Rodriguez v. FCA US, LLC

• Decision Date: 07 April 2022
• Docket Number: E073766
• Citation: 77 Cal.App.5th 209,292 Cal.Rptr.3d 382
• Parties: Everardo RODRIGUEZ et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. FCA US, LLC, Defendant and Respondent.
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

77 Cal.App.5th 209

292 Cal.Rptr.3d 382

Everardo RODRIGUEZ et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants,

v.FCA US, LLC, Defendant and Respondent.

E073766

Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 2, California.

Filed April 7, 2022

Rosner, Barry & Babbitt, Hallen D. Rosner, Arlyn L. Escalante, San Diego; Knight Law Group, Steve Mikhov, Los Angeles, and Roger R. Kirnos for Plaintiffs and Appellants.

Clark Hill, David L. Brandon, Los Angeles, Georges A. Haddad, San Francisco; Horvitz & Levy, Lisa Perrochet, and Shane H. McKenzie, Burbank, for Defendant and Respondent.

OPINION

SLOUGH, J.

This appeal from a grant of summary judgment involves the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (the Act) ( Civ. Code, § 1790 et seq. )—also known as California's "Lemon Law"—which provides special consumer remedies to purchasers of new cars covered by express warranties.¹ The remedy at issue here, commonly called the "refund-or-replace" provision, requires a manufacturer to replace a defective "new motor vehicle" or make restitution if, after a reasonable number of attempts, the manufacturer (or its representative) is unable to repair the vehicle to conform to the applicable express warranty. (§ 1793.2, subd. (d)(2).) The Act defines "new motor vehicle" as a new vehicle purchased primarily for personal (nonbusiness) purposes but also specifies that the term includes "a dealer-owned vehicle and a ‘demonstrator’ or other motor vehicle sold with a manufacturer's new car warranty." (§ 1793.22, subd. (e)(2).)

Plaintiffs Everardo Rodriguez and Judith Arellano purchased a two-year-old Dodge truck from a used car dealership. The truck had over 55,000 miles on it and, though the manufacturer's basic warranty had expired, the limited powertrain warranty had not. After experiencing electrical defects with the truck, plaintiffs sued the manufacturer, FCA US, LLC (Chrysler),² for violation of the refund-or-replace provision. FCA moved for summary judgment, arguing the truck was not a "new motor vehicle," and the trial judge agreed.

The sole issue in this case is whether the phrase "other motor vehicle sold with a manufacturer's new car warranty" covers sales of previously owned vehicles with some balance remaining on the manufacturer's express warranty. We conclude it does not and that the phrase functions instead as a catchall for sales of essentially new vehicles where the applicable warranty was issued with the sale. We therefore affirm.

IFACTS

In 2013 plaintiffs purchased a 2011 Dodge Ram 2500 from the Pacific Auto Center in Fontana. The truck originally came with a basic three-year/36,000 mile bumper-to-bumper warranty and a five-year/100,000 mile limited powertrain warranty, which covers the engine, transmission, and drive system. At the time of the sale, the truck had over 55,000 miles on it and its basic warranty had expired, though an unspecified balance remained on the powertrain warranty.

A year later, the truck's check engine light came on and plaintiffs took it to an authorized Chrysler dealer in Hemet for repair. The dealer appeared to fix the issue, but over the next year or so (through May 2015), the check engine light came on repeatedly, necessitating five additional trips to the same dealer for service.

On April 30, 2018, plaintiffs sued FCA alleging four causes of action, only one of which is at issue in this appeal—violation of section 1793.2, subdivision (d)(2), the Act's "new motor vehicle" refund-or-replace provision. Plaintiffs alleged the truck suffered defects in its Totally Integrated Power Module (TIPM), an enclosed device in the engine compartment that contains a circuit board and regulates electrical power to most of the truck's systems. ( Santana v. FCA US, LLC, supra , 56 Cal.App.5th at p. 339, 270 Cal.Rptr.3d 335.) They alleged they had afforded FCA a reasonable number of attempts to fix the issues with the TIPM and, because FCA failed to do so, they were entitled to a refund of the truck's sale price or a replacement vehicle.

FCA filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing plaintiffs' claim failed because the manufacturer's refund-or-replace provision applies to new vehicles only, and it was undisputed plaintiffs purchased the truck used. FCA presented evidence that the Pacific Auto Center is an unaffiliated, third party reseller and therefore was not one of its representatives at the time of sale. It also presented evidence that no warranties were issued at the time of sale.

After a hearing on the motion, Riverside County Superior Court Judge Jackson Lucky concluded a previously owned vehicle sold with a balance remaining on one of the manufacturer's express warranties does not qualify as a "new motor vehicle" under the Act. The judge entered judgment in favor of FCA, and plaintiffs timely appealed.

