).

III. Standard for Summary Judgment

The standard for summary judgment is straightforward and well-established: A district court should grant a motion for summary judgment "if the pleadings, depositions, and answers to the interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Lipsett v. Univ. of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881, 894 (1st Cir.1988). A factual dispute is "material" if it "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law," Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986), and "genuine", "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id.

The burden of establishing the nonexistence of a "genuine" issue as to a material fact is on the moving party. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 331, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). This burden has two components: (1) an initial burden of production, which shifts to the nonmoving party if satisfied by the moving party; and, (2) an ultimate burden of persuasion, which always remains on the moving party. Id. In other words, "[t]he party moving for summary judgment, bears the initial burden of demonstrating that there are no genuine issues of material fact for trial." Hinchey v. NYNEX Corp., 144 F.3d 134, 140 (1st Cir.1998). This burden "may be discharged by `showing' — that is, pointing out to the district court — that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). After such a showing, the "burden shifts to the nonmoving party, with respect to each issue on which he has the burden of proof, to demonstrate that a trier of fact reasonably could find in his favor." DeNovellis v. Shalala, 124 F.3d 298, 306 (1st Cir.1997) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-25, 106 S.Ct. 2548). Although the ultimate burden of persuasion remains on the moving party, the nonmoving party will not defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment by merely underscoring the "existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties;" the requirement is that there be a genuine issue of material fact. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

In addition, "factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted." Id. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Under Rule 56(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the nonmoving party "may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the adverse party's pleadings, but ... must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Summary judgment exists to "pierce the boilerplate of the pleadings and assay the parties' proof in order to determine whether trial is actually required." Wynne v. Tufts Univ. Sch. of Medicine, 976 F.2d 791, 794 (1st Cir. 1992).

IV. Analysis

A. Rule 12(b)(6): Perez's Standing Under Section 1983

Defendants move pursuant to Fed. R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) to dismiss the section 1983 claims of Pérez and the conjugal partnership. The express language of section 1983 provides that only the party whose civil rights have been violated may bring a claim. See Valdivieso Ortiz v. Burgos, 807 F.2d 6, 7 (1st Cir.1986) (holding that plaintiffs could not maintain a section 1983 claim for loss of familial association unless the government action was aimed at the relationship between a parent and young child because section 1983 actions are personal and do not inure to any person other than the person injured); Jaco v. Bloechle, 739 F.2d 239, 242 (6th Cir.1984) (stating that claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. section 1983 are "personal action[s] cognizable only by the party whose civil rights are violated"). "Family members do not have an independent claim under section 1983 unless the constitutionally defective conduct or omission was directed at the family relationship." Torres v. United States, 24 F.Supp.2d 181, 183 (D.P.R.1998) (citing Brown v. Ives, 129 F.3d 209, 211 (1st Cir.1997); Robles Vazquez v. Garcia, 110 F.3d 204, 206 n. 4 (1st Cir.1997)); see also Broadnax v. Webb, 892 F.Supp. 188 (E.D.Mich.1995) (stating that allowing persons other than those whose rights have been violated to sue would open the floodgates of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 litigation to an unmanageable point).

Elsa Pérez-Adorno is the wife...