Rodriguez v. State
| Docket Number | 2022-01857 |
| Decision Date | 02 August 2023 |
| Citation | 2023 NY Slip Op 04146 |
| Parties | Brian Rodriguez, appellant, v. State of New York, respondent. (Claim No. 136683) |
| Court | New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division |
Herman Law, P.A., New York, NY (Jeffrey Herman, Stuart Mermelstein Mark C. Zauderer, and Ira B. Matetsky of counsel), for appellant.
Letitia James, Attorney General, New York, NY (Judith N. Vale and Elizabeth A. Brody of counsel), for respondent.
FRANCESCA E. CONNOLLY, J.P., CHERYL E. CHAMBERS, PAUL WOOTEN BARRY E. WARHIT, JJ.
DECISION & ORDER
In a claim to recover damages for negligence, the claimant appeals from an order of the Court of Claims (Catherine Leahy-Scott, J.), dated January 11, 2022. The order granted the defendant's motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(2) to dismiss the claim for failure to comply with the pleading requirements of Court of Claims Act § 11(b).
ORDERED that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, and the defendant's motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(2) to dismiss the claim for failure to comply with the pleading requirements of Court of Claims Act § 11(b) is denied.
In July 2021, the claimant commenced this claim against the State of New York pursuant to the Child Victims Act (hereinafter the CVA) to recover damages for negligence, alleging that, when he was a teenager, he was sexually abused by a State employee while he was admitted to a State-operated psychiatric hospital for inpatient residential treatment. Subsequently, the State moved pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(2) to dismiss the claim for failure to comply with the pleading requirements of Court of Claims Act § 11(b). The State contended that the Court of Claims lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the claim because the claimant failed to adequately allege the "time when" his claim arose in compliance with Court of Claims Act § 11(b). By order dated January 11, 2022, the claims granted the State's motion, and the claimant appeals.
"'[B]ecause suits against the State are allowed only by the State's waiver of sovereign immunity and in derogation of the common law, statutory requirements conditioning suit must be strictly construed'" (Lichtenstein v State of New York, 93 N.Y.2d 911, 913, quoting Dreger v New York State Thruway Auth., 81 N.Y.2d 721, 724). Court of Claims Act § 11(b) requires a "claim to specify (1) the nature of the claim; (2) the time when it arose; (3) the place where it arose; (4) the items of damage or injuries claimed to have been sustained; and (5) the total sum claimed" (Lepkowski v State of New York, 1 N.Y.3d 201, 207 [alterations and internal quotation marks omitted]).
The "guiding principle informing" section 11(b)'s pleading requirements is that the information be sufficiently definite "'to enable the State... to investigate the claim[s] promptly and to ascertain its liability under the circumstances'" (Lepkowski v State of New York, 1 N.Y.3d at 207, quoting Heisler v State of New York, 78 A.D.2d 767, 767). "[A]bsolute exactness is not required" (Kimball Brooklands Corp. v State of New York, 180 A.D.3d 1031, 1032 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Morra v State of New York, 107 A.D.3d 1115, 1115). However, "[t]he Court of Claims Act does not require the State to ferret out or assemble information that section 11(b) obligates the claimant to allege" (Lepkowski v State of New York, 1 N.Y.3d at 208). "The determination whether a claimant's statement of the 'time when' the claim arose is sufficiently definite to enable the State to investigate and ascertain its liability under the circumstances is a sui generis determination depending upon the nature of the claim and specificity of allegations set forth in the claim" (Meyer v State of New York, 213 A.D.3d 753, 755; see Fenton v State of New York, 213 A.D.3d 737, 739).