IIANALYSIS

A. Standard of Review

A party moving for summary judgment bears an overall burden of persuasion to demonstrate there is no triable issue of material fact and they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. ( Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 845, 107 Cal.Rptr.2d 841, 24 P.3d 493.) "In reviewing a defense summary judgment, we apply the traditional three-step analysis used by the trial court, that is, we (1) identify the pleaded issues, (2) determine if the defense has negated an element of the plaintiff's case or established a complete defense, and if and only if so, (3) determine if the plaintiff has raised a triable issue of fact." ( Meddock v. County of Yolo (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 170, 175, 162 Cal.Rptr.3d 796.)

Where, as here, we are asked to answer a purely legal question of statutory interpretation based on undisputed facts, we independently construe the relevant statutory provisions. ( Atkinson v. Elk Corp. (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 739, 749-750, 135 Cal.Rptr.2d 433.) Because the language of the provision is the most reliable indicator of legislative intent, we start there, giving the words their plain and commonsense meaning within the context in which they appear. ( Coalition of Concerned Communities, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (2004) 34 Cal.4th 733, 737, 21 Cal.Rptr.3d 676, 101 P.3d 563.) "If the language is unambiguous, ‘then the Legislature is presumed to have meant what it said, and the plain meaning of the language governs.’ [Citation.] ‘If the statutory language permits more than one reasonable interpretation, courts may consider other aids, such as the statute's purpose, legislative history, and public policy.’ " ( Kirzhner v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC (2020) 9 Cal.5th 966, 972, 266 Cal.Rptr.3d 346, 470 P.3d 56 ( Kirzhner ).)

B. The Song-Beverly Act

Because we do not read statutory provisions in isolation, we consider the broader statutory context in which the definition of "new motor vehicles" applies before turning to the definition itself.

1. Statutory framework

"The Song-Beverly Act is a remedial statute designed to protect consumers who have purchased products covered by an express warranty." ( Robertson v. Fleetwood Travel Trailers of California, Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 785, 798, 50 Cal.Rptr.3d 731.) To that end, it regulates warranty terms and imposes service and repair obligations on the parties who issue the warranties. ( Joyce v. Ford Motor Co. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 1478, 1486, 131 Cal.Rptr.3d 548.)

The Act defines the parties who issue warranties as follows. A manufacturer is an entity "that manufactures, assembles, or produces consumer goods." (§ 1791, subd. (j).) A distributor is an entity "that stands between the manufacturer and the retail seller in purchases, consignments, or contracts for sale of consumer goods." (§ 1791, subd. (e).) A seller or retailer is an entity "that engages in the business of selling or leasing consumer goods to retail buyers." (§ 1791, subd. (l ).)

The Act requires that where a manufacturer sells "consumer goods" accompanied by an express warranty, it must maintain local repair facilities "to carry out the terms of those warranties." (§ 1793.2, subd. (a)(1)(A).) Importantly, "consumer goods" are defined as "any new product or part thereof that is used, bought, or leased for use primarily for personal, family, or household purposes, except for clothing and consumables." (§ 1791, subd. (a), italics added.) If, "after a reasonable number of attempts" the manufacturer is unable to conform the consumer goods to the applicable express warranty, the refund-or-replace provision kicks in, and "the manufacturer shall either replace the goods or reimburse the buyer in an amount equal to the purchase price paid by the buyer." (§ 1793.2, subd. (d)(1).)

The Act also provides for implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for "consumer goods"—i.e., new products. (§§ 1791.1, subd. (c), 1792.) These implied warranties may not last less than 60 days or more than one year after the sale of the consumer goods to which they apply, and liability for their breach lies with the manufacturer. (§§ 1791.1, subd. (c), 1792.)

That's not to say the Act has no protections for used goods; it does, but the protections are limited and bind the seller or distributor of the used product. (§ 1795.5.) Section 1795.5 provides express warranty protections for used goods only where the entity selling the used product issues an express warranty at the time of sale. The provision states: "Notwithstanding the provisions of subdivision (a) of Section 1791 defining consumer goods to mean "new" goods, the obligation of a distributor or retail seller of used consumer goods in a sale in which an express warranty is given shall be the same as that imposed on manufacturers under this chapter." (Italics added.) "It shall be the obligation of the distributor or retail seller making express warranties with respect to used consumer goods (and not the original manufacturer, distributor, or retail seller making express warranties with respect to such goods when new ) to maintain sufficient service and repair facilities within this state to carry out the terms of such express warranties." (§...