Rodriguez v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office of State, 11CA1868.
Decision Date | 16 August 2012 |
Docket Number | No. 11CA1868.,11CA1868. |
Citation | 343 P.3d 975 |
Parties | Helen M. RODRIGUEZ, Petitioner, v. INDUSTRIAL CLAIM APPEALS OFFICE of the State of Colorado; City of Brighton; and CIRSA, Respondents. |
Court | Colorado Court of Appeals |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Rehearing Denied Sept. 13, 2012.
The Frickey Law Firm, Janet Frickey, Lakewood, Colorado, for Petitioner.
No Appearance for Respondent Industrial Claim Appeals Office.
Ritsema & Lyon, P.C., Kelly F. Kruegel, Denver, Colorado, for Respondents City of Brighton and CIRSA.
¶ 1 Helen M. Rodriguez appeals from an order issued by the Industrial Claim Appeals Office (panel) in favor of the City of Brighton and its insurer, CIRSA (collectively Brighton). Exercising jurisdiction under sections 8–43–307 and 13–4–102(2)(a), C.R.S.2011, we set the order aside and remand for further proceedings.
¶ 2 Rodriguez works for Brighton as a special events coordinator. One morning, she fell while descending the stairs to her office. She was injured and was taken to the emergency room. There, she received a CT scan and an MRI. These tests revealed unruptured brain aneurysms.
¶ 3 Brighton initially admitted liability for Rodriguez's disability and medical benefits. But it later sought to withdraw its admission, arguing that Rodriguez's injuries did not arise out of her employment.
¶ 4 The matter was brought before an administrative law judge (ALJ). After hearing evidence and arguments, the ALJ made the following findings and conclusions:
1. Because Brighton initially admitted liability, it bore the burden of proof under section 8–43–201(1), C.R.S.2011.
2. Rodriguez's fall was not caused by her aneurysms but was “unexplained.”
3. Because Rodriguez's fall was unexplained, her injuries were not compensable. Brighton therefore sustained its burden of proving non-compensability and could withdraw its admission of liability.
¶ 5 Rodriguez appealed to the panel, which issued a written opinion affirming the ALJ's order.
¶ 6 Rodriguez contends that the ALJ erred in ruling that her injury was not compensable. Here is her argument:
Legal premise Uncertainty about the cause of an injury cannot properly bar a workers' compensation claim if every one of the potential causes satisfies the conditions of recovery.
Factual premise The ALJ found that the fall was not caused by Rodriguez's aneurysms. In light of this finding, and in light of the evidence presented, there is only a narrow range of potential causes. Every one of those potential causes satisfies the conditions of recovery.
Conclusion The ALJ erred in denying compensation.
¶ 7 We agree with Rodriguez's legal premise. But we think it unnecessary to decide whether the record supports her factual premise. Instead, assuming that Rodriguez's fall is “unexplained,” we conclude that she nevertheless is entitled to compensation.
¶ 8 An employee may recover for accidental injuries “arising out of and in the course of the employee's employment.” § 8–41–301(1)(c), C.R.S.2011. 1 An injury “arises out of” employment if it is caused by some risk distinctly associated with the claimant's work:
The term “arises out of” refers to the origin or cause of an injury. There must be a causal connection between the injury and the work conditions for the injury to arise out of the employment. An injury “arises out of” employment when it has its origin in an employee's work-related functions and is sufficiently related to those functions to be considered part of the employee's employment contract.
Horodyskyj v. Karanian, 32 P.3d 470, 475 (Colo.2001) (citations omitted).
¶ 9 Ordinarily, a claimant bears the burden of establishing the conditions of recovery. See § 8–43–201, C.R.S.2011. Therefore, when an ALJ finds that a fall is “unexplained,” the claimant may be faulted for failing to prove that her injuries arose out of her employment. See, e.g., Finn v. Indus. Comm'n, 165 Colo. 106, 108–09, 437 P.2d 542, 543–44 (1968) ( ); Irwin v. Indus. Comm'n, 695 P.2d 763, 766 (Colo.App.1984) ( ).
¶ 10 Here, however, the burden was shifted from the claimant to the employer. Because Brighton initially admitted liability, it was required to prove that Rodriguez's injury did not arise out of her employment. See § 8–43–201...
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Three Years After City of Brighton: Its Effect on the Compensability of Workers’ Compensation Claims
...P.2d 542 (Colo. 1968). [9] Rodriguez v. City of Brighton, W.C. No. 4-782-516 (ICAO August 23, 2011). [10] Rodriguez v. City of Brighton, 343 P.3d 975 (Colo.App. 2012); aff’d City of Brighton v. Rodriguez, 318 P.3d 496 (Colo. 2014). [11] Brighton, 381 P.3d at 502. These categories were devel......