As part of the CVA, Court of Claims Act § 10(10) was added to reflect that the time limitations set forth in section 10 would not apply to "any claim to recover damages for physical, psychological, or other injury or condition as a result of conduct which would constitute a sexual offense... committed against a child less than eighteen years of age." The legislature, however, did not amend the substantive pleading requirements under Court of Claims Act § 11(b), including the requirement that the claimant set forth the "time when" the claim arose (see Meyer v State of New York, 213 A.D.3d 753; Fenton v State of New York, 213 A.D.3d 737; Weichsel v State of New York, 211 A.D.3d 988, 989; J.F. v State of New York, 76 Misc.3d 1082, 1085 [Ct Cl]). Nevertheless, the legislative purpose of the CVA is to "remedy the injustices to survivors of child sexual abuse by extending New York's restrictive statutes of limitations that required most survivors to file civil actions or criminal charges long before they reported or came to terms with their abuse" (S.H. v Diocese of Brooklyn, 205 A.D.3d 180, 186).
Under the particular circumstances of this case, the date ranges provided in the claim, together with the other information set forth therein, were sufficient to satisfy the "time when" requirement of Court of Claims Act § 11(b). The claimant alleged, among other things, that "[i]n approximately 1987, when [he] was approximately sixteen (16) years old, [he] was admitted to" a State-operated psychiatric hospital "for inpatient residential treatment," and that "[while] admitted to the... facility" he was "sexually abused and assaulted" by a staff member on two occasions. Additionally, the claimant identified his alleged abuser in the claim and set forth the details of the two alleged assaults, including the location within the facility where they allegedly occurred. The claimant also alleged that, before the second incident of abuse occurred, he reported to his treating psychiatrist, whom the claimant identified by name, that the alleged perpetrator made the claimant "uncomfortable." "Given that the CVA allows claimants to bring civil actions decades after the alleged sexual abuse occurred, it is not clear how providing exact dates, as opposed to the time periods set forth in the instant claim, would better enable the State to conduct a prompt investigation of the subject claim" (Meyer v State of New York, 213 A.D.3d at 756; see Fenton v State of New York, 213 A.D.3d at 740). We note, however, "that our determination that the claimant met the 'time when' requirement in the context of this action brought under the CVA does not change our jurisprudence with respect to the 'time when' requirement under different contexts, such as where a 'single incidence of negligence' occurs on a discrete date or other situations where 'a series of ongoing acts or omissions occur[ ] on multiple dates over the course of a period of time'" (Meyer v State of New York, 213 A.D.3d at 757, quoting Sacher v State of New York, 211 A.D.3d 867, 872; see Fenton v State of New York, 213 A.D.3d at 741).
Accordingly, the Court of Claims should have denied the State's motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(2) to dismiss the claim.
CHAMBERS, J., concurs in the result, on constraint, and votes to reverse the order and deny the defendant's motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(2) to dismiss the claim for failure to comply with the pleading requirements of Court of Claims Act § 11(b), with the following memorandum:
I concur in the result on constraint of this Court's precedent in Meyer v State of New York (213 A.D.3d 753), and Fenton v State of New York (213 A.D.3d 737).
However, in my view, this Court's reliance upon the legislative history of the Child Victims Act (hereinafter CVA) to inform our understanding of section 11(b) of the Court of Claims Act is misplaced. I submit that "[t]he case law that has developed in non-Child Victims Act cases applies equally to Child Victims Act cases" (Doe v MacFarland, 66 Misc.3d 604, 614 [Sup Ct, Rockland County]), absent "any indication that the legislature intended to change that law by enacting the CVA" (PB-7 Doe v Amherst Cent. Sch. Dist., 196 A.D.3d 9, 12).
The text of a statute is the "clearest indicator" of legislative intent, and "courts should construe unambiguous language to give effect to its plain meaning" (Matter of DaimlerChrysler Corp. v Spitzer, 7 N.Y.3d 653, 660; see Matter of Avella v City of New York, 29 N.Y.3d 425, 434). Where a statute's language "is ambiguous[,] or where a literal construction would lead to absurd or unreasonable consequences that are contrary to the purpose of the [statute's] enactment," courts may "[r]esort to legislative history" (Matter of Auerbach v Board of Educ. of City School Dist. of City of N.Y., 86 N.Y.2d 198, 204; see Anonymous v Molik, 32 N.Y.3d 30, 37).
The CVA unambiguously makes no changes to the substantive pleading requirements under 11(b) of the...
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